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I. INTRODUCTION
The Federal Rules of Evidence permit an expert to testify in
terms of inferences and opinions without prior disclosure of the
underlying facts and data upon which the opinions or inferences are
based. I Traditionally, the factual basis for the expert's testimony was
1. Rule 705 states that: "The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give
his reasons therefor without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless the court
requires otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to disclose the underlying facts or
data on cross-examination." FED. R. EVID. 705.
In addition to permitting an expert to state an opinion before disclosing the factual basis
for the opinion, the Federal Rules of Evidence expand the range of permissible data upon
which an expert may base an opinion. See FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee's note, 56
F.R.D. 183, 283. Rule 703 states that:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or
inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the
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established through the use of hypothetical questions. 2 Such hypo-
thetical questions, however, confused juries and resulted in the pres-
entation of expert testimony that did not accurately reflect the
expert's opinion as to the actual facts in dispute.3 The Federal Rules
of Evidence have now eliminated the requirement that a party use
hypothetical questions to disclose the foundation for the expert's
opinion. Under the Federal Rules, once the witness' qualifications as
an expert have been established during direct examination, the attor-
ney conducting the direct examination need only ask the expert
whether he has an opinion based on a reasonable degree of scientific
or medical certainty and, if so, ask the expert to state that opinion.4
hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in
forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be
admissible in evidence.
FED. R. EvID. 703.
2. Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 626 F.2d 784, 791 (10th Cir. 1980). Under the common
law, hypothetical questions were allowed to include any material fact favorable to the party
asking the question. These facts, however, had to be supported by evidence already admitted
at trial. At a minimum, the propounder of the question had to include any material fact
essential to the formation of a rational opinion. Id.
3. Because hypothetical questions were required to contain all material facts necessary
for the expert's opinion, they tended to be long and extremely complex. Dean Wigmore
strongly criticized the use of hypothetical questions:
The hypothetical question, misused by the clumsy and abused by the clever, has
in practice led to intolerable obstruction of the truth. In the first place, it has
artificially clamped the mouth of the expert witness, so that his answer to a
complex question may not express his actual opinion on the actual case. This is
because the question may be so built up and contrived by counsel as to represent
only a partisan conclusion. In the second place, it has tended to mislead the jury
as to the purport of the actual expert opinion. This is due to the same reason. In
the third place, it has tended to confuse the jury, so that its employment becomes
a mere waste of time and a futile obstruction.
2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 686, at 812 (1940). Professor
McCormick praised the theoretical basis for the use of hypothetical questioning, but also iden-
tified its weaknesses in practice as follows:
The hypothetical question is an ingenious and logical device for enabling the jury
to apply the expert's scientific knowledge to the facts of the case. Nevertheless, it
is a failure in practice and an obstruction to the administration of justice. If we
require that it recite all the relevant facts, it becomes intolerably wordy. If we
allow, as most courts do, the interrogating counsel to select such of the material
facts as he sees fit, we tempt him to shape a one-sided hypothesis. Those expert
witnesses who have given their views seem to agree that this partisan slanting of
the hypothesis is the fatal weakness of the practice.
C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 16, at 33-34 (1954).
4. Rule 705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence would permit the following perfunctory
exchange between an attorney and an expert witness:
Q: Doctor, do you have an opinion based upon a reasonable degree of medical
certainty as to the extent of permanent disability suffered by the plaintiff as a
result of this automobile accident?
A: Yes.
Q: What is your opinion?
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On cross-examination, the opposing counsel may inquire into the
facts and data underlying the expert's opinion.
Elimination of the hypothetical question assumes that cross-
examination of the expert is a more efficient method of disclosing to
the trier of fact the factual bases of the expert's opinions.' Effective
cross-examination and rebuttal of an opponent's expert witness, how-
ever, requires advance knowledge of the expert's opinions and the fac-
tual bases underlying those opinions.6 Such advance knowledge is
obtained through the discovery techniques provided in Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4).7 Specifically, Rule 26(b)(4) creates the
framework through which a party may discover the facts known and
opinions held by his opponent's expert witness.
Rule 26(b)(4) essentially operates by establishing four distinct
categories of experts and subjecting each category to varying degrees
of discovery.8 The degrees of discovery permitted by the Rule reflect
an attempt to balance the discovering party's need to prepare for
cross-examination against the resulting unfairness to the party
employing the expert if the discovering party were permitted to build
his case through the information developed and acquired at the
expense of his opponent.' The situations that arise in practice, how-
ever, often involve experts who do not fall neatly into any one of the
A: She is totally permanently disabled.
Q: Thank you Doctor, that is all.
Hearings on Proposed Rules of Evidence Before the Special Subcommittee on Criminal Justice
of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 355-56 (Supp. 1973).
Although the rule requires no prior disclosure of the basis of the expert's opinion, the
proponent usually will lay a detailed foundation for the opinion of the expert in order to give it
greater credibility and weight in the eyes of the jury. It is clear, nevertheless, that the most
telling examination of the expert's opinion on a disputed matter will be the cross-examination
conducted by the opponent.
5. 3 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 399, at 703 (1979).
6. The advisory committee stated in its note to Rule 705 that:
[Leaving it to the cross-examiner to bring out the supporting data] assumes that
the cross-examiner has the advance knowledge which is essential for effective
cross-examination. This advance knowledge has been afforded, though
imperfectly, by the traditional foundation requirement. Rule 26(b)(4) of the
Rules of Civil Procedure, as revised, provides for substantial discovery in this
area, obviating in large measure the obstacles which have been raised in some
instances to discovery of findings, underlying data, and even the identity of the
experts.
FED. R. EVID. 705 advisory committee's note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 286. For a discussion of the
problems inherent in the cross-examination of expert witnesses, see Comment, Cross-Examina-
tion of Expert Witnesses: Dispelling the Aura of Reliability, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1073 (1988).
7. Id.
8. See infra notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
9. For a discussion of the problems inherent in the discovery of experts prior to the
adoption of Rule 26(b)(4) see infra notes 34-74 and accompanying text.
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Rule's expressed categories but straddle two or more categories.
Courts, therefore, have struggled in seeking to apply the Rule's rigid
classification scheme to the myriad situations that arise in actual prac-
tice. Because Rule 26(b)(4) is designed to accommodate the needs of
both the party seeking discovery and the party employing the expert,
an understanding of the Rule's operation is critical to a practitioner's
ability to cope with the unique problems that arise in discovering
expert information.
An understanding of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure con-
cerning the discovery of expert information is becoming increasingly
important in a growing number of states. Subsequent to the adoption
of Federal Rule of Evidence 705,10 twenty-seven states adopted an
identical or similar rule in their respective codes of evidence. I' Of
these twenty-seven states, twenty-three have adopted a rule of civil
procedure identical or similar to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b)(4). 12
10. FED. R. EvID. 705, 56 F.R.D. 183, 285.
11. Sixteen states have adopted a rule identical to Federal Rule of Evidence 705. See
ARIz. R. EvID. 705; ARK. R. EViD. 705; COLO. R. EVID. 705; IOWA R. EvID. 705; MICH. R.
EvID. 705; MINN. R. EVID. 705; Miss. R. EviD. 705; MONT. R. EvID. 705; N.H. R. EVID.
705; N.D. R. EvID. 705; OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2705 (1978); ORE. R. EViD. 705; UTAH R.
EVID. 705; VT. R. EvID. 705; W. VA. R. EVID. 705; Wyo. R. EvID. 705.
The following states have adopted a rule identical to Federal Rule of Evidence 705, except
for the substitution of the word "judge" for the word "court:" NEV. REV. STAT. tit. 4,
§ 50.305 (1977); N.M. R. EvID. 705; WASH. R. EVID. 705; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 907.05 (West
Cum. 1979).
The following states have adopted rules of evidence that are similar to Rule 705 with the
noted modifications: ALASKA R. EvID. 705 (The rule requires a balancing test for disclosure
of facts that would be otherwise inadmissible.); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.705 (West Supp. 1976)
(A party against whom expert evidence is offered may conduct preliminary voir dire to
establish sufficiency of the basis for expert's opinion.); HAW. R. EVID. 705 (The rule subjects
the admissibility of expert testimony to adequate pretrial disclosure.); IDAHO R. EVID. 705
(The rule subjects the admissibility of expert testimony to adequate pretrial disclosure.); ME.
R. EviD. 705 (The party against whom expert evidence is offered may conduct preliminary
voir dire to establish sufficiency of the basis for expert's opinion.); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-705
(Cum. Supp. 1978) (The rule subjects the admissibility of expert testimony to adequate pretrial
disclosure.); TEX. R. EvID. 705 (The rule specifically allows the expert to disclose the
underlying facts and data for his opinion on direct examination.).
12. Of the states that have adopted a rule of evidence similar to Federal Rule of Evidence
705, the following have adopted a rule on discovery of expert information identical to Rule
26(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: ALASKA R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4); ARIz. R. Civ.
P. 26(b)(4); COLO. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4); FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b)(3)(A)-(C); HAW. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(4); IDAHO R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4); ME. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4); MINN. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4);
MONT. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4); NEV. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4); N.M. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); N.D. R. CIv.
P. 26(b)(4); VT. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4); W. VA. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4); Wyo. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4).
Of the states that have adopted a rule of evidence similar to Federal Rule of Evidence 705,
the following have adopted a rule on discovery of expert information bearing a similarity to
Rule 26(b)(4) but which are notable in their differences: ARK. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)
(requirement of motion to court under 26(b)(4)(A)(ii) for discovery of expert witnesses using
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This Comment examines the federal court decisions which have
interpreted the scope and application of Rule 26(b)(4). In delineating
the current interpretation and application of the Rule, it identifies and
explores recurring problems that arise in the pretrial discovery of
expert information. Section II of this Comment describes the history
of expert discovery prior to the 1970 amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. 13 This historical perspective is the key to
understanding the policy concerns that underlie the application of
Rule 26(b)(4).
Section III examines the relationship of Rule 26(b)(4) to the gen-
eral discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
14
This Section discusses Rule 26(b)(1), which provides for a very broad
scope for discovery, including within its reach any relevant matter not
otherwise privileged. In addition, this Section explains how Rule
26(b)(4) limits the normally broad scope of discovery permitted under
the federal rules when the information sought is acquired or devel-
oped by experts in anticipation of litigation. Further, this Section
examines how Rule 26(b)(4) provides varying degrees of protection
for expert information-the degree of protection corresponding to the
expert's role in the litigation.
Section IV explores the two-step process of Rule 26(b)(4)(A),
which controls discovery of experts expected to testify at trial. 5 This
Section highlights the potential shortcomings of interrogatories as a
tool for preparing for the cross-examination of expert witnesses. In
addition, this Section examines the early resistance of courts to
methods other than interrogatories omitted, no provision for court to allocate fees and cost for
discovery of experts under 26(b)(4)(A)(ii)); Miss. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) (deleting reference to
discovery of examining physician); N.H. R. Civ. P. 35(b)(3) (no provision for the discovery of
an examining physician's report in 26(b)(4)(B)); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 3203(B)(3) (1982)
(eliminating two-step procedure for discovery of testifying expert's information); TEX. R. Civ.
P. 26(b)(4) (no provision for court to allocate fees and cost for discovery of experts under
26(b)(4)(A)(ii), also allows discovery of an expert's documents and tangible things); UTAH R.
Civ. P. 26(b)(4) (no provision for the allocation of fees for discovery under provision
26(b)(4)(A)(ii)); WASH. C.R. 26(b)(4) (must show exceptional circumstances to discover
information from any non-testifying expert); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 804.01(2)(d)(1)-
804.01(2)(d)(3) (West 1987) (requires disclosure of only the testifying expert's identity in
response to interrogatories).
The following states, while they have not adopted a rule of evidence similar to Federal
Rule 705, have adopted a rule of civil procedure similar or identical to Rule 26(b)(4) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: ALA. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) (The Rule adds the phrase "or
assigned" to the provision corresponding to subsection (B) in federal rule.); DEL. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(4); VA. R. Civ. P. 4: 1(b)(4)(A)-(C); Ky. R. Civ. P. 26.02(4); TENN. R. Civ. P. 26.02(4);
IND. T.R. 26(b)(4); MASS. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4).
13. See infra notes 20-74 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 75-102 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 103-244 and accompanying text.
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allowing additional discovery under subsection (A)(ii), absent a show-
ing of need by the party seeking discovery. This section concludes by
discussing the recent trend of cases which hold that no special need is
required before deposing testifying experts or discovering their
reports.
In Section V, this Comment examines the limited immunity from
discovery which Rule 26(b)(4)(B) provides to nontestifying experts.'
6
Information acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation by
non-testifying experts is subject to discovery only upon a showing of
exceptional circumstances. This Section identifies two categories of
cases in which courts have found the existence of exceptional circum-
stances and have consequently allowed the discovery at issue. In
addition, this Section examines the question whether the exceptional
circumstances standard applies to discovery of the identity of nontes-
tifying experts.
Section VI examines the availability of discovery for nontestify-
ing experts' reports and attorneys' work-product. 7 These materials
are normally protected from discovery but may lose some or all of
that protection if shown to a testifying expert to prepare him for trial.
Section VII explores the discovery of information from informal
consultants and in-house experts.'" The issues examined regarding
informal consultants include the manner in which the courts deter-
mine the status of such experts and whether ex-parte contacts with
informal consultants violate Rule 26(b)(4)(B). This Section then
examines the question whether in-house experts should be protected
under Rule 26(b)(4).
Finally, Section VIII addresses the discovery of expert informa-
tion not acquired in anticipation of litigation.' 9 Such information is
outside the protection of Rule 26(b)(4). The ordinary witness doctrine
is applied to experts who gain information as actors or viewers to
occurrences at issue in the lawsuit. This same doctrine has been
applied to allow discovery of knowledge acquired by nontestifying
experts prior to their retention as experts by one of the parties. This
Section also examines the discovery of experts not retained by either
party. Such "pure" experts are subject to discovery as ordinary wit-
nesses; however, courts have the ability to modify or quash burden-
some discovery subpoenas upon a showing of good cause by the
"pure" expert.
16. See infra notes 245-316 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 317-91 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 392-496 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 497-596 and accompanying text.
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II. THE HISTORY OF EXPERT DISCOVERY PRIOR TO THE
ADOPTION OF RULE 26(b)(4)
In light of the reliance of the advisory committee for the Federal
Rules of Evidence on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4),2 ° the
analysis of Rule 26(b)(4) should focus on its ability to serve as a tool
that sufficiently enables a party to prepare for cross-examination of its
adversary's expert witness at trial. A prerequisite to evaluating the
efficacy of the Rule, however, is an understanding of the problems
that arose in placing limits on the discovery of expert information
prior to the adoption of Rule 26(b)(4). In particular, it is enlightening
to analyze the three different sources relied upon by the advisory com-
mittee to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in drafting the Rule.2'
Two of the sources are articles written by Professor Jack Friedenthal
and Mr. Jeremiah Long.2 2 The third source is the 1965 case of
Knighton v. Villian & Fassio.23
The scope of discovery 24 of expert information can be limited in
two ways: First, the court can place limits on the devices used for
discovery. For instance, a court could limit discovery to the use of
interrogatories. Second, limitations could be placed on the area of
permissible inquiry. In limiting the area of permissible inquiry, a
court might permit discovery of the facts known by the expert but
protect from discovery the expert's conclusions which were based on
those facts. In terms of limitation on the area of permissible inquiry,
full discovery can be said to occur when a court permits discovery of
an expert witness that is limited only by the general requirement of
relevancy which is placed on the discovery of information from ordi-
nary witnesses.25
20. FED. R. EvID. 705 advisory committee's note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 286. See also supra
note 6.
21. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee's note, 48 F.R.D. 487, 504.
22. Friedenthal, Discovery and Use of an Adverse Party's Expert Information, 14 STAN. L.
REV. 455 (1962); Long, Discovery and Experts Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 38
F.R.D. 111 (1965), updated and reprinted from 39 WASH. L. REV. 665 (1965).
23. 39 F.R.D. 11 (D. Md. 1965).
24. Graham, Discovery of Experts Under Rule 26(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, Part One: An Analytical Study, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 895, 911 n.70. Professor
Graham identifies two possible meanings for the word "scope." He interprets the word
"scope" as used in the advisory committee's note to mean the particular device employed to
discover the expert's information. In his articles, however, Professor Graham uses "scope" to
refer to the "permissible area of inquiry upon discovery ... without reference to the particular
discovery device employed." Id.
25. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). For an example of the use of the term "full discovery" in
this sense, see Graham, supra note 24, at 905 n.48.
19881 1107
1108 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:1101
Prior to the adoption of Rule 26(b)(4) in 1970,26 courts differed
significantly over the scope of discovery that would be allowed of an
adversary's expert witness.27 Such an inconsistency among the courts
resulted in cases with similar factual patterns being decided with dia-
metrically opposite results.28 As one commentator has since noted,
the "discovery of expert witnesses concededly was in a chaotic
state." 29
An unadopted 1946 amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure reflected the early judicial attitude toward discovery of
expert information. The proposal would have denied pretrial discov-
ery of expert reports, except for the reports of physicians under Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 35.30 It appears that the omission in the
26. Order of the Supreme Court of the United States Adopting the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure as Amended, 48 F.R.D. 459, 461-62 (1970).
27. Graham, supra note 24, at 899; see also Long, supra note 22, at 119 ("[N]o sound body
of coherently related propositional law is deducible from the cases, nor have general standards
employed by various courts yet furnished an adequate method of attack in this 'hazy frontier
of the discovery process.' "). For a short review of the history of expert discovery, see Smith v.
Ford Motor Co., 626 F.2d 784, 791-94 (10th Cir. 1980). For examples of the divergent degrees
of discovery granted in different cases, compare, Sachs v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 167 F.2d 570
(6th Cir. 1948); United States v. 38 Cases, More or Less, 35 F.R.D. 357 (W.D. Pa. 1964);
Henlopen Hotel Corp. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 33 F.R.D. 306 (D. Del. 1963); Cold Metal Process
Co. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 7 F.R.D. 425 (N.D. Ohio 1947), all allowing discovery of the
expert's conclusions, with United States v. 6.82 Acres of Land, More or Less, 18 F.R.D. 195
(D. N.M. 1955); Hickey v. United States, 18 F.R.D. 88 (E.D. Pa. 1952). Both of these latter
two cases deny even discovery of the experts' names.
28. 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2029, at 240-41
(1970). As an example of the divergent treatment of similarly situated experts, Professors
Wright and Miller contrast the experiences of two experts in a single patent infringment
action. Id. The action spawned two separate cases: Cold Metal Process Co. v. Aluminum Co.
of Am., 7 F.R.D. 425 (N.D. Ohio 1947) (Cold Metal Process I), and Cold Metal Process Co. v.
Aluminum Co. of Am., 7 F.R.D. 684 (D. Mass. 1947) (Cold Metal Process II). The plaintiff in
both these cases, Cold Metal Process Co., had consulted two experts: One from the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), and the other from Case Institute of
Technology (Case). Cold Metal Process II, 7 F.R.D. at 685. The plaintiff's attorney advised
each expert to refuse to answer questions concerning the work they had done for the plaintiff.
Id. at 686. The defendant filed separate motions for deposition of the experts in the federal
district courts in Massachusetts and Ohio. The United States District Court for Massachusetts
denied the defendant's motion to depose the expert from MIT, holding that the attorney-client
privilege extended to the discovery of expert information and also that discovery of such
information was against public policy. Cold Metal Process II, 7 F.R.D. at 686. In contrast, the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio granted the defendant's motion
to compel answers to questions propounded to the expert from Case during deposition, ruling
that such information was not privileged under the attorney-client privilege. Cold Metal
Process I, 7 F.R.D. at 426. When the expert from Case persisted in his refusal to answer the
propounded questions, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the
judgment of contempt against him by the district court. Sachs v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 167
F.2d 570 (6th Cir. 1948).
29. Graham, supra note 24, at 899.
30. See Report of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the District
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rejected amendment of any reference to discovery directly from the
expert resulted from the assumption that such discovery was already
prohibited.3' A similarly restrictive view toward the discovery of
expert information underlaid many court decisions.32 Even where
courts allowed discovery of expert information, they frequently lim-
ited the discovery to the facts known by the expert and did not permit
the discovery to reach the expert's conclusions.3 3 The courts dis-
agreed as to the limits placed on discovery, as well as to the justifica-
tions for limiting discovery.
The three justifications34 advanced by the early cases for denying
discovery were the attorney-client privilege, 35 the work-product the-
Courts of the United States, 5 F.R.D. 433, 457 (1946) ("The court shall not order the
production or inspection of any part of the writing that reflects an attorney's mental impressions,
conclusions, opinions, or legal theories, or, except as provided in Rule 35, the conclusions of an
expert." (emphasis in original)). Rule 35 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as it was in effect
in 1946 and like its modern day counterpart, provided for the discovery of the reports of
examining physicians in cases where the mental or physical condition of a party was in
controversy. Fed. R. Civ. P. 35, 308 U.S. 46 (1939).
31. See Graham, supra note 24, at 899-900. Professor Graham stated that:
The Advisory Committee Note was silent as to other means of discovering expert
witness information, saying only that "[p]arties who have retained expert
witnesses at their own expense are also protected, except as provided in Rule 35."
This is an apparent reference to protection from all discovery on work-product
grounds.
Id. at n.21.
32. Id. at 900.
33. See, e.g., Walsh v. Reynolds Metals Co., 15 F.R.D. 376, 378 (D.N.J. 1954) (excluding
the conclusions contained in the report of a heating expert who inspected a heating device
shortly after it had exploded). Some courts, permitting discovery of the expert's conclusions
usually noted that the conclusions were central to the determination of the litigation. See, e.g.,
E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 24 F.R.D. 416 (D. Del. 1959)
("Looked at from a practical rather than a legalistic point of view, the facts of a case like this
are the opinions of the experts and the groundwork for those opinions comes within the ambit
of a proper search for facts beyond the knowledge of the moving party.").
34. Friedenthal, supra note 22, at 455 (1962); see also C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra
note 28, § 2029, at 241-44 (discussing the changing attitude of courts toward the discovery of
experts and their opinions); Long, supra note 22, at 123 (discussing the work-product doctrine
and considerations of unfairness as grounds for denying discovery).
In contrast, some courts that permitted discovery of the facts and opinions held by an
expert, usually did so by relying on the Supreme Court's statement in Hickman v. Taylor that
discovery simply advanced the disclosure of such information from the time of trial to the
period preceding it. 395 U.S. 495, 507 (1947). See 4 J. MOORE, J. LUCAS & G. GROTHEER,
JR., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 26.66[1], at 26-405-06 (2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter J.
MOORE].
35. See, e.g., American Oil Co. v. Pennsylvania Petroleum Prods. Co., 23 F.R.D. 680, 685-
86 (D.R.I. 1959); Schuyler v. United Air Lines, Inc., 10 F.R.D. 111, 113 (M.D. Pa. 1950);
Cold Metal Process Co. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 7 F.R.D. 684, 686 (D. Mass. 1947).
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ory,36 and "the rule of unfairness."37 In their articles, Professor Jack
N. Friedenthal and Mr. Jeremiah Long analyzed and rejected the
attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine as justifica-
tions for denying discovery. Professor Friedenthal distinguished facts
and opinions known and held by an expert from the expert's reports
on the basis that the former constitutes evidence, whereas the latter
only constitutes communication. 38  He concluded that it would be
undesirable to extend the attorney-client privilege to prevent discov-
ery of the expert's analysis and conclusions for two reasons.39 First,
the attorney-client privilege traditionally protected only communica-
tions." Although the expert's report might arguably fall within the
protection of the rule, Professor Friedenthal concluded that it should
not be extended to preclude discovery of the expert's observations and
conclusions.4" Second, there is a legitimate need to prepare for effec-
tive cross-examination and rebuttal at trial. 2 Professor Friedenthal
similarly argued against the application of the work-product doc-
trine.43 Unlike the observations and opinions of the attorney, which
36. See, e.g., United States v. 284,392 Square Feet of Floor Space, 203 F. Supp. 75, 76, 79
(E.D.N.Y. 1962); Korman v. Shull, 184 F. Supp. 928, 934-35 (W.D. Mich. 1960); Carpenter-
Trant Drilling Co. v. Magnolia Petroleum Corp., 23 F.R.D. 257, 262 (D. Neb. 1959); Colden
v. R. J. Schofield Motors, 14 F.R.D. 521, 522 (N.D. Ohio 1952).
37. See, e.g., United States v. 2,001.10 Acres of Land, More or Less, 48 F.R.D. 305, 308
(N.D. Ga. 1969); Maginnis v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 207 F. Supp. 739, 742 (E.D. La.
1962); Walsh v. Reynolds Metals Co., 15 F.R.D. 376, 378-79 (D.N.J. 1954); Roberson v.
Graham Corp., 14 F.R.D. 83, 84 (D. Mass. 1952); Boynton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 36
F. Supp. 593, 595 (D. Mass. 1941); Lewis v. United Air Lines Transp. Corp., 32 F. Supp. 21,
23 (W.D. Pa. 1940).




42. Id. Professor Friedenthal wrote his article prior to the adoption of Rule 705 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. The adoption of Rule 705 increases the need to prepare an effective
cross-examination since the attorney on direct examination no longer needs to establish the
foundation for the expert's opinion.
43. Id. at 472. Professor Friedenthal argued that the opinions and conclusions of experts
are not the type of information that Hickman v. Taylor sought to protect. Justice Murphy
writing for the majority in Hickman stated that:
Proper preparation of a client's case demands that [the attorney] assemble
information, sift what he considers to be the relevant from the irrelevant facts,
prepare his legal theories and plan his strategy without undue and needless
interference. That is the historical and the necessary way in which lawyers act
within the framework of our system of jurisprudence to promote justice and to
protect their clients' interests. The work is reflected, of course, in interviews,
statements, memoranda, correspondence, briefs, mental impressions, personal
beliefs, and countless other tangible and intangible ways-aptly though roughly
termed by the Circuit Court of Appeals ... as the "Work product of the lawyer."
Were such material open to opposing counsel on mere demand, much of what is
now put down in writing would remain unwritten. An attorney's thoughts,
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the work-product doctrine is intended to protect, theobservations and
opinions of the expert constitute evidence."
Both Professor Friedenthal and Mr. Long recognized, however,
that genuine concerns were raised that discovery of expert informa-
tion might be unfair to both the expert and the party who hired the
expert. 45 Two separate and distinct theories underlie the "rule of
unfairness. "46 Under the first theory, it is proposed that both the
expert and the party hiring the expert have a property right in the
expert's information. 47  Thus, permitting discovery of the expert
information would violate this property right. Courts frequently
addressed the extent to which an expert possessed a property right in
his own expertise in cases in which an expert was subpoenaed to tes-
tify as an ordinary witness. 48 The majority of the courts that decided
the "property right" issue held that an expert could be compelled to
testify about knowledge he had acquired prior to the litigation in the
same manner as any other citizen possessing relevant knowledge.49
The litigant, however, could not require the expert to do additional
research to prepare for examination at trial.50
On the other hand, a minority of the courts took the view that
the expert's special training and knowledge comprised his stock in
trade.5' Under such a view, compelling an expert to testify--even
about knowledge the expert already possessed-amounted to the tak-
ing of property without just compensation. 52 Although the protection
heretofore inviolate, would not be his own. Inefficiency, unfairness and sharp
practices would inevitably develop in the giving of legal advice and in the
preparation of cases for trial. The effects on the legal profession would be
demoralizing. And the interests of justice would be poorly served.
Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511. Professor Friedenthal argued that discovery of expert information
would not have the same demoralizing effect on the expert or the attorney "since the only
danger is that the expert might trip himself should he change his testimony at the trial."
Friedenthal, supra note 22, at 472. Professor Friedenthal concluded that with respect to the
application of the work-product doctrine, therefore, the expert witness should be treated no
differently than any other witness with relevant information. Id.
44. Friedenthal, supra note 22, at 473.
45. Id. at 479-88; Long, supra note 22, at 138-39.
46. Friedenthal, supra note 22, at 479; Graham, supra note 24, at 902-06.
47. Friedenthal, supra note 22, at 479.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 480.
50. Id. at 481.
51. Id. at 480. Professor Friedenthal noted that this argument is even more compelling
when it is realized that if a party is free to call any expert, the most desirable expert in a
particular field might be unduly burdened by being called in every situation. Id.
52. Id. at 481. See, e.g., Walsh v. Reynolds Metals Co., 15 F.R.D. 376 (D.N.J. 1954).
Courts extended the property right theory to prevent discovery of information not only from
the expert, but also from the party employing the expert. Id. at 481-82. Other courts
prevented discovery from the party in the mistaken belief that a confidential relationship exists
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afforded by property right theory does not extend to the expert's
knowledge of the underlying facts of the litigation,53 in most situa-
tions it is next to impossible for an expert to separate his opinions and
conclusions from his observations.
5 4
The second theory used for denying discovery under the rule of
unfairness was that unlimited discovery would encourage a party to
wait until his opponent had hired experts and then make his own case
through the discovery process using the more diligent litigant's
expert." Permitting a party to prepare his case in such a manner is
not only unfair; it also promotes laziness.5 6 A party may seek to dis-
cover the information of the adversary expert for a number of pur-
poses: to obtain favorable testimony which might be used at trial, to
acquire ideas which can lead to new theories of the case, or to lay the
foundation for cross-examination in case the witness is called at trial
by the party employing him." Although the final purpose-prepara-
tion for cross-examination-is a legitimate and necessary activity, it is
impossible to monitor a party's use of information which was
obtained to prepare for cross-examination.58 Therefore, it is difficult
to prevent a party from using this information to build his own case
or to develop new ideas.59 Professor Friedenthal concluded, however,
between the party and the expert and that much of the information the expert receives
concerning a case is attributable to his being a member of a team that assists in the litigation.
Id. at 482. Professor Friedenthal noted that this latter position ignores the court's power to
compel any person having information relevant to the litigation, including the client, to divulge
the information either during discovery or at trial. Id. Professor Graham observed that,
although Professor Friedenthal rejected the "teammate" theory, it is very similar to Professor
Friedenthal's argument for protecting expert reports-specifically, that discovery of expert
reports would discourage parties from hiring experts. Graham, supra note 24, at 903 n.39; see
Friedenthal, supra note 22, at 460.
53. Friedenthal, supra note 22, at 481.
54. Id.
55. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee's note, 48 F.R.D. 487, 504 ("Past judicial
restrictions on discovery of an adversary's expert, particularly as to his opinions, reflect the
fear that one side will benefit unduly from the other's better preparation."); Friedenthal,.supra
note 22, at 481; Graham, supra note 24, at 903.
56. Friedenthal, supra note 22, at 483.
57. Id. at 485. Professor Friedenthal noted that the fear that one party will call another
party's expert witness is the most appealing argument in favor of the "rule of unfairness." Id.
Realistically, however, several factors make it an unlikely practice. First, the adverse party
often calls its own expert who is then subject to complete cross-examination. Id. During
cross-examination, most of the information which the cross-examining party might wish to
elicit may be drawn out while testing the basis of the expert's opinion. Id. at 484. Second, if
the expert is not called by the employing party, the non-employing party may nevertheless be
reluctant to call him for fear that the expert has become "client oriented" and may go to great
lengths to testify favorably for the employing party. Id.
58. Id. at 487.
59. Id. Professor Friedenthal analyzed the problem of allowing unlimited discovery as
follows:
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that discovery of an expert's opinion is necessary because "[t]he ulti-
mate requirement that judicial decisions be based on the true facts
overcomes any detriment which might be suffered by the adversary
system."'  Nevertheless, Friedenthal noted, courts should use their
powers to avoid the related inequities by controlling the timing and
mutuality of discovery."
In order to discourage laziness, Professor Friedenthal proposed
that discovery be limited to experts who are to be called as witnesses
at trial unless good cause to the contrary is shown.62 To prevent the
discovering party from using his opponent's experts to build his own
case, discovery should also be contingent on mutuality of discovery.63
Under a policy of mutuality, a party's right to discovery would be
conditioned on the party allowing his adversary equal access to his
own experts.6M Mr. Long proposed a similar plan, emphasizing that
courts take an active role in tailoring the course of discovery to ensure
that the parties are "in a reciprocal position so that the advantages of
discovery may be mutually available."65
Though the advisory committee's note to Rule 26(b)(4) states
that the Rule adopts the proposals of Professor Friedenthal and Mr.
Long, the language of the Rule is patterned after Judge Rozel Thom-
The obvious objection to permitting unlimited discovery for cross-examination is
that it is impossible to divorce information for purposes of impeachment from
information to be used in direct support of the discoverer's own case. A court
may control the actual introduction of evidence at trial, but it cannot prevent the
use of information, ostensibly obtained for cross-examination only, to provide
new approaches or to collect data which can be utilized by the discoverer's
experts but which information was obtained only after considerable calculation
and expense to the adverse party. A decision must be made, then, whether the
needs of cross-examination outweigh the unfairness which could result. As
already pointed out, the benefits to cross-examination in cases involving expert
witnesses are substantial, whereas the unfairness, if it does exist in a particular
case in terms of time, effort, and money, is often no worse in the case where an
attorney seeks information from an adverse party's expert than it is where he





62. Id. Professor Friedenthal noted that discovery would therefore occur shortly before
trial when a party knows which experts it will present as witnesses.
63. Id. at 488.
64. Specifically, Professor Friedenthal proposed that the court require parties to designate
their experts a short time before trial, with any expert not listed being prohibited from
testifying at trial. Id.
65. Long, supra note 22, at 154. In addition, Mr. Long proposed that the parties exchange
reports prior to engaging in discovery that is unlimited in its scope. Id.
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sen's66 decision in Knighton v. Villian & Fassio.67 In Knighton, the
court established the following procedure for discovering the informa-
tion of the adversary's expert:
A party, by means of interrogatories served under Rule 33,
F.R.Civ. P., a reasonable time prior to trial, may require any other
party (i) to identify each person whom the other party expects to
call as an expert witness at trial, and (ii) to state the subject matter
on which the expert will testify. The party who served the inter-
rogatories may proceed by any appropriate method to discover
from the expert or the other party facts known or opinions held by
the expert which are relevant to the stated subject matter and not
privileged.6"
In accordance with Knighton, appropriate methods of discovery
include production of documents, depositions upon written interroga-
tories, or "any agreed procedure."69
There are striking differences between Judge Thomsen's
approach and the Friedenthal and Long proposals.7 ° Professor
Friedenthal and Mr. Long both supported unlimited discovery to
leave unrestricted the opportunity to prepare for cross-examination.71
In contrast, the Knighton court limited discovery to the expert's opin-
ion and the reasons for that opinion.72 In addition, the court required
only that the interrogatories be propounded a reasonable time before
66. Judge Thomsen served on the advisory committee that drafted the 1970 amendments,
including Rule 26(b)(4). Graham, supra note 24, at 906 n.53.
67. 39 F.R.D. 11 (D. Md. 1965); see FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee's note,
48 F.R.D. 487, 504.
68. Knighton, 39 F.R.D. at 13. The Knighton court continued:
The phrase "expects to call" has been chosen rather than the term "may call",
because the latter phrase is too broad; but the phrase "expects to call" will be
interpreted broadly, to achieve the purpose of the ruling, which is to make
available to each party a reasonable time before trial the facts, the opinions and
the reasons for the opinions of the experts whom his opponent will call at the
trial, so that a party may adequately prepare for cross-examination of his
opponents' experts. While it is contemplated that a party will be entitled to
obtain full disclosure of an expert's opinion and the facts and reasons upon which
it is based, it is not contemplated that a party will be allowed, by deposition or
otherwise, to conduct a preliminary cross-examination of his opponents' experts
for the purpose of developing material to be used for impeachment nor to obtain
the opinion of his opponents' expert on other facts than those which shaped his
opinion. Id. at 13-14.
69. Id. at 13 n.2.
70. Graham, supra note 24, at 907-08. There are also a number of similarities. Like
Professor Friedenthal and Mr. Long, the Knighton court rejected both the attorney-client
privilege and the work-product doctrine as grounds for denying discovery of expert
information. Id. at 907. The two-step procedure established by the Rule is also in agreement
with similar suggestions by the two writers. Id.
71. Id. at 907.
72. Id.
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trial, in contrast to Professor Friedenthal's proposal that discovery
occur shortly before trial in order to encourage parties to develop
their own cases instead of relying on their opponent's experts.
73
Finally, the Knighton court did not require any mutuality of discov-
ery, apparently deciding that there was no inherent unfairness in
allowing a party to discover information from his opponent's expert.74
III. AN OVERVIEW OF RULE 26(b)(4)
Discovery of expert information under Rule 26(b)(4) acts as a
limiting exception to the broad discovery provisions of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. A general discussion of discovery is thus
necessary for an appreciation of Rule 26(b)(4)'s operation.
A. The Relation of Rule 26(b)(4) to Discovery in General
Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure establishes the
permissible scope of discovery. 7  Rule 26(b)(1) permits a party to dis-
cover any information that is not privileged and which is relevant to
the subject matter of the litigation.7 6 Relevancy is broadly interpreted
in the context of discovery.77 Thus, a party is permitted to discover
information that would be inadmissible at trial as long as it is reason-
ably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible information.78
Professors Wright and Miller identify three purposes which are
served by a rule permitting liberal discovery:79 First, liberal discovery
aids in narrowing and clarifying the disputed issues prior to trial.8 °
Second, it facilitates the acquisition of evidence by the parties for use
73. Id.
74. Id. at 908.
75. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 28, at § 2001.
76. Rule 26(b)(1) states in part as follows:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is
relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to
the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of
any other party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition
and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity
and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not
ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at trial if
the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence.
FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(1).
77. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 28, at § 2001 (scope of discovery is broad with
restrictions directed toward the use of, rather than the acquisition of, the information
discovered).
78. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1); see supra note 76.
79. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 28, at § 2001.
80. Id.
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at trial.81 And third, it assists in securing information about the exist-
ence of evidence that may be used at trial, and how and from whom
such evidence may be obtained. 2 In fulfilling these goals, discovery
helps to avoid surprise at trial, while providing information that may
be used as the basis for a pretrial settlement.
8 3
Rule 26(b)(4), however, does place limits on the otherwise broad
scope of discovery:
84
Trial Preparation: Experts. Discovery of facts known and opin-
ions held by experts, otherwise discoverable under the provisions
of subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and acquired or developed in
anticipation of litigation or for trial, may be obtained only as
follows:
(A)(i) A party may through interrogatories require any
other party to identify each person whom the other party expects
to call as an expert witness at trial, to state the subject matter on
which the expert is expected to testify, and to state the substance of
the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify and
a summary of the grounds for each opinion. (ii) Upon motion, the
court may order further discovery by other means, subject to such
restrictions as to scope and such provisions, pursuant to subdivi-
sion (b)(4)(C) of this rule, concerning fees and expenses as the
court may deem appropriate.
(B) A party may discover facts known or opinions held by
an expert who has been retained or specially employed by another
party in anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial and who
is not expected to be called as a witness at trial, only as provided in
Rule 35(b) or upon a showing of exceptional circumstances under
which it is impracticable for the party seeking discovery to obtain
facts or opinions on the same subject by other means.
(C) Unless manifest injustice would result, (i) the court shall
require that the party seeking discovery pay the expert a reason-
able fee for time spent in responding to discovery under subdivi-
sions (b)(4)(A)(ii) and (b)(4)(B) of this rule; and (ii) with respect to
discovery obtained under subdivision (b)(4)(A)(ii) of this rule the
court may require, and with respect to discovery obtained under
subdivision (b)(4)(B) of this rule the court shall require, the party
seeking discovery to pay the other party a fair portion of the fees
and expenses reasonably incurred by the latter party in obtaining




84. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4); J. MOORE, supra note 34, at 26.66[2].
85. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4). Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, referred to
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Rule 26(b)(4) establishes four distinct categories of experts sub-
ject to varying degrees of discovery:8 6 First, experts a party expects to
call at trial;17 second, experts retained or specially employed in antici-
pation of litigation or preparation for trial, but not expected to be
called to testify at trial;8 third, experts informally consulted in prepa-
ration for trial but not retained as such; 9 and fourth, experts whose
information was not acquired in preparation for trial.90 The first two
classes are created by the explicit language of subsections (A) and (B)
of the Rule. The latter two classes are implicit in the Rule and are
discussed in the advisory committee's note.91
B. Rule 26(b)(4) and the Multiple Roles of the Expert in Litigation
Experts play two primary roles in litigation: as witnesses and as
consultants. As witnesses, experts are used to educate the trier of fact
concerning evidence that has already been introduced but which may
not be properly understood without the assistance of an expert's spe-
cialized knowledge. 92 Additionally, the testimony of an expert may
be used to establish a fact in dispute. Rule 26(b)(4) permits the party
faced with cross-examining the expert the opportunity to discover
information concerning the opinion to which the expert is expected to
testify and the factual basis for that opinion.93
As consultants, experts play an even more extensive role, both
during pretrial preparation94 and at trial. 95 Experts assist attorneys in
in subsection (B) of Rule 26(b)(4), concerns the discovery of reports of examining physicians in
cases where the mental or physical condition of a party is at issue. FED. R. Civ. P. 35.
86. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 28, at § 2029.
87. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A).
88. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B).
89. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee's note, 48 F.R.D. 487, 504.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or, education, may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise." FED. R. EvID. 702; cf FED. R. EvID. 701 (Opinion Testimony of Lay
Witnesses).
93. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A); see supra note 85 and accompanying text.
94. Generally, expert witnesses perform five basic functions during pretrial preparation.
They can: (1) help educate the attorney concerning the technical details of the case;
(2) develop factual data through experiments and tests; (3) assist the attorney in evaluating the
merits of the case and developing the applicable legal theories; (4) advise the attorney as the
attorney attempts to discover and evaluate information from the opposing party's expert
witnesses; and (5) actively participate in pretrial negotiations. D. DANNER, EXPERT WITNESS
CHECKLISTS §§ 1:21, 1:23 (1983).
Experts have also been hired to prepare demonstrative evidence or analytical models for
calculating damages. In particularly complex cases, computer experts have been hired solely
to track the immense volume of documents involved in the litigation. Finally, an expert might
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developing the theories that will be presented at trial, and also per-
form experiments and tests which may be used as the basis of their
own testimony or the testimony of other experts. Perhaps most
importantly, though, experts act as educators to attorneys to give
them the background necessary to understand and cope with the fac-
tual issues raised by the litigation. These are valuable activities which
benefit the litigation process as a whole. It is important, therefore,
that the discovery rules not act as a disincentive to parties when they
are deciding to engage experts for these roles.
Because Rule 26(b)(4) allows a party legitimately to shield his
experts from discovery under certain circumstances, parties are more
likely to hire experts. This is especially true in those cases where the
benefits of hiring the expert would otherwise be outweighed by the
possibility that the information developed by the expert might be used
against the hiring party.
A hypothetical case will help to understand the different ways in
which experts are involved in litigation and will serve to illustrate the
functioning of Rule 26(b)(4) in handling the different types of expert
witnesses. Assume for the purpose of illustration that a computer
company has hired an attorney to defend it in a lawsuit brought by a
purchaser of one of its personal computers. In the complaint, the pur-
chaser alleges that he was injured while installing a circuit board nec-
essary for the computer's operation.
Although the attorney has handled a wide range of product lia-
bility claims, she is unfamiliar with computers. In beginning her
investigation into the merits of the case, the attorney has contacted
the highly respected electrical engineering department of a nearby
university. The first person she spoke with was Professor Green.
Professor Green made it clear from the outset that he did not wish to
become involved in the litigation. He was willing, however, to speak
be employed to direct and coordinate the work of a team of experts where a background in a
number of separate disciplines is essential to an understanding of the work of individual
experts. Becker, The Use of Experts in Pretrial Discovery, in USING EXPERTS IN CIVIL CASES
1, 5-7 (M. Kraft. ed. 1982).
95. An expert may appear in a number of different capacities as a witness at trial. If the
expert possesses first-hand knowledge of any of the facts in dispute, the expert may testify both
to the disputed facts and any inferences that an expert could draw from those facts. An expert
may also testify to the results of any tests or examinations which the expert performed prior to
trial. An expert may give an opinion based on evidence that has already been admitted at trial.
Finally, under Rule 705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, an expert may give an opinion based
on information that has not been admitted at trial if such information is reasonably relied upon
by such experts in the particular field in forming inferences about the subject. D. DANNER,
supra note 94, at § 1:24. Aside from serving as a witness, an expert may consult with an
attorney at trial in order to help the attorney formulate an effective cross-examination of the
other party's expert witness. Id.
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with the attorney informally to recommend to her certain texts on
safety standards for personal computers, and to provide her with a list
of recognized experts in the field who might be willing to act as con-
sultants or witnesses.
After her discussion with Professor Green, the attorney decided
to contact Professor White, one of the individuals on Professor
Green's list. Professor White is a tenured member of the electrical
engineering faculty of a prominent university. In addition, Professor
White has done extensive research on the subject of consumer product
safety. After discussing the known details of the case with the attor-
ney, Professor White agreed to assist in defending the case. He
warned her, however, that he becomes very nervous when speaking in
public, and that he probably would not be very effective as a testimo-
nial expert. Although the attorney agrees that Professor White's
demeanor makes him undesirable as a witness, she has entered into a
written agreement to retain his services as a consultant. The parties
have agreed that Professor White would advise the attorney concern-
ing the technical aspects of the case and perform experiments, which
they both have agreed would be necessary to establish that the prod-
uct was safe.
Due to Professor White's fear of public speaking, the attorney
has hired Professor Black to testify in the event that the litigation
reaches the trial stage. Professor Black is a poised academician who
does not quite possess the research credentials of Professor White, yet
has respectable credentials. In addition, she is articulate and able to
express even the most technical concepts in easily understandable lay
terms. The attorney believes that this will be extremely important in
persuading the jury that the computer in question was safe.
Finally, the computer company recommends that the attorney
work with Mr. Brown who was the chief technician on the design
team that developed the computer. The attorney hopes that Mr.
Brown will be valuable both as a witness because he is familiar with
the developmental history of the product, and as a consultant for her-
self and the other experts because he will be able to provide informa-
tion concerning the early safety testing of the machine. Such
information might eliminate any need to perform other tests and
experiments.
It can be seen from this hypothetical that during the course of
litigation, a number of signfficant relationships may arise among the
attorney, the experts, and the litigating party. As mentioned above,
the experts will act as consultants to the attorney. By the very nature
of this relationship, it will be necessary that information flow both
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from the experts to the attorney and from the attorney to the experts.
Furthermore, the experts will exchange information among each
other. This latter exchange most commonly occurs in the case of a
testifying expert using the information developed by a non-testifying
expert. Finally, an expert might be a party or a representative of a
party involved in the litigation.
Frequently, an expert will prepare a report that will be communi-
cated to the attorney to guide him in the handling of the case, or to
another expert to be used as the basis of that expert's testimony at
trial. Conversely, the attorney may prepare materials that will allow
the experts to become familiar with the specific factual background of
the case. A question arises, therefore, concerning the extent to which
such materials are discoverable.
As a testifying expert, Professor Black will be subject to discov-
ery in accordance with Rule 26(b)(4)(A).96 Following the procedures
of the Rule, discovery of the facts known and opinions held by Profes-
sor Black will normally begin with the propounding of interrogatories
followed by a motion to the court for further discovery. If the motion
for further discovery is granted, it may be limited at the discretion of
the court, and fees may be allocated in accordance with Rule
26(b)(4)(C). 97 In contrast, Professor White, the expert who was
retained but who was not expected to testify at trial, will only be sub-
ject to discovery under exceptional circumstances in accordance with
Rule 26(b)(4)(B). 9s The stark difference between the treatment of the
two experts becomes readily apparent when both experts cooperate in
performing a single set of tests on the company's product in prepara-
tion for trial. Though the results of such experiments will usually be
discoverable from Professor Black, they will rarely be discoverable
from Professor White. By shielding the non-testifying expert from
discovery, it is hoped that parties will be more likely to engage such
experts to assist in the litigation, thereby improving the quality of pre-
trial preparation.
Because discovery of information is based on whether the expert
in possession of the information is expected to testify at trial, rather
than on the role the expert played in the preparation of the informa-
tion, prudence dictates that an attorney carefully consider to whom
certain pretrial work is assigned. For instance, if tests must be per-
formed, but there is a substantial possibility that the tests will produce
results that are unfavorable to the client's case, there is a strong incen-





tive to have the tests performed by the non-testifying expert. Once it
has been ascertained that the results of the test are not damaging to
the client's case, they may be passed on to the testifying expert to be
used as the basis of the expert's opinion at trial.
Courts have allowed parties to be fairly flexible in designating
their testifying and non-testifying experts. For example, citing the
right of the defendant to execute the trial strategy it deemed appropri-
ate, the court in Mantolete v. Bolger99 permitted a party to redesignate
its testifying expert as an expert not expected to testify in order to
invoke the higher degree of protection afforded to non-testifying
experts. "° Similarly, courts have limited the scope of inquiry in the
discovery of a testifying expert to the subject matter upon which the
expert is expected to testify at trial. 01 Thus, an expert might be sub-
ject to discovery as a testifying expert concerning one matter raised by
the litigation, but not subject to discovery as a non-testifying expert
on another matter in the same litigation.
Allowing a party to limit discovery of its expert's information by
either redesignating the expert or limiting the scope of the expert's
testimony at trial is not contrary to the overall policy objectives of the
Rule. In both cases, the need for preparing for cross-examination and
rebuttal at trial has been eliminated, resulting in a corresponding
reduction in the need for discovery. As noted, the very purpose of
allowing the discovery of expert information is to allow the opponent
of the witness to prepare for cross-examination at trial. 102 Neverthe-
less, the need for one party's preparation for cross-examination must
be balanced against the benefits of encouraging parties to seek out and
obtain reliable expert advice so that advantages of using experts in
pretrial preparation is not lost.
IV. RULE 26(b)(4)(A): DISCOVERY OF A TESTIFYING
EXPERT'S INFORMATION
The two-step procedure of Rule 26(b)(4)(A) governs discovery of
a testifying expert."13 This section explores two questions: First, the
information that may be gathered through interrogatories pro-
pounded under Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i); and second, when additional dis-
covery may be granted under Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(ii).
99. 96 F.R.D. 179 (D. Ariz. 1982).
100. Id. at 182 n.2.
101. See, e.g., Bailey v. Meisterbrau, Inc., 57 F.R.D. 11 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (Discovery should
be limited to those opinions which the expert is expected to give at trial.).
102. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee's note, 48 F.R.D. 487, 504; see supra
notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
103. For the text of Rule 26(b)(4)(A), see supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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A. Information That May be Gained Through Interrogatories
Rule 26(b)(4)(A) sets up a two-step procedure that a party must
follow to discover the facts known and opinions acquired or devel-
oped by an opponent's testifying expert in anticipation of litigation or
for trial.'" The Rule reflects the understanding that to effectively
prepare for cross-examination and rebuttal at trial, a party must be
able to anticipate the potential testimony of the experts his opponent
expects to call. 105 The first step, laid down in Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i),
permits a party to propound interrogatories asking the adversarial
party to identify each expert witness that party expects to call at trial,
and to disclose the subject matter on which the expert is expected to
testify. 106 In addition, the adversarial party may be compelled to dis-
close the substance of the facts and opinions about which the expert is
expected to testify, as well as a summary of the grounds for each opin-
ion."17 Discovery under this subsection of the Rule is viewed as a
matter of right."8 The second step, laid down in Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(ii),
permits the discovering party, after propounding interrogatories, to
make a motion to the court for additional discovery. 9 This addi-
tional discovery may occur through any of the discovery techniques
allowed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)."'
104. Hockley v. Zent, Inc., 89 F.R.D. 26, 29 (M.D. Pa. 1980); In re IBM Peripheral EDP
Device Antitrust Litig., 77 F.R.D. 39, 41 (N.D. Cal. 1977); United States v. IBM, 72 F.R.D.
78, 81 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Herbst v. International Tel. & Tel. Co., 65 F.R.D. 528, 530 (D. Conn.
1975); United States v. John R. Piquette Corp., 52 F.R.D. 370, 372 (E.D. Mich. 1970);
Continental Ins. v. Cole, 467 So. 2d 309, 311 (1985) (construing a state rule of civil procedure
identical to Rule 26(b)(4)). But see Dennis v. BASF Wyandotte Corp., 101 F.R.D. 301, 303
n. I (E.D. Pa. 1983) (Read literally, Rule 26(b)(4) does not require that written interrogatories
be propounded before a party may move for further discovery.).
105. Hoover v. United States Dept. of the Interior, 611 F.2d 1132, 1142 (5th Cir. 1980); J.
MOORE, supra note 34, at 26.66[3]; FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee's note, 48
F.R.D. 487, 503-04. Because experts may base their conclusions on any combination of a
multitude of underlying facts, it is frequently difficult for an attorney to anticipate the
approach that his adversary's expert will undertake. Id. at 503. Rule 26(b)(4) was designed to
alleviate this problem by providing the attorney with the advance knowledge necessary to
prepare properly for cross-examination and rebuttal. Id.; see also Heitmann v. Concrete Pipe
Mach., 98 F.R.D. 740, 743 (E.D. Mo. 1983) (The predicament in which Rule 705 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence places a cross-examiner justifies the interpretation of Rule
26(b)(4)(A)(ii) as permitting discovery of a testifying expert's information.).
106. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i); see supra note 85 and accompanying text.
107. Id.
108. See Bates v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 83 F.R.D. 535, 539 (D.S.C. 1979); Rupp v.
Vock & Weiderhold, Inc., 52 F.R.D. 111, 113 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
109. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(ii); see supra note 85 and accompanying text.
110. FED R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(ii); J. MOORE, supra note 34, at 26-416 (The term "other
means," as used in Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(ii), includes both the taking of the expert's deposition,
and the production of documents upon which the expert has relied.); see also FED R. Civ. P.
26(a).
DISCO VER Y OF EXPERTS
An empirical study conducted by Professor Graham in 1976 con-
cluded that the actual procedures followed by attorneys varied greatly
from the two-step procedure set out in Rule 26(b)(4)(A), with full
discovery occurring routinely. 1  Professor Graham found that the
liberal, extra-judicially conducted discovery that was occurring in
practice at the time of his study was in sharp contrast with the con-
servative attitude of the courts toward the granting of additional dis-
covery under Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(ii)." 12  Nevertheless, despite
suggestions that the two-step procedure of Rule 26(b)(4)(A) be elimi-
nated,1 3 courts have consistently required the discovering party to
propound interrogatories before making a motion for additional dis-
covery under Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(ii)."
4
If a court denies a party's motion for additional discovery under
Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(ii), interrogatories will be the only discovery device
available to the party to obtain information concerning his adver-
sary's testifying experts. Professor Graham argues that, by their very
nature, interrogatories are inadequate when used as the sole discovery
device for preparing the cross-examination and rebuttal of an expert
witness." 15 An empirical study that he conducted revealed that many
attorneys share this view. "6 In apparent recognition of this problem,
11. Graham, Discovery of Experts Under Rule 26(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: Part Two, An Empirical Study and a Proposal, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 169, 172. A
similar study has confirmed this result in at least one state that has adopted a rule identical to
Rule 26(b)(4). Day, Expert Discovery Under Federal Rule 26(b)(4): An Empirical Study in
South Dakota, 31 S.D.L. REV. 40, 51 (1985).
112. Graham, supra note 11, at 170, 172.
113. Day, supra note 11, at 51.
114. See, e.g., In re IBM Peripheral EDP Device Antitrust Litig., 77 F.R.D. 39, 41 (N.D.
Cal. 1977) (Rule 26(b)(4)(A) envisions a two-part procedure.); United States v. IBM, 72
F.R.D. 78, 81 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (Rule 26(b)(4)(A) sets forth a "two-step" procedure.).
115. Graham, supra note 24, at 917-18. Professor Graham noted that depositions are
clearly superior to interrogatories if a searching inquiry of an opponent's expert is necessary.
Id. at 918. The flexibility of the deposition as a discovery device allows a party to gain a great
deal of information and to pursue immediately newly discovered avenues of inquiry. Id. In
addition, it helps to prevent the sanitization of the expert's opinions by depriving the expert of
the opportunity to consult with the opposing attorney at length before answering. Id. In
contrast, interrogatories are normally used to gather information concerning general pleading
allegations, simple facts, and admissions, and to learn of the existence of documents and
persons with relevant facts. Id. at 917. Professor Graham concluded that Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i)
is an "uncomfortable modification and overreaching of the normal function of
interrogatories." Id. at 918.
116. Graham, supra note 111, at 172, 174. The open-ended responses received in Professor
Graham's survey reveal the practical problems of using interrogatories as devices for gathering
expert information. Attorneys typically described responses to interrogatories propounded
under Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i) as being sparse and incomplete. Id. Attorneys also noted that the
responses are frequently "couched in language of [the] lawyer, not [the] expert witness" or that
answers reflect the testimony that the other attorney would like the expert to give at trial. Id.
Another complaint is that interrogatories are inadequate to explore sufficently the impact on
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the trend in the most recent court decisions has been toward an
increasingly liberal granting of additional discovery; as long as there
is no abuse of the discovery process and the parties have made a
proper allocation of the expert's fees." 7
Although interrogatories have severe limitations as a discovery
device in preparing for cross-examination, responses to interrogatories
can provide attorneys with useful information upon which to base tac-
tical decisions concerning the utility of pursuing certain lines of
inquiry either during discovery or at trial."8I Moreover, as the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit noted in Weiss v. Chrysler Motors
Corp., 9 the 1970 amendment to Rule 26(b)(4) "was not merely for
[the] convenience of the court and the parties, but was intended to
make the task of the trier of fact more manageable by means of an
orderly presentation of complex issues of fact."' 
20
Answers to interrogatories are often too evasive, however, to
properly fulfill even these functions. A number of cases concerning
interrogatories propounded to experts under Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i),
therefore, have focused on whether answers to the interrogatories
were sufficient under the Rule. 12  One method for preventing evasive
answers to interrogatories is to ask detailed and narrowly-focused
questions. Specific questions may be asked in an interrogatory pro-
pounded to an expert if that question falls within the areas of inquiry
specifically allowed by Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i). Some courts have
attempted to delineate specifically what information a party may
obtain when propounding interrogatories to experts. 2  While these
cases have helped to establish some minimum guidelines for informa-
tion that may be obtained under Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i), the decisions
have failed to establish any truly useful general measure of sufficiency.
Rupp v. Vock & Weiderhold, Inc.123 was one of the first cases to
consider the issue of the sufficiency of responses to interrogatories in
terms of specific information. The court found that the plaintiff's
the expert's opinion of differing factual assumptions. Id. Finally, interrogatories fail to
provide an attorney with an opportunity to assess the expert's demeanor or ability to withstand
rigorous cross-examination. Id. Such information may affect tactical decisions ranging from
the bargaining posture assumed by the party during settlement negotiations to the selection of
jurors during voir dire. The problems with discovery through interrogatories is perhaps best
summarized by an attorney who wrote: "Need full discovery--experts on cross are dangerous
unless maximum preparation is afforded." Id.
117. See infra notes 151-229 and accompanying text.
118. Graham, supra note 24, at 917.
119. 515 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1975).
120. Id. at 457.
121. Graham, supra note 24, at 918.
122. See infra notes 123-150 and accompanying text.
123. 52 F.R.D. 111 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
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identification of expert witnesses by name only was insufficient and
ordered the plaintiff "to furnish defendant with each expert's present
address, his current occupation or profession, and his particular spe-
cialty."' 24 Subsequent to Rupp, courts have gone further by encour-
aging parties to exchange helpful information, including biographical
data of their experts. 125 In Boselli v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Trans-
portation Authority, 26 the district court required a plaintiff to respond
to interrogatories that asked how much time each of the plaintiff's
experts had spent in their examination of the plaintiff. The court
declared such information to be within the scope of "the substance of
the facts relied on by the expert in reaching his opinions." 127
By focusing on whether certain questions fall within the scope of
inquiry permitted by Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i), the courts have avoided the
problem of deciding whether a party's response provides the informa-
tion required by the Rule in terms of disclosing the substance and
basis of the expert's opinion. This approach may prove useful in cases
where the course of investigation undertaken by the expert is rela-
tively easy to predict, as in the case of interrogatories submitted to an
examining physician. To place on the discovering party the burden of
anticipating the myriad possible lines of investigation undertaken by
the expert, however, defeats one of the primary purposes of Rule
26(b)(4)-that of aiding the lawyer "in anticipat[ing] the particular
approach his adversary's expert will take or the data on which the
expert will base his judgment on the stand."' 12
In Weiss v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 29 the court established a more
useful test for measuring the sufficiency of responses to interrogato-
ries. In Weiss, the plaintiff sued for injuries received during an auto-
mobile accident which the plaintiff claimed was caused by a defect in
124. Id. at 113; see also Mann v. Newport Tankers Corp., 96 F.R.D. 31, 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)
(It is insufficient identification of an expert to list his address as "New York, New York.");
Clark v. General Motors Corp., 20 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 679 (D. Mass. 1975) (The expert's
qualifications are part of his identity.); Olmert v. Nelson, 60 F.R.D. 369, 371 (D.D.C. 1973)
(Plaintiffs must provide defendant with each expert's present address, current occupation or
profession, and particular specialty.); Manna Music, Inc. v. Smith, 26 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 595
(M.D. Pa. 1978) (The plaintiff is entitled to the name, job title, and business and home
addresses of each expert witness expected to testify.).
125. United States v. International Business Mach. Corp., 72 F.R.D. 78, 83 (S.D.N.Y.
1976).
126. 108 F.R.D. 723 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
127. Id. at 727; see also Baise v. Alwel's, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 95 (W.D. Mo. 1983) (Because a
party is entitled to a summary of the grounds for each opinion, the responding party was
ordered to provide opposing counsel with a list of books upon which its expert's opinion was
based.).
128. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee's note, 48 F.R.D. 487, 503.
129. 515 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1975).
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the steering mechanism manufactured by the defendant. 13° During
discovery, a metallurgist for Chrysler conceded that the break in the
Pitman arm stud of the steering mechanism was caused by two suc-
cessive fractures."3 At trial, Chrysler sought to refute the plaintiff's
theory that the fractures in the system were due to fatigue by having
its expert testify that both breaks in the steering mechanism occured
after the plaintiff's car had already left the road and hit a stump.
1 32
The plaintiff moved to have the expert's testimony stricken because
the the defendant had not revealed in either its original or supple-
mented answers to interrogatories that the expert would testify to
such a theory.133 The trial court refused to grant the plaintiff's
motion. 134 The court of appeals reversed the trial court's decision
noting that the policy of "mak[ing] the task of the trier of fact more
manageable by means of an orderly presentation of complex facts"
had been frustrated by Chrysler's failure to disclose the potential testi-
mony of its expert. 3 5
In Hockley v. Zent,136 the trial court followed the approach of
the court of appeals in Weiss by viewing the purpose of expert interro-
gatory answers as that of giving notice of the theory that the expert
will testify to at trial. The plaintiffs in Hockley were injured when a
truck driven by one of the original defendants to the action collided
with the back of their stationary car. 37 The original defendants in
the action, the driver of the truck and his employer, joined the co-
manufacturers of the truck as third-party defendants.1 38 The truck
manufacturers then propounded interrogatories to the truck driver
and his employer that closely paralleled the language of Rule
26(b)(4)(A)(ii). The interrogatories asked for information as to the
expected testimony of the experts hired by the truck driver and his
employer concerning any theories of liability that were to be asserted
against the truck manufacturers.'39 In response, the truck driver and
his employer gave a series of short answers, essentially stating that the
brake system manufactured by the truck manufacturers was equipped
with safety devices that were inadequate to warn the third-party




134. Id. at 456.
135. Id. at 457.
136. 89 F.R.D. 26 (M.D. Pa. 1980).





plaintiff of brake failure. "0 The court stated that the primary func-
tion of the interrogatories required under Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i) was to
afford the discovering party notice of the basic arguments the
responding party intended to present at trial. '4 , The court noted that
even the "skeletal" answers provided by the responding party in this
case fulfilled this requirement of the Rule. 142
At least one other circuit court has applied a test of sufficiency
similar to the one in Weiss. In Grogan v. Garner,43 the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld the trial court's decision to
exclude the testimony of an expert witness concerning the tax implica-
tions of a stock transaction because the party calling the witness had
failed to disclose this possible "subject area" in his answer to interrog-
atories. '44 The trial court had apparently excluded the testimony in
question because it presented an unexpected theory at trial, rather
than simply being a component of a broader range of testimony con-
cerning the financial statements about which the expert was permitted
to testify. 1
45
The advantage of a standard of sufficiency based on a theory of
notice is that it does not depend on a determination by the court as to
whether a response provides the information necessary for cross-
examination. It is apparent from the conclusory answer that was held
to have been adequate by the Hockley court, however, that the rule
would permit answers to interrogatories that were insufficient for the
actual preparation of cross-examination. If the courts are to adopt a
standard of sufficiency based on a theory of notice, then a liberal pol-
icy of granting additional discovery under Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(ii) would
also seem appropriate. Once a party knows what theories its oppo-
nent expects to assert at trial, the party will know whether, and to
140. Id. at 28.
141. Id. at 30. Apparently, under the notice standard, only minimal information
concerning the theory that will be pursued at trial by the expert needs to be conveyed in the
answers to interrogatories. In Hockley, the court found that the answers given by the plaintiff
fulfilled the requirements of the notice standard even though they simply stated that the expert
had concluded that the brake system manufactured by the defendant was "equipped with
inadequate failsafe devices, disconnect features, nor [sic] devices to warn of system failure."
Id. at 28.
142. Id. at 31.
143. 806 F.2d 829, 837 (8th Cir. 1986).
144. Id.; see also Laaperi v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 787 F.2d 726 (1st Cir. 1986) (The
district court could reasonably have concluded that defendants were not surprised by a new
theory brought up by the expert at trial.); Jenkins v. Whittaker Corp., 785 F.2d 720, 728 (9th
Cir. 1986) (In light of the lack of notice to the plaintiffs and the cumulative nature of the
testimony, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the expert's new theory.).
145. Grogan, 806 F.2d at 837-38.
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what extent, additional discovery will be required to prepare for
cross-examination and rebuttal of the witness.
Viewing the role of interrogatories as a means of providing notice
to the other party of the need to develop contrary evidence is also
consistent with the purpose behind the adoption of Rule
26(e)(1)(B), 46 which requires a party to supplement seasonably 4 its
answer to any question directly addressed to the identity of each per-
son expected to be called as an expert witness at trial, the subject
matter on which the person is expected to testify, and the substance of
the person's testimony. 48 This duty to supplement seasonably infor-
mation provided during discovery continues even through the time of
the trial. 49 Rule 26(e)(1)(B) was adopted to carry out the provisions
of Rule 26(b)(4) when "new information renders substantially incom-
plete or inaccurate an answer which was complete and accurate when
made." 5
In summary, though courts consistently have required parties to
follow the two-step procedure of Rule 26(b)(4)(A) for discovering
information from a testifying expert, the main function of interrogato-
146. Rule 26(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states in part:
A party who has responded to a request for discovery with a response that was
complete when made is under no duty to supplement his response to include
information thereafter acquired, except as follows: (1) A party is under a duty
seasonably to supplement his response with respect to any question directly
addressed to ... (B) the identity of each person expected to be called as an expert
witness at trial, the subject matter on which he is expected to testify, and the
substance of his testimony.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(1). Rule 26(e)(1) requires a party to inform its opponent of any potential
change in its expert witness' testimony. The Rule reflects the concern of the advisory commit-
tee that, at a minimum, a party should have notice of any new issue or theory that might be
raised at trial. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(e) advisory committee's note, 48 F.R.D. 487, 508; see
also Laaperi v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 787 F.2d 726 (lst Cir. 1986) (The supplementation
requirement of Rule 26 should not be read mechanically, but rather in light of its dual pur-
poses of narrowing issues and eliminating surprise.). "
147. See, e.g., Tabatchnick v. G. D. Searle & Co., 67 F.R.D. 49 (1975) ("In the absence of
unexpected developments, supplementation after the jury has been drawn cannot be considered
to have been made 'seasonably.' ").
148. See Laaperi v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 787 F.2d 726 (1st Cir. 1986). Laaperi was an
action in negligence and breach of warranty centered on a smoke detector manufactured by the
defendant. Id. at 728. Although the defendant claimed that the plaintiff had failed to
supplement his interrogatories to alert it to the fact that the expert would testify to a "separate
circuit" theory, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit found that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the expert to testify to this theory because the
company had had notice or was actually aware of the theory. Id. at 733. Significantly, an
official of the defendant company conceded at trial that a group of company executives had
discussed a "separate ciicuit" theory two weeks earlier. Id.
149. Weiss v. Chryslk.- Motors Corp., 515 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1975).
150. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(e) advisory committee's note, 48 F.R.D. 487, 507-08.
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ries has become that of providing a party With notice of the theories
that the expert will assert at trial.
B. Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(ii) - Granting Additional Discovery
Although eighteen years have passed since the adoption of Rule
26(b)(4), relatively few published decisions have addressed the ques-
tion of what showing a party needs to make in order to be granted
additional discovery under subparagraph 26(b)(4)(A)(ii). 51
1. THE DEPOSITION/REPORT DICHOTOMY
The earliest decisions concerning the granting of additional dis-
covery under Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(ii) reflected divergent approaches to
the issue. The results often appeared to turn on whether the expert's
deposition or the expert's report was being sought.15 2 This divergence
of results reflects the confusion which has developed because of the
absence in the rule of a standard for granting additional discovery. I
The early trend with respect to the production of the expert wit-
ness' reports was to permit such discovery only if the party seeking
discovery showed some need for the miaterials.1 54 In the medical mal-
practice action of Wilson v. Resnik,1" the plaintiff sought production
of defendant's expert witness' report under subparagraph
26(b)(4)(A)(ii).15 6 The plaintiff alleged that the defendant's answers
to interrogatories were sketchy and conclusory. 157 The court rejected
151. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), discovery orders are
interlocutory and thus are usually not appealable until a final judgment has been entered. As a
result, few appellate decisions deal with issues concerning the granting or denial of motions for
discovery.
152. Compare Herbst v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 65 F.R.D. 528, 530-31 (D. Conn.
1975) (granting the motion to depose the expert witness without requiring a showing of
substantial need) with Breedlove v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 57 F.R.D. 202, 205 (N.D. Miss.
1972) (denying a motion for production of expert reports because there was no showing of
"unique or exceptional circumstances" or "substantial need") and Wilson v. Resnick, 51
F.R.D. 510, 511-12 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (denying motion for production of the expert witness'
report absent a showing of substantial need).
153. For an explanation of the rule's failure to set forth a standard, see Graham, supra note
24, at 895, 920.
154. See, e.g., Breedlove, 57 F.R.D. at 205; United States v. 145.31 Acres of Land, 54
F.R.D. 359, 360 (M.D. Pa. 1972); Wilson v. Resnick, 51 F.R.D. 510, 511-12 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
155. 51 F.R.D. 510 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
156. Id. at 511.
157. Id. The plaintiff's interrogatories paralleled Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i) in requesting the
defendant to identify each expert and disclose the subject matter on which the expert was
expected to testify, the substance of the facts and opinions to which the experts were expected
to testify, and a summary of the grounds for each opinion. Id. In response the defendant
identified his expert and stated that the expert would testify essentially that the plaintiff was
treated in accordance with good, sound, medical practice and that any damage suffered by the
plaintiff was minimal. Id.
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this claim, finding that the defendant's answers were sufficient."' In
addition, the court stated that "to compel production of documents
... on mere allegation that answers to interrogatories were insufficient
would defeat the entire procedure which Rule 26(b)(4) sets forth.' 159
Therefore, the court held that discovery of the reports was controlled
by the work-product doctrine of Rule 26(b)(3), 160 and that the plain-
tiffs had failed to make the showing of substantial need required
under the rule. 6'
Similarly, in Breedlove v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,162 a federal dis-
trict court in Mississippi prohibited the discovery of the expert's
report because the plaintiff failed to show either "exceptional circum-
stances" or "substantial need."'' 63 The reports sought by the plaintiff
in Breedlove had been prepared by the defendant's employees.'64 Sub-
sequent to the preparation of the reports, the defendant permitted the
plaintiff to depose the employees. 165 When the plaintiff requested the
court to order production of the reports that had been given to the
defendant's attorney, the defendant objected that the scope of inquiry
for the depositions, to which the defendant had voluntarily consented,
should not be any greater than the scope permitted under subsection
26(b)(4)(A)(i) for interrogatories. 166 In denying discovery, the Breed-
love court first held that the defendant had not waived the protection
that the employees might have had as expert witnesses under Rule
26(b)(4)(A), because they had consented to the taking of the deposi-
tion. 167 Thus, the court reasoned, the plaintiffs were initially limited
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. Rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure reads in part:
Subject to the provisions of subdivision (b)(4) of this rule, a party may obtain
discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable under
subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial
by or for another party or by or for that other party's representative (including
his attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a
showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in
the preparation of his case and that he is unable without undue hardship to
obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means. In ordering
discovery of such materials when the required showing has been made, the court
shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions,
or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the
litigation.
FED. R. Ov. P. 26(b)(3).
161. 51 F.R.D. at 512.
162. 57 F.R.D. 202 (N.D. Miss. 1972).
163. Id. at 205.
164. Id. at 204-05.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 205.
1130
DISCOVER Y OF EXPERTS
in the deposition to the scope of discovery permitted under Rule
26(b)(4)(A)(i). 16  In considering the plaintiff's request for additional
discovery, the court noted that there was no showing of "unique or
exceptional circumstances" that required the production of the
report. 169  The court added that "unique or exceptional circum-
stances" would exist to require production of the reports if the
requesting party could demonstrate that it otherwise could not elicit
the basis and scope of the experts' opinions and supporting data.
70
Next, the court considered whether the report was discoverable
under Rule 26(b)(3), which controls the discoverability of attorney
work-product. 17' After examining the expert's report in camera, the
Breedlove court found that the reports had been prepared in anticipa-
tion of litigation, and that they were responsive to inquiries of the
defendant's attorney.' 72 The court held, therefore, that the party
seeking discovery of such reports needed to show both "substantial
need" for the reports and the inability to obtain their substantial
equivalent without undue hardship. Because the plaintiff had failed to
make such a showing of need, the court denied discovery.
173
In contrast, in Herbst v. International Telephone & Telegraph
Corp., 174 the discovering party was seeking to take the deposition of
its adversary's experts. 75  The Herbst court adopted a liberal
approach under Rule 26(b)(4)(A), reasoning that discovery of experts
should be just as liberal as the discovery of ordinary witnesses once
the problem of a party unfairly obtaining the benefit of its opponent's
expert "cheaply" has been resolved. 176 The Herbst court held that the
expert was subject to discovery after the parties properly allocated the
expert's fees between themselves.'77 The Herbst court placed no
restriction on the discovery, 178 although restrictions, such as those on
mutuality and timing suggested by Professor Friedenthal and Mr.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 205.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Breedlove, 57 F.R.D. at 205.
173. Id.
174. 65 F.R.D. 528 (D. Conn. 1975).
175. Id. at 528.
176. Id. at 531-32.
177. Id. at 532. The Herbst court stated that the parties were to determine how the expert's
fees would be shared, any disagreement between the parties being submitted to the court. Id.
178. Professor Graham argues that the fact that the court imposed neither a restriction on
timing nor a requirement of mutuality indicates that it did not recognize the concerns of
Professor Friedenthal and Mr. Long over the unfairness of allowing one party to use discovery
of an adverse party's expert to develop its own case. Graham, supra note 24, at 924.
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Long, would have been within the court's power. 79
The Herbst decision was followed in a product liability action in
Dennis v. BASF Wyandotte Corp., ' ° in which the court allowed dis-
covery of the plaintiff's expert witness by deposition without any
showing of substantial need.' 8 ' In Dennis, the plaintiff's answers to
the defendant's interrogatories stated little more than the opinion that
the product had been manufactured and designed negligently, and
that it was not fit for the ordinary purpose for which it had been
designed.8 2 In permitting the deposition, the court equated the right
to depose the expert as "at least equal to the right of a litigant to
depose an eyewitness to an intersectional traffic accident where
injured parties are involved in litigation."'8 3 The court reasoned that
permitting the deposition would serve four important policy goals:
First, it would improve the prospects of a settlement because the par-
ties would be better able to judge the relative strengths and weak-
nesses of their respective cases.'8 4  Second, it would increase the
likelihood of a fair trial by bringing all the relevant facts to light."8 5
Third, it would avoid trial by surprise.8 6 And fourth, it would
reduce the possibility that the expert would alter or amend a genera-
lized opinion to fit the evidence at trial.8 7 In holding that additional
discovery was not conditioned on a showing of substantial need, the
court noted that it was particularly important in cases in which the
reponding party's answers to interrogatories were "very general and
conclusory."' 88 To balance any concern that it would be unfair to
allow the additional discovery, the court followed the Herbst decision
and ordered the party seeking discovery to pay all fees and expenses
incurred by its opponent in accordance with Rule 26(b)(4)(C)(i).' 89
2. THE TREND TOWARD A CONSISTENT STANDARD
In contrast to the conservative approach taken by the courts in
Wilson and Breedlove with respect to discovery of expert reports, the
179. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee's note, 48 F.R.D. 487, 504 ("The court
may order further discovery and it has ample power to regulate its timing and scope to prevent
abuse."); see Friedenthal, supra note 22, at 487-88; Long, supra note 22, at 152-54.
180. 101 F.R.D. 301, 303 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
181. Id. at 301.
182. Id. at 302.





188. Id. at 304.
189. Id.
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liberal approach to discovery taken by the Herbst and Dennis courts is
consistent with the Supreme Court's view of the discovery process 9 °
and the policy reasons which brought about the 1970 amendments to
Rule 26.1 As the advisory committee to Rule 26(b)(4) noted:
"Effective cross-examination of an expert witness requires advance
preparation."
1 92
The question remains, however, whether a distinction should be
made between a motion to depose the expert and a motion for the
production of the expert's report. Professor Graham argues against
the application of a higher standard for the discovery of expert reports
than for other forms of discovery. He notes that the advisory com-
mittee specifically rejected the work-product doctrine as a justification
for denying discovery of expert information and that Rule 26(b)(3),
which codifies the work-product doctrine into the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, is "subject to" the provisions of Rule 26(b)(4).
193
Professor Graham then argues:
With respect to discretionary incorporation [of the standard of
Rule 26(b)(3) into Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(ii)], the distinction between
Wilson and Breedlove as involving experts' reports, and Herbst and
Piquette as involving oral depositions, -is not significant. Any
attempt to superimpose the substantial need requirement of Rule
26(b)(3) solely as to expert reports as the standard for further dis-
covery pursuant to Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(ii) in fact is doomed to fail-
ure. Such incorporation would allow depositions more readily
than discovery of expert reports. Yet discovery of expert reports
often may be preferable to depositions when a party seeks further
discovery to prepare for cross-examination and rebuttal. Docu-
ment discovery clearly is less of an imposition on an expert's time
while being no more of an intrusion on the expert's mental
processes than is face-to-face inquiry about his opinions and the
grounds therefor.
194
Subsequent to the publication of Professor Graham's article, a
number of decisions have adopted a more consistent standard for dis-
190. See, e.g., Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947) ("Mutual knowledge of all the
relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation."); accord Dennis v.
BASF Wyandotte Corp., 101 F.R.D. at 303 (citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. at 495) ("This
liberal reading of Rule 26 is entirely consistent with the Supreme Court's position that the
deposition-discovery rules are to be given a broad and liberal treatment and should enable the
parties to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before trial.").
191. See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee's note, 48 F.R.D. 487, 503-
05.
192. Id. at 503.
193. Graham, supra note 24, at 927.
194. Id.
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covery of expert depositions and expert reports.195 For example, in
Quadrini v. Sikorsky Aircraft Div., United Aircraft Corp., 196 a case
arising out of a helicopter crash, the trial court anticipated that the
complex litigation would turn on the testimony of the expert wit-
nesses because of the disputes over technical facts that existed
between the parties. 9 7 In ordering the production of the expert's
report, including reports containing the preliminary conclusions of
the expert, the court rejected the plaintiff's contention that expert
reports were discoverable only upon a showing of substantial need
and undue hardship.g1 It observed that allowing pretrial discovery of
expert reports would "guard against the possibility of a sanitized pres-
entation at trial, purged of less favorable opinions expressed at an ear-
lier date."' 99
The Quadrini court's approach was adopted by a California dis-
trict court in In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Litiga-
tion.2" Though the trial court rejected the discovering party's motion
for the production of documents as overly broad, it also analyzed and
rejected the Rule 26(b)(3) substantial need test of Wilson and Breed-
love. 20 1 In rejecting the work-product standard, the IBM court
focused on the texts of Rules 26(b)(3) and 26(b)(4). Reaching the
same conclusion as Professor Graham, it remarked that "Rule
26(b)(3) expressly states that it is subject to the provisions of subsec-
tion (b)(4)" and that "where the drafters wanted to include a specific
standard, they did so. ''202 The IBM court declared that "the purpose
behind the requirement of a court order for further discovery in Rule
195. E.g., American Steel Prod. Corp. v. Penn Central Corp., 110 F.R.D. 151 (S.D.N.Y.
1986); Delcastor, Inc. v. Vail Ass'n, Inc., 108 F.R.D. 405 (D. Colo. 1985); Dennis v. BASF
Wyandotte Corp., 101 F.R.D. 301 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Heitmann v. Concrete Pipe Mach., 98
F.R.D. 740 (E.D. Mo. 1983); Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Hartz Mountain Indus., 553 F. Supp. 45
(S.D.N.Y. 1982); In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Litig., 77 F.R.D. 39 (N.D. Cal.
1977); Quadrini v. Sikorsky Aircraft Div., United Aircraft Corp., 74 F.R.D. 594 (D. Conn.
1977); Herbst v. International Tel. & Tel. Co., 65 F.R.D. 528 (D. Conn. 1975); see also J.
MOORE, supra note 34, $ 26-416 (Although some early decisions required that substantial need
for experts' reports be shown, most courts have construed Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(ii) liberally.).
196. 74 F.R.D. 594 (D. Conn. 1977).
197. Id. at 595.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. 77 F.R.D. 39, 41 (N.D. Cal. 1977) ("The court is of the opinion that Quadrini
correctly interpreted Rule 26(b)(4)(A)."); see also Heitmann v. Concrete Pipe Mach., 98
F.R.D. 740, 743 (E.D. Mo. 1983) ("This court is of the opinion that the Quadrini and IBM
cases correctly read Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(ii) as allowing production of testifying expert's
documents where such documents are needed for effective cross-examination.").
201. In re IBM, 77 F.R.D. at 41; see also Beverage Mktg. Corp. v. Ogilvy & Mather Direct
Response Inc., 563 F. Supp. 1013, 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (rejecting application of Rule 26(b)(3)
substantial need test).
202. In re IBM, 77 F.R.D. at 41. An example of a specific standard incorporated into Rule
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26(b)(4)(A)(ii) is to insure that the movant's only interest is in
obtaining information for cross-examination."2 3
In another recent case, American Steel Products Corp. v. Penn
Central Corp. ,2 the Federal District Court for the Southern District
of New York granted the discovering party's request to take the
expert's deposition as well as obtain his report, rejecting any sugges-
tion that additional discovery of an expert witness required a showing
of compelling need or exceptional circumstances. 205 The Penn Cen-
tral court stated that "although Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(ii) is normally used
to obtain an expert's deposition, courts that have considered the issue
have found no reason to refuse to apply the rule to a request for docu-
ments from an adversary's expert.
20 6
The most throughly reasoned rejection of the incorporation of
the work-product doctrine into discovery under Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(ii)
of expert reports is found in the patent litigation case of Hewlett-Pack-
ard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc.207 In Hewlett-Packard, the plaintiff
sought production of the drafts of a declaration that the defendant's
expert had prepared for a prior proceeding before the United States
Patent and Trademark Office.208 The objectives of the lawsuit and the
proceeding before the Patent Office were the same: The plaintiff was
attempting to have the defendant's patent declared invalid. 2' The
plaintiff thus sought the drafts of the declaration to enable it to chal-
lenge the expert's anticipated testimony before the district court and
to show that the Patent Office's decision had been based on the
incomplete and purposefully misleading declaration of the defendant's
expert. 210 The court quickly focused on what it viewed as the disposi-
tive issue: whether the drafts of the declaration were discoverable
under Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(ii). 21I The court noted that Quadrini and its
progeny had rejected the work-product doctrine as grounds for pro-
tecting the reports and the drafts of reports generated by experts.
212
The district court ruled that the drafts of the expert's declaration
were not protected by the work-product doctrine and were discovera-
26(b)(4) is the requirement of a showing of exceptional circumstances before allowing
discovery of non-testifying, retained experts. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B).
203. In re IBM, 77 F.R.D. at 41.
204. 110 F.R.D. 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
205. Id. at 153.
206. Id.
207. 116 F.R.D. 533 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
208. Id. at 534.
209. Id. at 535.
210. Id. at 535-36.
211. Id. at 536.
212. Id.
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ble under Rule 26(b)(4).2 13 The court responded in detail to the
defendant's assertion that allowing discovery of the drafts would do
''great violence to the values that the work-product doctrine was
developed to protect. 21 4 The court interpreted the decision in Hick-
man v. Taylor as focusing solely on the privacy interest of attor-
neys.2 'I Attorneys' privacy was protected in Hickman for two related
reasons: First, the attorney's work-product was protected to allay the
attorney's fear that his opponent would gain access to his ideas, per-
ceptions, assessments, and plans: Second, the attorney's work-prod-
uct was protected to lessen the temptation of a lazy attorney to wait
until the other side had completed its "investgatory homework" and
then receive the information thus acquired through discovery.216 The
district court reasoned that the drafters of Rule 26(b)(3), in codifing
the work-product doctrine, however, had specifically removed experts
and the information they develop from the purview of the work-prod-
uct doctrine's protection.2 17 Because the expert's declaration in the
instant case consisted of descriptions of physical facts and of engineer-
ing reasoning, rather then legal reasoning or litigation strategy, the
court reasoned that discovery of the information would not threaten
the values at the center of the work-product doctrine.2"'
Anticipating that the decision to permit discovery might be
appealed, the district court continued by addressing possible argu-
ments that might be advanced for extending the work-product doc-
trine to protect the drafts of expert's reports. One possible argument
posited by the court was the fact that, in reality, reports of experts in
complex litigation often are drafted by the attorneys handling the
cases. 2 19 Alternately, the drafts of the report of an expert could be
viewed as the product of an intense and very private dialogue between
the expert and the attorney in which "the expert contributes the raw
data and the lawyer packages it into a form that is likely to go the
farthest toward satisfying the relevant legal standard. ' ' 22 The court
rejected either argument as a ground for extending the work-product
doctrine to the drafts of an expert's reports. The court said that it was
not interested in "furthering the corruption of the truth finding pro-
cess" by developing rules that encouraged attorneys to write self-serv-
213. Id. at 537.
214. Id. at 538.
215. Id.
216. Id.
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ing opinions which were then presented to the trier of fact as the
independent opinions of "technical experts."2 2 ' Moreover, because
the trier of fact needed to assess the relative credibility of opposing
experts, it was important to determine to what degree the opinions of
the expert reflected the direct input of the attorney who hired the
expert.
22 2
The defendant argued that discovery of the report would have a
chilling effect on the exchange between the expert and the attorney.223
The court noted that permitting discovery of the drafts would chill
the dialogue; however, the truth finding process would be better
served "if lawyers played a lesser role in the formulation of other peo-
ple's opinions.
224
As the Quadrini court suggested, a liberal policy toward discov-
ery of expert witnesses is needed most when expert testimony is cen-
tral to the resolution of a dispute.22 5 In such cases, advance
knowledge of the basis of the expert witness' opinion through pretrial
discovery is essential for effective cross-examination. The decision in
Hewlett-Packard pushes the concept to its fullest by recognizing that
not only is it important that the cross-examiner have access to the
conclusions of the expert, but also, to a certain extent, that the cross-
examiner have access to the process by which the expert's final opin-
ion is articulated in order to ensure that it has not been "purged of
less favorable opinions expressed at an earlier date. '226 Because inter-
rogatories are relatively ineffective in the preparation of cross-exami-
nation, a liberal policy of granting additional discovery under Rule
26(b)(4)(A)(ii) is appropriate to effectuate the policy goals of discov-
ery.2 27 The liberal granting of discovery must be tempered, however,
by the court's willingness to place limitations on the discovery and to
order the payment of fees and expenses when required to prevent
abuse. Nevertheless, despite the trend favoring discovery of expert
reports and the criticism of the conservative approach,228 some courts
have continued to require a showing of some special need before per-
mitting discovery of expert reports.229
221. Id.
222. Id. at 540.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. 74 F.R.D. at 595.
226. Id.
227. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee's note, 48 F.R.D. 487, 504.
228. Graham, supra note 24, at 897.
229. Bell v. General Elec. Co., 38 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 671, 674 (E.D. Pa. 1984); see also Boselli
v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Auth., 108 F.R.D. 723 (E.D. Pa. 1985). In Boselli, the
plaintiff was attempting to discover copies of the expert's notes which were used in the
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3. EVASIVENESS IN DISCOVERY
Because the disclosure requirements of Rule 26(b)(4)(A) are
ambiguous at best, parties seeking discovery of expert information fre-
quently encounter three, often-used evasive practices by the respond-
ing party. First, the problem is most readily apparent with
interrogatories are propounded under Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i). Parties
seeking to avoid discovery usually answer such interrogatories in a
brief, conclusory, and evasive manner, even though the interrogato-
ries are frequently phrased in language paralleling the Rule.2 3° Sec-
ond, evasiveness is encountered in the discovery of expert reports.23" '
Expert reports often progress through a series of changes by the
expert and the attorney. Therefore, there is an obvious temptation to
purge the report of any information that may be unfavorable to the
client's case.232 Similarly, an attorney may withhold information
from the expert until after the opposing party has been given the
expert's report or has completed its deposition of the expert.233
Finally, Professor Graham has identified the use of "Saturday Night"
experts as one of the most effective ways of avoiding discovery.234 A
"Saturday Night" expert is an expert selected such a short time before
trial that the discovering party is not able to obtain full discovery.235
Courts frequently order additional discovery, such as the deposi-
tion of an expert or the production of the expert's report, in order to
combat evasiveness during discovery.236 In addition, courts may
preparation of the expert's report. Id. at 727. Although the plaintiff did not establish that the
notes constituted a report of the expert, the court analyzed the discovery of the notes as if
discovery of an expert's notes and an expert's report were the same thing. Id. The court
rejected the request for the discovery of the notes, stating that the plaintiff had failed to show
"any particular need or necessity." Id.
230. See, e.g., Kane Gas Light and Heating Co. v. Pennzoil Co., 99 F.R.D. 614, 615 (W.D.
Pa. 1983); Mann v. Newport Tankers Corp., 96 F.R.D. 31, 32-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Hockley v.
Zent, Inc., 89 F.R.D. 26, 28 (M.D. Pa. 1980); Bates v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 83 F.R.D.
535 (D.S.C. 1979); Rupp v. Vock & Weiderhold, Inc., 52 F.R.D. 111, .113 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
231. Graham, supra note 111, at 188.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 185.
235. Id. Professor Graham noted that it is impossible to establish whether the expert was
actually engaged shortly before trial or was actually engaged months in advance and only
revealed shortly before tm-Al. Professor Graham also identifies two variations of the "Saturday
Night" expert. Id. The first variation is the "newly discovered critical" expert who surfaces
immediately prior to or during trial. The second variation is substituting a new expert for an
expert who performed poorly during a deposition. Id. at 186-87. The original expert is usually
called "unexpectedly" out of town, necessitating a replacement. Id. at 187 n.38.
236. See, e.g., Mann v. Newport Tankers Corp., 96 F.R.D. 31, 33 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (Because
the plaintiff failed to respond to interrogatories, the defendant was allowed to depose experts
with costs paid by the plaintiff.); Beverage Mktg. Corp. v. Ogilvy & Mather Direct Response,
Inc., 563 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (Production of expert's report was ordered because of
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exclude the expert's testimony at trial if the evidence was not revealed
during discovery.2 37  It must be noted, however, that in the case of
"Saturday Night" experts, the opposing party may be forced to inter-
view the expert or read his report during a short recess.
2 38
Two states, Illinois and Pennsylvania, have adopted rules specifi-
cally designed to reduce the incentive for engaging in dilatory discov-
ery practices. Illinois Rule of Civil Procedure 220(d) limits an
expert's direct testimony at trial to the extent of disclosure during
pretrial discovery.239 A similar limitation is contained in Penn-
sylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 4003.5(C). 2 40 Both rules, however,
allow the expert to testify to matters upon which no inquiry was made
during discovery. The rationale for this latter provision is that the
insufficient interrogatory responses.). But see Wilson v. Resnick, 51 F.R.D. 510, 511 (E.D. Pa.
1970) (Even if the responses to interrogatories were insufficient, production of the expert's
report is not warranted.).
237. See Grogan v. Garner, 806 F.2d 829, 837 (8th Cir. 1986) (excluding expert testimony
when the party failed to disclose the existence of the experts in response to interrogatories);
Jenkins v. Whittaker Corp., 785 F.2d 720, 728 (9th Cir. 1986) (excluding the expert opinion of
defendant's employee, where defendant's testimony gave no evidence that such individuals
would testify as experts); Scott & Fetzer Co. v. Dile, 643 F.2d 670, 673 (9th Cir. 1981) (The
district court abused its discretion by allowing a party to call an expert witness and present a
new theory where no notice was provided in pretrial preparation.); Voegeli v. Lewis, 568 F.2d
89 (8th Cir. 1977) (It was reversible error for the district court to allow important testimony of
an expert witness at trial different from that indicated at the expert's deposition because the
proponent of the expert testimony had a duty to supplement its expert's deposition testimony.);
Barnes v. St. Francis Hospital and School of Nursing, 211 Kan. 315, 507 P.2d 288 (1973)
(excluding expert testimony for failure to supplement answers to interrogatories).
238. Graham, supra note 111, at 188.
239. Although Rule 220(d) of the Illinois Rules of Civil Procedure differs significantly from
Federal Rule 26(b)(4), it is designed to address many of the same problems sought to be
addressed by Rule 26(b)(4). Illinois Rule 220(d) states:
To the extent that the facts known or opinions held by an expert have been
developed in discovery proceedings through interrogatories, depositions or
requests to produce, his direct testimony at trial may not be inconsistent with nor
go beyond the fair scope of the facts known or opinions disclosed in such
discovery proceedings. However, he shall not be prevented from testifying as to
facts or opinions on matters regarding which inquiry was not made in the
discovery proceedings.
ILL. R. Civ. P. 220(d).
240. Rule 4003.5 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure is similar, but not identical,
to Federal Rule 26(b)(4). Subparagraph (c) of Rule 4003.5 states:
To the extent that the facts known or opinions held by an expert have been
developed in discovery proceedings under subdivision (a)(1) or (2) of this rule,
his direct testimony at the trial may not be inconsistent with or go beyond the
fair scope of his testimony in the discovery proceedings as set forth in his
deposition, answer to an interrogatory, separate report, or supplement thereto.
However, he shall not be prevented from testifying as to facts or opinions on
matters on which he has not been interrogated in the discovery proceedings.
PA. R. Civ. P. 4 0 0 3.5(c).
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discovering party should not be permitted to control the scope of the
expert's trial testimony by limiting the scope of discovery requested.
Additional weapons against evasiveness in expert discovery have
been provided by amendments to Federal Rule 26. In 1980, Rule
26(f)241 was adopted, permitting discovery conferences in which the
trial court may establish a proposed plan of discovery upon the
motion of any party. Rule 26(g),242 adopted in 1980, requires an
241. Rule 26(f) provides:
At any time after commencement of an action the court may direct the attorneys
for the parties to appear before it for a conference on the subject of discovery.
The court shall do so upon motion by the attorney for any party if the motion
includes:
(1) A statement of the issues as they then appear;
(2) A proposed plan and schedule of discovery;
(3) Any limitations proposed to be be placed on discovery;
(4) Any other proposed orders with respect to discovery; and
(5) A statement showing that the attorney making the motion has
made a reasonable effort to reach agreement with opposing
attorneys on the matters set forth in the motion. Each party and
his attorney are under a duty to participate in good faith in the
framing of a discovery plan if a plan is proposed by the attorney for
any party. Notice of the motion shall be served on all parties.
Objections or additions to matters set forth in the motion shall be
served not later than 10 days after service of the motion. Following
the discovery conference, the court shall enter an order tentatively
identifying the issues for discovery purposes, establishing a plan
and schedule for discovery, setting limitations on discovery, if any;
and determining such other matters, including the allocation of
expenses, as are necessary for the proper management of discovery
in the action. An order may be altered or amended whenever
justice so requires.
Subject to the right of a party who properly moves for a discovery
conference to prompt convening of the conference, the court may combine the
discovery conference with a pretrial conference authorized by Rule 16. FED. R.
Civ. P. 26(f).
The advisory committee's note to Rule 26(f) observes that the provision
would only be used only in rare cases. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f), advisory
committee's note, 85 F.R.D. 521, 527. The committee's note also states,
however, that the provision was adopted in lieu of more fundamental changes to
the provisions of Rule 26(b)(1) to address discovery abuses. The 1983
amendment to Rule 26(b)(1) and the related advisory committee's note propose a
much more active role for the courts during discovery in complex cases. Cases
turning on expert testimony are particularly in need of judicial monitoring.
242. Rule 26(g) provides:
Every request for discovery or response or objection thereto made by a party
represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in
the attorney's individual name, whose address shall be stated. A party who is not
represented by an attorney shall sign the request, response, or objection and state
the party's address. The signature of the attorney or party constitutes a
certification that the signer has read the request, response, or objection, and that
to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed after a
reasonable inquiry it is: (I) consistent with these rules and warranted by existing
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attorney to sign discovery requests and responses to certify that they
are not interposed for the purpose of delay or evasiveness. Further,
Rule 26(b)(1) was amended in 1983 to encourage federal courts to
take a more active role in addressing the problems of evasiveness and
excessive discovery.243 Both the adoption of Rule 26(f) and the
amendment to Rule 26(b)(1) greatly increase the ability of the courts
to address discovery abuses.2
law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law; (2) not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of the litigation; and
(3) not unreasonable or unduly burdensome or expensive, given the needs of the
case, the discovery already had in the case, the amount in controversy, and the
importance of the issue at stake in the litigation. If a request, response, or
objection is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the
omission is called to the attention of the party making the request, response, or
objection, and a party shall not be obligated to take any action with respect to it
until it is signed. If a certification is made in violation of the rule, the court, upon
motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who made the
certification, the party on whose behalf the request, response, or objection is
made, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay the
amount of reasonable expenses incurred because of the violation, including a
reasonable attorney's fee.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g).
The advisory committee noted that "[t]he subdivision provides a deterrent to both exces-
sive discovery and evasion by imposing a certification requirement that obliges each attorney
to stop and think about the legitimacy of a discovery request, a response thereto, or an objec-
tion." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g), advisory committee's note, 92 F.R.D. 165, 219.
243. Rule 26(b)(1) reads in part:
The frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods set forth in subdivision
(a) shall be limited by the court if it determines that: (i) the discovery sought is
unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source
that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking
discovery has had ample opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain the
information sought; or (iii) the discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive,
taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, limitations
on the parties' resources, and the importance of the issues at stake in the
litigation. The court may act upon its own initiative after reasonable notice or
pursuant to a motion under subdivision (c).
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
244. The advisory committee's note to the 1983 amendment to Rule 26 states in part that:
Excessive discovery and evasion or resistance to reasonable discovery requests
pose significant problems. . . . The purpose of discovery is to provide a
mechanism for making relevant information available to the litigants. "Mutual
knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper
litigation." Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947). Thus the spirit of the
rules is violated when advocates attempt to use discovery tools as tactical
weapons rather than to expose the facts and illuminate the issues by overuse of
discovery or unnecessary use of defensive weapons or evasive responses. All of this
results in excessively costly and time-consuming activities that are
disproportionate to the nature of the case, the amount involved, or the issues or
values at stake.
FED. R. Cv. P. 26 advisory committee's note, 97 F.R.D. 165, 216-17 (emphasis added); see
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V. RULE 26(b)(4)(B): DISCOVERY OF AN EXPERT RETAINED OR
SPECIALLY EMPLOYED BUT NOT EXPECTED TO BE
CALLED AT TRIAL
Discovery of experts retained for assistance in trial preparation
but not expected to testify is governed by Rule 26(b)(4)(B).245 Such
experts are given much greater protection than experts who are
expected to testify at trial.24 6 Because the expert will not be called
upon to testify, the policy concern of adequate preparation for cross-
examination and rebuttal is absent.247 Instead, the focus is on the pre-
vention of unfairness to the retaining party.
248
Rule 26(b)(4)(B) protects the facts known or opinions held by an
expert that were acquired in anticipation of litigation.249 Judges and
scholars disagree, however, over whether the rule extends to protect
the identity of such an expert. The advisory committee's note states
that a party may, on a proper showing, require its opponent to name
non-testifying experts.25 ° Some courts have held that the proper
showing in such a situation is the same exceptional circumstances
standard required to discover the facts known and opinions held by
the non-testifying expert.251 Other courts take the more liberal view
that the discoverability of a non-testifying expert's identity is gov-
erned by the relevancy standard of Rule 26(b)(1) and that only addi-
also FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f) advisory committee note, 85 F.R.D. 521, 527 ("To this end this
subdivision provides that counsel who has attempted without success to effect with opposing
counsel a reasonable program or plan for discovery is entitled to the assistance of the court.").
245. For the text of Rule 26(b)(4), see supra text accompanying note 85.
246. See Ager v. Jane C. Stormont Hosp., 622 F.2d 496, 503 (10th Cir. 1980) ("The party
'seeking disclosure under Rule 26(b)(4)(B) carries a heavy burden' in demonstrating the
existence of exceptional circumstances.") (quoting Hoover v. Department of the Interior, 611
F.2d 1132, 1142 n.13 (5th Cir. 1980)).
247. Mantolete v. Bolger, 96 F.R.D. 179, 181 (D. Ariz. 1982), rev'd in part on other
grounds, 767 F.2d 1416 (9th Cir. 1985); Inspiration Consol. Copper Co. v. Lumberman's Mut.
Casualty Co., 60 F.R.D. 205, 210 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Day, The Ordinary Witness Doctrine:
Discovery of the Pre-Retention Knowledge of a Nonwitness Expert Under Federal Rule
26(b)(4)(B), 38 ARK. L. REV. 763, 793 (1985).
248. See, e.g., Ager, 622 F.2d at 502; In re Sinking of Barge "Ranger I," 92 F.R.D. 486, 488
(S.D. Tex. 1981). For a discussion of the policy concern of fairness, see 8 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, supra note 28, § 2032; Maurer, Compelling the Expert Witness: Fairness and Utility
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 19 GA. L. REV. 71, 91 (1984); Note, Proposed
1967 Amendments to the Federal Discovery Rules, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 271, 282 (1968).
249. For the text of Rule 26(b)(4)(B), see supra text accompanying note 85.
250. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee's note, 48 F.R.D. 487, 504.
251. E.g., Ager, 622 F.2d at 503; In re Pizza Time Theatre Sec. Litig., 113 F.R.D. 94, 97
(N.D. Cal. 1986); Kuster v. Harner, 109 F.R.D. 372, 375 (D. Minn. 1986); Puerto Rico
Aqueduct and Sewer Auth. v. Clow Corp., 108 F.R.D. 304, 311 (N.D. Cal. 1985); Gidlewski v.
Bettcher Indus., 38 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 664, 667 (E.D. Pa. 1983); In re Sinking of Barge "Ranger
I," 92 F.R.D. 486, 488 (S.D. Tex. 1981); Guilloz v. Falmouth Hosp. Ass'n, 21 Fed. R. Serv. 2d
1367, 1371 (D. Mass. 1976); Perry v. W.S. Darley & Co., 54 F.R.D. 278, 280 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
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tional discovery is given the further protection of the exceptional
circumstances test. 2 These inconsistent approaches result from the
promotion of the competing policy concerns of adequate trial prepara-
tion and the "fairness doctrine" which underlie the application of
Rule 26(b)(4).253
A. Discovery of the Identity of a Non-Testifying Expert
The leading case for liberal discovery of the identification of non-
testifying experts is Baki v. B.F. Diamond Construction Company.254
In Baki, a Jones Act case, the plaintiff sought a court order to compel
the defendant to answer interrogatories regarding the identity of any
expert consulted in anticipation of trial but not expected to be called
as a witness. 255 The defendants refused to answer the interrogatories
on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to establish exceptional cir-
cumstances as required by Rule 26(b)(4)(B)1 5 6 After analyzing the
relationship between Rules 26(b)(1), 26(b)(4)(A)(i) and 26(b)(4)(B),
the Baki court concluded that the broad scope of Rule 26(b)(1)
encompassed the identities of both testifying and non-testifying
experts.257 The word "identify" in Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i), the court said,
calls for designating specifically which experts are expected to be trial
witnesses out of the overall list obtained 'initially under Rule
26(b)(1). 258 It added that the word "identify" was deliberately left out
of Rule 26(b)(4)(B) because no further identification of experts was
needed. Thus, the authority for obtaining the name and address of
non-testifying experts was located in Rule 26(b)( 1).259 Therefore,
according to the Baki court, a party must provide the identity of every
expert that it formally consults for trial preparation, whether or not it
intends to call the expert at trial.
The leading case for the restrictive view is Ager v. Jane C.
252. Martin v. Easton Publishing Co., 85 F.R.D. 312, 314 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Roesberg v.
Johns-Manville Corp., 85 F.R.D. 292, 303 (E.D. Pa. 1980); In re Folding Carton Antitrust
Litig., 83 F.R.D. 256, 259-60 (N.D. Ill. 1979); Arco Pipeline Co. v. S/S Trade Star, 81 F.R.D.
416, 417 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Weiner v. Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc., 76 F.R.D. 624, 628 (S.D. Fla.
1977); Baki v. B.F. Diamond Constr. Co., 71 F.R.D. 179, 181-82 (D. Md. 1976); Sea Colony,
Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co., 63 F.R.D. 113, 114 (D. Del. 1974); see also 8 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, supra note 28, § 2032 (construing the "proper showing" standard as simply requiring
a party to request the identity of a nontestifying expert by an interrogatory, to which the
opponent could object and seek a protective order).
253. See supra notes 34-65 and accompanying text.
254. 71 F.R.D. 179 (D. Md. 1976).
255. Id. at 181.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 181-82.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 182.
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Stormont Hospital and Training School.26 The plaintiff in Ager
brought a medical malpractice action against the defendant, Stormont
Hospital. During discovery, the defendant propounded an interro-
gatory on Ms. Ager requesting the identities of any person contacted,
and whether they were going to testify as to the care and treatment
rendered by a co-defendant physician.2 6  The magistrate, relying on
Baki, ordered Ms. Ager to answer the interrogatory.262 Ms. Ager's
counsel refused and was found in civil contempt for failing to comply
with the order to answer defendant's interrogatory regarding the iden-
tity of experts who were consulted but who were not expected to tes-
tify at trial.263 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit rejected
the Baki view, however, and held that the proper standard in such a
situation, called for in the advisory committee's note, was the excep-
tional circumstances standard found in Rule 26(b)(4)(B). 26 The
Tenth Circuit's decision flowed from its analysis of the policy con-
cerns that led to the 1970 amendments to Rule 26, specifically the
"doctrine of fairness. "265 The court stated that "once the identities of
retained or specially employed experts are disclosed, the protective
provisions of the rule concerning facts known or opinions held by
such experts are subverted.
266
The Tenth Circuit identified four specific problems which would
subvert the rule. First, the expert may be contacted or his records
obtained and information thereby revealed which normally would not
be discoverable under Rule 26(b)(4)(B).267 Second, the opponent may
seek to compel the testimony of the non-testifying expert at trial.268
Third, the opponent may call the party to the stand and question him
about non-testifying experts in an attempt to place an inference in the
minds of the jurors that the party may have suppressed adverse facts
or opinions. 269 And fourth, disclosure of the identities of hon-testify-
ing experts may create a chilling effect on the field of consulting
experts.27 °
260' 622 F.2d 496 (0th Cir. 1980).
261. Id. at 498.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 499.
264. Id. at 503.
265. For a discussion of the "fairness doctrine," see supra notes 45-65 and accompanying
text.
266. Ager, 622 F.2d at 503.
267. Id.
268. Id. (citing Kaufman v. Edelstein, 539 F.2d 811 (2d Cir. 1976) (The court has the





Subsequent decisions have strengthened the position taken by the
Tenth Circuit in Ager by directly refuting the Baki court's reading of
the interrelationship of Rules 26(b)(1) and 26(b)(4). These decisions
have espoused the view that although Rule 26(b)(1) is the general rule
concerning discovery, its broad scope is limited by the specific direc-
tives of Rule 26(b)(4).271 They argue that the "proper showing" men-
tioned in the advisory committee's note refers to the specific
requirement of exceptional circumstances contained within Rule
26(b)(4)(B). 27
An additional argument for protecting the identities of non-testi-
fying experts was raised in In re Pizza Time Theatre Securities Litiga-
tion.273 In Pizza Time Theatre, a federal district court in California
rejected the Baki ruling, in part, because the lawyer's decision of
which experts to call as witnesses, and which ones not to call, involves
a decision at the trial preparation stage that "implicates values that
the work-product doctrine was designed to protect. ' 274 It should be
emphasized that this argument is not contrary to the advisory com-
mittee's rejection of work-product protection for expert informa-
tion275 because the focus of the protection here is not the expert's
information but the lawyer's trial preparation decisions. 276 The policy
arguments of Ager as well as the subsequent interpretations of the
relationship between Rules 26(b)(1) and 26(b)(4) refute the analysis of
the Baki court and combine to make a more compelling argument in
favor of the application of the exceptional circumstances requirement
for discovery of non-testifying expert's identities.277 In fact, a recent
271. See Kuster v. Harner, 109 F.R.D. 372, 374-75 (D. Minn. 1986) (Rule 26 (b)(1) creates
a general rule for discovery, but subdivision (b)(4)(B)'s restriction on discovery of non-
testifying experts constitutes a specific limitation upon that general rule.); In re Sinking of
Barge "Ranger I," 92 F.R.D. 486, 488 (S.D. Tex. 1981) (The broad scope of discovery allowed
by Rule 26(b)(1) must be read in light of the more specific directive of 26(b)(4), requiring a
showing of exceptional circumstances.).
272. Kuster, 109 F.R.D. at 374-75; "Ranger I," 92 F.R.D. at 488.
273. 113 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
274. Id. at 98. The court stated that "a solid argument could be advanced that decisions by
lawyers about which people to use for confidential pretrial consultation fall into that most
sacrosanct category recognized in the last sentence of the first paragraph of Rule 26(b)(3),
namely 'the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney.' " Id.
275. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee's note, 48 F.R.D. 487, 505 (The Rule
rejects "as ill-considered the decisions which have sought to bring expert information within
the work-product doctrine.").
276. 113 F.R.D. at 98; see also Mantolete v. Bolger, 96 F.R.D. 179, 182 n.2 (D. Ariz. 1982)
(allowing the defendant to follow the trial strategy it deemed appropriate, including changing
the status of an expert and thereby narrowing the scope of discovery), rev'd in part on other
grounds, 767 F.2d 1416 (9th Cir. 1985); In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig. 105 F.R.D. 577,
580 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (allowing the defendants to follow the trial strategy they deemed
appropriate).
277. But see Note, Discovery of the Nontestifying Expert Witness' Identity Under the Federal
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federal district court decision which adopted the Ager ruling stated
that it is the prevailing viewpoint on the issue.278
B. The Exceptional Circumstances Requirement
of Rule 26(b)(4)(B)
Rule 26(b)(4)(B) protects the facts and opinions of non-testifying
experts by limiting an opposing party's discovery to "exceptional cir-
cumstances under which it is impracticable for the party seeking dis-
covery to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other
means." '279 The Rule does not define this requirement and thus courts
have been left to apply this standard on a case-by-case basis.211 In
their analysis of the cases and comments on this issue, Professors
Wright and Miller conclude that it will rarely be possible to make the
required showing, and in their opinion that result was deliberately
intended by the draftsmen of the rule.281
The 26(b)(4)(B) limitation on discovery of non-testifying experts
covers only the facts or opinions "acquired or developed in anticipa-
tion of litigation or for trial. '28 2 Thus, knowledge possessed by a non-
testifying expert that was acquired prior to retention by a party to the
lawsuit is outside the protection of Rule 26(b)(4) and is instead sub-
ject to the general discovery provisions of Rule 26(b)(1). 8 3 Knowl-
Rules of Civil Procedure: You Can't Tell the Players Without a Program, 37 HASTINGS L.J.
201, 223 (1985) (arguing that the Ager court's analysis is flawed because it improperly
construed the unfairness doctrine as mandating that exceptional circumstances are required
before a non-testifying expert's identity can be discovered); Note, Discovery of the Non witness
Expert Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)(B), 67 IOWA L. REV. 349, 372 (1982)
(arguing that the overriding policy of Rule 26(b) is to provide full pretrial preparation, and it is
thus appropriate that courts allow discovery of non-testifying expert's identities under Rule
26(b)(4)(B) whenever relevant to the litgation, as opposed to adopting the Ager court's
exceptional circumstances requirement).
278. Kuster, 109 F.R.D. at 375; see also Pizza Time Theatre, 113 F.R.D. at 98 (quoting the
Kuster court's recognition of Ager as the prevailing viewpoint).
279. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B). For the entire text of the Rule, see supra note 85 and
accompanying text.
280. See Pearl Brewing Co. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 415 F. Supp. 1122, 1137 (S.D. Tex.
1976); see also Graham, supra note 24, at 933 (noting that a test which requires a court to
balance independent availability and need against harm must obviously be applied on a case-
by-case basis).
281. 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 28, § 2032, quoted in Eliasen v. Hamilton, Ill
F.R.D. 396, 402 (N.D. Ill. 1986); see Ager v. Jane C. Stormont Hospital and Training School,
622 F.2d 496, 503 (10th Cir. 1980) ("The party 'seeking disclosure under Rule 26(b)(4)(B)
carries a heavy burden' in demonstrating the existence of exceptional circumstances.")
(quoting Hoover v. Department of the Interior, 611 F.2d 1132, 1142 n. 13 (5th Cir. 1980)).
282. E.g., Marine Petroleum Co. v. Champlin Petroleum Co., 641 F.2d 984, 990 (D.C. Cir.
1979).
283. Marine Petroleum, 641 F.2d at.990; Eliasen, 111 F.R.D. at 403; see United States v.
22.80 Acres of Land, 107 F.R.D. 20 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (The government's land appraisal report
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edge acquired by the expert prior to being retained may include
opinions expressed by the expert in previous testimony, or in reports,
books and articles which were prepared prior to-the expert being
hired for the present litigation.2 84 The protection of Rule 26(b)(4)(B)
may be lifted, even from trial preparation materials prepared by non-
testifying experts specifically for the present litigation, if the materials
are shown to an expert who is expected to testify at trial.285
Cases interpreting Rule 26(b)(4)(B) reveal two general categories
of exceptional circumstances in which the rule is applicable.286 The
first category encompasses situations where a change in circumstances
involving a matter at issue in the action renders the party seeking
discovery unable to obtain any information on that issue from any
source except the opponent's non-testifying expert. These cases gen-
erally involve a dispute over an object or condition which has been
altered or destroyed prior to one party's expert having had the oppor-
tunity to examine the object or condition in question. The second cat-
egory encompasses situations where the party seeking discovery could
only gain access to the necessary facts or opinions through the expen-
diture of an inordinate amount of time, money and other resources.
Delcastor, Inc. v. Vail Associates, Inc. ,287 a case exemplifying the
first category of exceptional circumstances, involved an action arising
from a mudslide. In Delcastor, the plaintiff sought discovery of a
report prepared by defendant's expert. The defendant's engineering
consultant was the only expert to have made observations of the mud-
slide site the day after it occurred, that is, before its condition had
appreciably changed.288 The only other expert to have made any
observations of the mudslide did so five days after the event when the
site conditions had significantly changed.28 9 The court found these
facts sufficient to meet the exceptional circumstances test because it
was impractical for plaintiff to obtain information similar to that con-
is not protected under Rule 26(b)(4) because the government failed to show that the report was
prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial.); Barkwell v. Sturm Ruger Co., 79 F.R.D.
444, 446 (D. Alaska 1978) (By its own terms, Rule 26(b)(4)(B) is not applicable to an expert's
facts and opinions not acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation.).
284. See infra notes 497-542 and accompanying text.
285. Eliasen, Ill F.R.D. at 399-401; Heitmann v. Concrete Pipe Machinery, 98 F.R.D.
740, 742 (E.D. Mo. 1983). For further discussion of materials that lose protection from
pretrial discovery when shown to an expert witness, see infra notes 318-92 and accompanying
text.
286. Day & Dixon, A Judicial Perspective on Expert Discovery Under Federal Rule 26(b)(4):
An Emprical Study of Trial Court Judges and a Proposed Amendment, 20 JOHN MARSHALL L.
REV. 377, 384 (1987).
287. 108 F.R.D. 405 (D. Colo. 1985).
288. Id. at 408.
289. 'Id. at 409.
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tained in the defendant's expert's report, and it ordered the defendant
to produce the report for the plaintiff.
290
Similarly, the court in MacDonald Sprague Roofing Co. v. USM
Weather-Shield Systems Co. 291 held that a change in the condition of
the roof at issue amounted to a showing of exceptional circumstances
which warranted discovery of a report prepared by the defendant's
expert. 292 This case involved-an action by a roofing contractor against
a manufacturer of roofing materials over defective materials supplied
by the defendant and installed by the plaintiff for a third party.
293
After the plaintiff notified the defendant of the defect, the defendant
had its expert examine the roof and prepare a report.294 Prior to the
replacement of the roof, the defendant informed the plaintiff that the
expert's report would not be made available to the plaintiff.295 In
spite of that warning, the plaintiff replaced the entire roof without
having any other expert examine the defect.296 The court ruled that
exceptional circumstances had been demonstrated by the plaintiff and
ordered the defendant to produce its expert's report.297
In Dixon v. Cappellini,298 the plaintiff brought a civil rights
290. Id. The court rested its decision on two cases decided before the 1970 amendment to
Rule 26. Sanford Const. Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Sales, 45 F.R.D. 465, 466 (E.D.
Ky. 1968); Colden v. R. J. Schofield Motors, 14 F.R.D. 521, 522 (N.D. Ohio 1952). Sanford
Construction involved a dispute over a ruptured sewer pipe, where the plaintiff refused to allow
the defendant's expert to observe the excavation and replacement of the damaged pipe on the
plaintiff's property. Only the plaintiff's experts were present. The United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky allowed discovery of the report prepared by the
plaintiff's expert because the information contained in the report could not be obtained by the
defendant through independent investigation. Sanford Construction, 45 F.R.D. at 466. The
Delcastor court found the facts of its own case to be analogous to those of Sanford Construction
"for practical purposes," because "[in] both cases, circumstances precluded all but one of the
party's experts from gaining a first hand observation of the object or condition." Delcastor, 108
F.R.D. at 409. In Colden, a defendant was allowed discovery of the plaintiff's expert's report
because the automobile at issue had been disassembled after it had been examined by the
plaintiff's expert. Following Colden, the Delcastor court allowed discovery because it was
"impracticable" for the defendant to obtain the information elsewhere. Delcastor, 108 F.R.D.
at 409.
291. 35 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1121 (D. Mass. 1983).
292. Id. at 1124.




297. Id. at 1124. The court recognized that the plaintiff could have engaged its own expert
to examine the roof before making repairs but was careful to emphasize that it granted the
discovery due to the fact that the plaintiff had not yet engaged an attorney when the decision
to repair the roof was made. Id. But cf Hoffman v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 107 F.R.D. 793
(D. Mass. 1985) (denying discovery of a non-testifying expert's report because any impra-
cticability in obtaining discovery resulted from the defendant's "own counsel's tardiness in
seeking to inspect the [now unavailable] machine").
298. 88 F.R.D. I (M.D. Pa. 1980).
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action claiming that she suffered extreme fright and nervous shock as
a result of the defendant's attempt to "de-program" her from the con-
trol of the Unification Church.2 99 The central issue in the case
focused on the mental and physical condition of Ms. Dixon immedi-
ately following the "de-programing" which occurred eight months
prior to the lawsuit.3°° The court permitted discovery of the reports
made by plaintiff's non-testifying psychologist and psychiatrist
because an independent medical examination would not have pro-
duced equivalent information regarding Ms. Dixon's mental state at
the time in question.3"1
The leading case in the second category of exceptional circum-
stances is Pearl Brewing Co. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co.302 In Pearl
Brewing, a liquor wholesaler sued its supplier for antitrust violations
alleging price fixing by the supplier.30 3 The defendant sought discov-
ery of a complex econometric computer program created by the plain-
tiff's non-testifying experts for the plaintiff's case.3° 4 The plaintiff
objected to discovery on two grounds. First, the plaintiff argued that
the defendant was only entitled to interrogatory responses as pre-
scribed in Rule 26(b)(4)(A), 305 and second, that the defendant should
only be entitled to discovery of the testifying expert who was an
observer to the creation of the computer program.30 6 Before under-
taking an analysis of the above issues, the Pearl court rejected the
contention that Rule 26(b)(4)(B) contains a30 7 two-step procedure
similar to that found in Rule 26(b)(4)(A). Instead, the court inter-
preted Rules 26(b)(4)(A) and 26(b)(4)(B) as being mutually exclusive,
and held that the latter rule permitted the court to order whatever
form of discovery was required by the exceptional circumstances
encountered in a given case. 30 8 The court found that limiting discov-
ery to the testifying expert who had observed the creation of the com-
plex computer program would not be sufficient because he had
inadequate expertise in that area.309 After examining the potential
299. Id. at 3.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. 415 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D. Tex. 1976).
303. Id. at 1134.
304. Id. at 1135.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 1137.
308. Id; see also Delcastor, Inc., v. Vail Assoc. Inc., 108 F.R.D. 405, 410 (D. Colo. 1985)
(granting the production of an expert's report because of exceptional circumstances which
made the information otherwise unavailable, but denying deposition of the non-testifying
expert).
309. Pearl Brewing, 415 F. Supp. at 1138.
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unfairness to the plaintiff, and after balancing the expenditure of time
and resources that would be necessary to decipher the program
against the potential delay in an already protracted case, the court
concluded that the totality of the circumstances qualified as excep-
tional circumstances under Rule 26(b)(4)(B).31 °
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has stated that the
focus of the exceptional circumstances test is on the particular infor-
mation at issue and not on the availability of the personal testimony
of the non-testifying expert.31" ' Therefore, it may be concluded from
the above cases that a party must demonstrate that it is virtually
unable to acquire any facts or opinions on the subject in which it is
interested in order to meet the exceptional circumstances requirement
of Rule 26(b)(4)(B).31 2
Critics argue that the availability of Rule 26(b)(4)(B) protection
for certain experts can lead to the suppression of unfavorable findings
or opinions by a party buying out available experts by hiring them as
non-testifying experts.313 This criticism, however, is not very con-
vincing for the following reasons. First, the rule does not protect
opinions or reports of non-testifying experts expressed or written
prior to their retention by either of the parties.3 14 In addition, the
court has the power to compel an expert to testify to opinions already
held.315 Second, it is unlikely that a party could buy out all experts on
an issue given the ever-increasing pool of expert witnesses. Further-
more, if all such experts were bought off, it is within the court's power
to find such a situation as meeting the exceptional circumstances
requirement of the rule.
31 6
310. Id.
311, Marine Petroleum Co. v. Champlin Petroleum Co., 641 F.2d 984, 996 (D.C. Cir.
1979).
312. Id. at 996-97 (quoting 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 29, § 2032); see also In
re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 105 F.R.D. 577, 581 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (allowing deposition
of experts on specific information which was not "readily available from any other source,"
and denying discovery on issues for which information was readily available in literature on
the subject).
313. United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66, 76 (9th Cir. 1968); Note, Discovery of Expert
Information, 47 N.C.L. REV. 401, 406 (1969). For a comparison of state and federal decisions
which have dealt specifically with the use, by one party, of an expert consulted initially by the
opponent but not used by that party because of an adverse opinion, see infra notes 397-458 and
accompanying text.
314. See infra notes 497-542 and accompanying text.
315. Kaufman v. Edelstein, 539 F.2d 811 (2d Cir. 1976).
316. See Eliasen v. Hamilton, I11 F.R.D. 396, 402 (N.D. I1. 1986) (A party may depose an
opponent's non-testifying expert under the unusual circumstances that there are no other
available experts in the same field or subject area.); Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 57 F.R.D. 11,
14 (N.D. I1. 1972) ("The Rule clearly contemplates a showing that a party has found opinions
by others on the subject to be unavailable before he may obtain discovery from his opponent's
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VI. DISCOVERY OF MATERIALS GIVEN
TO A TESTIFYING EXPERT
Cases such as Quadrini v. Sikorsky Aircraft Division, United Air-
craft Corp. and In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Litigation
address the issue of whether materials developed in anticipation of
trial by an expert who is expected to testify at trial are discoverable.
A different issue is raised under Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(ii) when discovery
is sought of the materials that a testifying expert relied upon in reach-
ing an opinion. Though the advisory committee specifically rejected
the work-product doctrine and the attorney-client privilege as
grounds for protecting materials produced by an expert, 317 it failed to
address clearly the issue of whether materials an expert relied upon in
developing an opinion lost any privilege or protection that they pos-
sessed prior to being shown to the expert.
At least one court has held that the mere act of an attorney
arranging documents in a purposeful manner may confer work-prod-
uct status on the documents.318 It could be argued, therefore, that
almost any materials gathered and arranged by an attorney for pres-
entation to an expert could be claimed to fall within the protection of
the doctrine. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3), 319
work-product materials are not discoverable unless a party can show
both that it has a substantial need for the materials and that it could
not obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials without undue
hardship.320 Materials that constitute the opinion work-product of an
attorney enjoy an even higher standard of protection that makes such
materials rarely discoverable.32 I Similarly, materials prepared by a
non-testifying expert, such as his report, are normally discoverable
only upon a showing of exceptional circumstances.322
retained expert who is not expected to be called to testify on the same subject."); see also Ager
v. Jane C. Stormont Hospital and Training School, 622 F.2d 496, 503-04 n.8 (10th Cir. 1980)
(Professor Sacks, a reporter to the advisory committee, cited one example of exceptional
circumstances as occurring when the number of experts in a field is small and those experts are
already retained by others.).
317. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee's note, 48 F.R.D. 487, 505.
318. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 74 F.R.D. 613, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). The
Berkey court noted that the pages collate the expected, imagined, or hoped-for proofs of
counsel and reflected, among other things, the "advocate's professional interaction with the
materials of his art." Id.
319. For the text of Rule 26(b)(3), see supra note 160.
320. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); J. MOORE, supra note 34, 26.64[3.-1], at 26-362; C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 28, § 2025, at 214.
321. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); J. MOORE, supra note 34, T 26.64[3.-2], at 26-383; C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & F. ELLIOT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2026, at 107 (2d
ed. 1987).
322. See supra notes 279-316 and accompanying text.
19881
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:1101
A problem arises when a testifying expert relies upon materials
prepared by a non-testifying expert. A problem results because in
cross-examining the testifying expert, it may be necessary to attack
the materials upon which he based his opinion, although the materials
were prepared by someone else-someone who will not appear at
trail.3 23 In addition, when materials have been prepared by one expert
and given to another, a party may need to discover not only the con-
tent of the materials but also information about, and from, the expert
who prepared the materials.3 24 Professor Graham has observed that
to cross-examine the testifying expert effectively, it may be necessary
to discover information from the non-testifying, or "second-tier"
expert.325 Such discovery is necessary to explore the non-testifying
expert's qualifications and background, to determine the facts, data or
opinions upon which the non-testifying expert relied, and to evaluate
the acceptance within the discipline of any tests that were performed
by the non-testifying expert.3 26 Finally, a cross-examiner needs to
know whether the second-tier expert's opinion exhibits a reasonable
degree of scientific, medical or technical certainty. Such information
can only come directly from the second-tier expert.32 7
The work-product doctrine protects materials prepared in antici-
pation of litigation or for trial.3 28 It does not, however, protect from
discovery relevant facts known, or available, to the party from whom
discovery is being sought even if the facts are contained in a document
which is itself not discoverable.329 Similarly, Rule 26(b)(4)(B) does
not protect from discovery facts or opinions of the non-testifying
expert which were not acquired or developed in anticipation of litiga-
tion.330 To the extent that materials or information given to the testi-
fying expert encompass such information, the underlying information
is discoverable. Nevertheless, the manner in which the underlying
facts or opinions were set out by the attorney or the non-testifying
expert may itself have a subtle influence and effect on the testifying
expert's opinion. This is particularly true where the opinion of the
expert depends on the expert's subjective impressions.
Discovery of the actual material given to the expert is necessary,





328. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); see supra note 160 for the text of the Rule.
329. J. MOORE, supra note 34, T 26.64[1], at 26-348; C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note
28, § 2023, at 194.
330. J. MOORE, supra note 34, 26.66[2], at 26-408; C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note
28, § 2029, at 250.
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therefore, even in those cases where substantially the same informa-
tion may be provided to the discovering party in another form.
Prohibiting discovery of this type of information would encourage
parties to give experts information in a protected form in order to
frustrate discovery. In contrast, because the information may usually
be presented to the expert in a form other than that which represents
the work-product of an attorney or the report of a non-testifying
expert, a rule permitting discovery of otherwise protected material
would not be unduly burdensome on parties in preparing their expert
witnesses for trial.
In the antitrust action, United States v. International Business
Machines Corp.,331 IBM sought depositions of the government's
expert witnesses and production of all materials considered by the
expert's in reaching their conclusions. The court denied the request
for the deposition of the experts themselves because IBM had failed to
follow the two-step procedure of 26(b)(4)(A).332 The court, however,
did permit discovery of the information given to the experts by the
government.333 Quoting from the advisory committee's note, which
referred to Rule 26(b)(4) as "a new provision dealing with discovery
of information (including facts and opinions) obtained by a party from
an expert retained by that party in relation to litigation or obtained by
the expert and not yet transmitted to the party," the court held that
only discovery of materials generated by the expert would be con-
trolled by Rule 26(b)(4)(A).334 By ordering production of the docu-
ments, the court apparently held that discovery of materials relied
upon by an expert would be limited only by the requirement of rele-
vancy imposed by Rule 26(b)(1).
3 5
Despite the sweeping language of this decision, a number of
courts still wrestle with the problem of deciding whether to grant
motions for the discovery of material given by a party to its expert.
Though courts usually permit the discovery of materials not other-
wise protected by the work-product doctrine or by Rule 26(b)(4)(B),
they have been reluctant to permit discovery where these protections
have been invoked. The primary question then is whether showing
materials to a testifying expert is included within an exception to the
rules which permit a party to protect materials from discovery.
Courts that have considered the issue of permitting discovery of
331. 72 F.R.D. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
332. Id. at 81; see supra notes 103-20 and accompanying text for an explanation of the
"two-step" procedure of Rule 26(b)(4)(A).
333. Id.
334. Id. at 82.
335. Id.
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work-product materials given to testifying experts have reached vary-
ing results. In Boring v. Keller,336 the defendant's expert was expected
to testify as to whether the plaintiff had given her informed consent to
a medical procedure.337 Inadvertently, the defendant doctor's attor-
ney gave to his testifying experts papers containing the attorney's
impressions of the plaintiff's demeanor and appearance during a dep-
osition. 338 The court recognized that because the expert had read the
attorney's characterization of the witness, the materials would be rele-
vant to an evaluation of the expert's assessment of the plaintiff.
3 39
Therefore, the court held that the defendant had effectively waived
the protection of the work-product doctrine by showing the materials
to his testifying experts, even though the materials constituted "opin-
ion" work-product, which, as shown immediately below, some courts
have ruled is never discoverable.3 °
Hestitancy in allowing the discovery of opinion work-product
appeared in the antitrust action, Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak
Co. 34 ' Berkey was cited by the Boring court for the proposition that
work-product protection is waived when the materials are shown to
an expert witness. 342 The Berkey court prohibited the discovery of
four notebooks prepared by Kodak's attorney containing the attor-
ney's synthesis of the facts and factual issues of the litigation.343 Dur-
ing discovery, it was revealed that two of Kodak's expert witnesses
had received and read the notebooks subsequent to their being
retained. 3" Although one expert could not recall using the notebook
in reaching his conclusions, the other expert stated that it provided
him with background information concerning the company's product
development.345
Instead of applying the discovery procedures of Rule 26(b)(4),
the Berkey court analyzed the discovery request in light of Federal
Rule of Evidence 612,346 which gives a court the discretionary power
336. 97 F.R.D. 404 (D. Colo. 1983).
337. Id. at 406.
338. Id. at 404.
339. Id. at 408.
340. Id. at 407.
341. 74 F.R.D. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
342. 97 F.R.D. at 407.
343. 74 F.R.D. at 617.
344. Id. at 614.
345. Id.
346. Rule 612 of the Federal Rules of Evidence reads:
Except as otherwise provided in criminal proceedings by section 3500 of title 18,
United States Code, if a witness uses a writing to refresh his memory for the
purpose of testifying, either -
(1) while testifying, or
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to compel the production of a writing used to refresh the memory of a
witness prior to his giving testimony. 47 The Berkey court concluded
that Rule 612 was applicable because the information in the note-
books impacted on the expert witness' testimony.348 The court
expressed its concern that a party might influence an expert's opinion
with items of work-product and then prevent access to the documents
that might "reveal and counteract the effects of such materials." '349 In
holding that the work-product doctrine was a bar to discovery in this
case, however, the court found that there was no testimony that the
attorney in this litigation planned to use the work-product materials
to influence the opinion of the expert with the intention of thereby
preventing their discovery.35° In addition, other materials which were
provided to the discovering party contained most of the information
contained in the documents given to the experts. 351  Finally, noting
the lack of developed case law on this issue, the court stated that
Kodak's counsel was "not vividly aware of the potential for a stark
choice between withholding the notebooks from the experts or turn-
ing them over to opposing counsel. ' 352 The Berkey court went on,
however, to issue a warning that in future cases, "a sharp discounting
of the concerns on which the defendant is prevailing" in the case at
hand would result in the discovery of materials shown to expert
witnesses.3 53
By focusing on the impact that the materials had on the expert
witness' opinion, the court sidestepped the fact that the purpose of
Federal Rule of Evidence 612 is to test the existence and accuracy of
(2) before testifying, if the court in its discretion determines it is necessary in
the interests of justice, an adverse party is entitled to have the writing produced
at the hearing, to inspect it, to cross-examine the witness thereon, and to
introduce in evidence those portions which relate to the testimony of the witness.
If it is claimed that the writing contains matters not related to the subject matter
of the testimony the court shall examine the writing in camera, excise any
portions not so related, and order delivery of the remainder to the party entitled
thereto. Any portion withheld over objections shall be preserved and made
available to the appellate court in the event of an appeal. If a writing is not
produced or delivered pursuant to order under this rule, the court shall make any
order justice requires, except that in criminal cases when the prosecution elects
not to comply, the order shall be one striking the testimony or, if the court in its
discretion determines that the interests of justice so require, declaring a mistrial.
FED. R. EvID. 612.
347. Berkey, 74 F.R.D. at 615.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 616.
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the witness' memory.354 Rule 612 assumes that prior to the giving of
the materials to the witness to refresh his memory, the witness had
already known the information contained in the materials. The awk-
wardness, therefore, of applying this rule in Berkey lies in the fact that
the information provided to the witnesses in Berkey was, presumably,
not information already known to them.
In addition, the Berkey court failed to consider the application of
Rule 26(b)(4). Even if the ultimate result in future cases is the same,
it is desirable that Rule 26(b)(4) be used to reach the result instead of
Rule 612 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 26(b)(4) has been
specifically designed to work in conjunction with the other discovery
provisions of Rule 26. To expand unnecessarily the scope of Rule 612
to cover such cases runs the risk of bypassing many of the safeguards
built into the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, such as those included in the 1983 amendments to Rule26(b)( 1).351
In Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp.,356 the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit took a less expansive view of discovery than that taken
in Boring, or foreshadowed in Berkey. In Bogosian, the class-action
plaintiffs designated eight experts to testify on the subjects of gasoline
marketing, statistics, economics, chemistry and automotive engineer-
ing. 57 All parties agreed that the experts would be subject to deposi-
tions pursuant to Rule 26(b)(4)(A).358 In anticipation of the
impending depositions, the district court ordered the production of
virtually every document the testifying experts had examined during
the course of the litgation. 359 The order provided that the plaintiffs
need only identify, but not produce, documents which they asserted
were protected by the attorney-client privilege or the work-product
doctrine.3 " Upon a subsequent motion by the defendant oil compa-
nies, the district court ordered the production of the 115 documents
which had been identified as attorney work-product. 361 The district
354. FED. R. EvID. 612 advisory committee's note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 277.
355. The advisory committee's note to Rule 612 of the Federal Rules of Evidence suggests
that there was concern that Rule 612 might be used to seek overly broad discovery:
The purpose of the phrase "for the purpose of testifying" is to safeguard against
using the rule as a pretext for wholesale exploration of an opposing party's files
and to insure that access is limited only to those writings which may fairly be
said in fact to have an impact upon the testimony of the witness.
Id.
356. 738 F.2d 587 (3d Cir. 1984).







court ordered the production of the materials in accordance with
Rule 26(b)(4) because the attorneys needed to adequately prepare for
the cross-examination of the experts.3 62 In a clash between the work-
product protection of Rule 26(b)(3) and the discovery provisions of
Rule 26(b)(4), the trial court reasoned that Rule 26(b)(4) would have
to take precedence.3 63
In considering the plaintiff's writ of mandamus, the Third Cir-
cuit distinguished between two types of attorney work-product.3 4
The first type, ordinary work-product, consists of documents or tangi-
ble things produced by a party's attorney or agent in anticipation of
litigation.365 Discovery of this type of work-product is controlled by
the substantial need test found in the first sentence of Rule 26(b)(3).36 6
The second type of work-product consists of the "documents pre-
pared by attorneys containing solely their mental impressions and
thought processes relating to the legal theories of a complex case.
367
This core or opinion work-product is entitled to an even greater pro-
tection. 368 After making this distinction, the court concluded that the
first sentence of Rule 26(b)(3), subjecting discovery of ordinary work-
product to the provisions of Rule 26(b)(4), does not limit the work-
product protection described in the second sentence of Rule 26(b)(3),
which gives heightened protection to opinion work-product materi-
als. 369 The court also found in its analysis of Rule 26(b)(4) that an
effective cross-examination of expert witnesses can be accomplished
"without an inquiry into the lawyer's role in assisting with the formu-
lation of the theory. ' 370 The Third Circuit held that the plaintiff did
not need to produce the materials it claimed were protected by the
work-product doctrine.37 '
In contrast to the cases addressing the issue of attorney work-
product given to a testifying expert, courts have been relatively consis-
tent in granting additional discovery under Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(ii) when
faced with the question of whether to permit the discovery of a report
prepared by a non-testifying expert which was given to a testifying
expert. One of the earliest cases to address the question of the protec-
tion afforded by Rule 26(b)(4)(B) to a report prepared by a non-testi-
362. Id.
363. Id. at 590.
364. Id. at 592.
365. Id. at 593.
366. See supra notes 190-229 and 319-30 and accompanying texts.
367. Bogosian, 738 F.2d at 594.
368. Supra note 321 and accompanying text.
369. Bogosian, 738 F.2d at 594.
370. Id. at 595.
371. Id.
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fying expert which has been shown to a testifying expert was
Heitmann v. Concrete Pipe Machinery.372 In Heitmann, the defend-
ant's testifying expert revealed that he had relied upon the report of
the defendant's non-testifying expert in forming his opinion.373 In
exercising its discretion under Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(ii), the trial court
ruled that although the report would normally have enjoyed the
higher level of protection afforded by the exceptional circumstances
standard of Rule 26(b)(4)(B), the defendant in Heitmann took the
report out of the protection of the rule when it voluntarily gave the
report to its testifying expert.374 The court added that the report was
necessary for an effective cross-examination of the expert and that the
defendant could have prevented the discovery of the report simply by
not giving the report to its testifying expert.375
The court in Delcastor, Inc. v. Vail Associates, Inc. 3 6 relied on
the Heitmann decision to support its opinion granting discovery of
the defendant expert's report. The report sought by the plaintiff in
Delcastor was written by the defendant's expert who was going to tes-
tify at trial, but only concerning the factual circumstances surround-
ing the mudslide that was the subject matter of the litigation.377
Because the expert was not expected to testify concerning his opinions
on the cause of the mudslide, the defendant argued that the report
should be protected under Rule 26(b)(4)(B) as the report of a non-
testifying expert.378 The plaintiff sought discovery of the defendant's
expert's report because the expert was the only expert to have seen the
property immediately after the mudslide.37 9 Though the court found
that this created sufficient exceptional circumstances to justify its
decision to permit discovery of the report,38 0 it further supported its
decision by noting that the report had been given to and relied upon
by the defendant's expert who was expected to testify at trial on the
issue of causation. 3 ' The court rejected as meaningless the defend-
ant's characterization of the testifying expert's reliance on the report
as only being a general, as opposed to a specific, reliance.38 2 The
court stated that if the testifying expert relied upon the report at all in
372. 98 F.R.D. 740 (E.D. Mo. 1983).
373. Id. at 741.
374. Id. at 742.
375. Id. at 743.
376. 108 F.R.D. 405 (D. Colo. 1985); see also supra notes 287-90 and accompanying text.
377. Delcastor, 108 F.R.D. at 407.
378. Id. at 408.
379. Id: at 409.
380. Id.
381. Id. at 408.
382. Id.
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formulating an opinion, the need for preparing cross-examination
required the production of the report.383
In Eliasen v. Hamilton,38 4 the trial court limited the breadth of
the Delcastor holding by refusing to grant the deposition of plaintiffs'
non-testifying expert who had written a report which was then given
to the plaintiffs' testifying expert. The plaintiffs in Eliasen permitted
the defendants to depose their testifying expert and gave them a copy
of the non-testifying expert's report. 385 The testifying expert had
reviewed the report, but declined to use it or rely upon it in the forma-
tion of an opinion.386 The court refused to permit the deposition of
the report's author because it went "beyond the report considered by
the testifying expert. ' 387 To do so, reasoned the court, the deposition
would have exceeded the scope of discovery permitted in either
Heitmann or Delcastor where only production of the report was
granted and not full discovery of the non-testifying expert.388
To date, no court has explicitly adopted Professor Graham's ana-
lytical approach for dealing with the problem of second-tier experts
under Rule 26(b)(4). Professor Graham suggests that in all cases
courts should find that second-tier experts are retained and that
exceptional circumstances are present.389 Professor Graham but-
tresses his argument by pointing out that it is impossible for a party to
obtain the necessary information about the second-tier expert from
anyone but the second-tier expert.39 °
Professor Graham has proposed an amendment to Rule
26(b)(4)(A), which would in effect permit discovery of any materials
given to the expert witness in addition to discovery of any underlying
second-tier experts. The proposed amendment reads in relevant part
as follows:
(A) A party may discover from a person whom any other party
expects to call as an expert witness at trial, and from the other
party, facts and data known and opinions held by the expert wit-
ness together with the grounds of each opinion. Furthermore, if
such expert witness relies in forming his opinion, in whole or in
part, upon facts, data, or opinions contained in a document or
made known to him by or through another person, a party may
383. Id.
384. 111 F.R.D. 396 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
385. Id. at 397.
386. Id.
387. Id. at 399.
388. Id.
389. Graham, supra note 111, at 199. For further discussion of the discovery of second-tier
experts, see supra notes 323-27 and accompanying text.
390. Graham, supra note 111, at 199.
1988] 1159
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:1101
also discover with respect thereto.391
Though Professor Graham proposed the amendment to deal spe-
cifically with the problem of the second-tier expert, the broad lan-
guage of the amendment would also seem to encompass the discovery
of work-product materials. In essence, the proposed amendment
would reject the approach taken by the court in Eliasen and would
allow discovery of the second-tier expert so that the discovering party
may fully prepare to cross-examine and rebut the testifying expert at
trial.
VII. DISCOVERY OF OTHER CLASSES OF EXPERTS WITHIN THE
SCOPE OF RULE 26(b)(4)
- Rule 26(b)(4) deals expressly with experts who have been
retained or specially employed in anticipation of litigation or prepara-
tion for trial.392 There are, however, other classes of experts that have
been the subject of debate in the courts and in the scholarly literature.
The advisory committee's note identifies certain experts as falling
within the category not covered by Rule 26(b)(4); experts who are
actors or viewers with respect to the subject matter of the lawsuit,393
general employees of a party not specially employed,3 94 and experts
informally consulted in preparation for trial but not retained or spe-
cially employed.395 Other discovery questions not covered by the
391. Id. at 200.
392. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4). For the text of Rule 26(b)(4), see supra note 85 and
accompanying text.
393. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee's notes, 48 F.R.D. 487, 503 (noting that
Rule 26(b)(4) treats as an ordinary witness an expert "whose information was not acquired in
preparation for trial but rather because he was an actor or viewer with respect to transactions
or occurrences that are part of the subject matter of the lawsuit"); see, e.g., Sipes v. United
States, 111 F.R.D. 59, 61 (S.D. Cal. 1986) (A treating physician is not protected as an expert
by Rule 26(b)(4) because the information and opinions he possessed were obtained by virtue of
his role as actor or viewer of the occurrences giving rise to the litigation.); Quarantillo v.
Consolidated Rail Corp., 106 F.R.D. 435, 436 (W.D.N.Y. 1985) (A neurologist's role in the
actual treatment of the plaintiff removes discovery limitations of Rule 26(b)(4)(A).); Baran v.
Presbyterian Univ. Hosp., 102 F.R.D. 272, 273 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (Opinion testimony by the
defendant doctor is admissible without advance notice during pretrial discovery because Rule
26(b)(4)(A) is not applicable to the testimony of a party to the lawsuit.).
394. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B) advisory committee's note, 48 F.R.D. 487, 504 (Rule
26(b)(4)(B) excludes "an expert who is simply a general employee of the party not specially
employed on the case."). Compare Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Sun Shipbuilding & D.D.
Co., 68 F.R.D. 397, 408 (E.D. Va. 1975) (treating in-house experts, for discovery purposes, as
ordinary witnesses) with Seiffer v. Topsy's Int'l, Inc., 69 F.R.D. 69, 72 (D. Kan. 1975) (holding
a partner in the defendant accounting firm to be "specifically employed in anticipation of
litigation," thereby giving him limited immunity as a non-testifying expert).
395. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee's note, 48 F.R.D. 487, 504 (Rule
26(b)(4)(B) "precludes discovery against experts who were informally consulted in preparation
for trial, but not retained or specially employed."); see, e.g., Ager v. Jane C. Stormont Hosp.,
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Rule concern the knowledge and opinions of retained non-testifying
experts which were not acquired in anticipation of litigation (pre-
retention knowledge), and the ability to compel discovery of experts
who may hold relevant information but have not been retained by
either party (pure experts).
A. Experts Informally Consulted but Not Retained
The advisory committee's note expressly precludes any discovery
of experts who have been informally consulted but not retained or
specially employed by a party to the dispute.396 The ambiguity of the
Rule lies in the definition of retained or specially employed. If a court
finds that an expert has been retained or specially employed by one of
the parties for litigation, then the expert moves up into the subdivi-
sion (B) class of experts, which is subject to discovery upon a showing
of exceptional circumstances.397 On the other hand, if the expert was
only informally consulted, this expert is completely protected from
the discovery process. 39 1 The leading case on informal consultants is
Ager v. Jane C. Stormont Hospital and Training School 399 In Ager, a
medical malpractice action, the defendant sought to discover the iden-
tities of all experts whom the plaintiff had contacted regarding the
care and treatment rendered by the co-defendant physician.400 The
plaintiff's attorney refused to divulge the identities of any non-testify-
ing experts.4° 1 As a result of continued refusal to comply with court
orders, the plaintiff's attorney was found in civil contempt, which was
appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.4 2
The plaintiff urged the court to adopt Professor Graham's defini-
tion of an informal consultant, by which "an expert 'would be infor-
622 F.2d 496, 501 (10th Cir. 1980) (The advisory committee's note precluding discovery of
informal consultants encompasses information, opinions, and the identity of the consultants.);
USM Corp. v. America Aerosols, Inc., 631 F.2d 420, 424-25 (6th Cir. 1980) (Because
discovery of expert information acquired in anticipation of litigation must be made according
to Rule 26(b)(4), "if no provision is made for experts consulted informally in anticipation of
litigation, no discovery concerning them is permissible.").
396. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee's note, 48 F.R.D. 487, 504; 4 J. MOORE,
supra note 34, 26.66[4]; 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 29, at § 2033; Graham,
supra note 24, at 938-40.
397. See Note, Discovery of the Nonwitness Expert Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b)(4)(B), 67 IOWA L. REV. 349, 355 (1982); see also Graham, supra note 24, at 939
(Although the distinction between experts retained and those only informally consulted is
unclear at times, it is important for purposes of discovery.).
398. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee's note, 48 F.R.D. 487, 504; see, e.g., Ager,
622 F.2d at 501-02.
399. 622 F.2d 496 (10th Cir. 1980).
400. Id. at 498.
401. Id. at 498-99.
402. 1d; see supra notes 260-72 and accompanying text.
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mally consulted if, for any reason, the consulting party did not
consider the expert of any assistance', and that, '[a] consulting party
may consider the expert of no assistance because of his insufficient
credentials, his unattractive demeanor or his excessive fees.' ,0 The
trial court's magistrate adopted a stricter definition, excluding from
the category of "informal consultant" any expert with whom a party
had made an appointment to discuss a case or examine records and
give advice or opinions for which a fee was paid or promised.' The
trial court envisioned an informal consultation as being one at a
"social event or on a golf course," where a discussion concerning a
case ensued, but no written report or charge was made or
contemplated.4° 5
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit recognized the mer-
its of both arguments but found that each should be only a factor in
the determination of the status of the expert.4 6 The appellate court
then established the following four-factor test to determine the status
of an expert on a case-by-case basis. First, the trial court must ascer-
tain the manner in which the consultation was initiated. Second, the
court must identify the nature, type, and extent of information or
material provided to, or determined by the expert in connection with
his review. Third, the court must ascertain the duration and intensity
of the consultive relationship. And fourth, the court must identify the
terms of the consultation, if any, such as payment and confidentiality
of the test data or opinions. 4° 7 While this multifactor approach has
the advantage of flexibility, it is also true, as one commentator has
pointed out, that the court's failure to weigh each factor and to clarify
the meaning of certain of the factors may render the test difficult to
apply." 8
Several policy reasons compel additional protection from discov-
ery for informal consultants. First, allowing discovery of informal
consultants may have a chilling effect on potential expert witnesses.409
For instance, the Ager court expressed a fear that a liberal discovery
rule for informally consulted experts may "inevitably lessen the
number of candid opinions available as well as the number of consul-





408. Note, supra note 397, at 358-59.
409. See, e.g., Ager, 622 F.2d at 503; Healy v. Counts, 100 F.R.D. 493, 497 (D. Colo. 1984).
See generally Friedenthal, supra note 22.
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tants willing to even discuss a potential.., claim with counsel."410 A
second and more direct reason is that allowing discovery of the iden-
tity of informally consulted experts may lead to ex-parte contact
between the opposing party and the expert.4"1 Such ex-parte contacts
raise the policy concern about the unfairness of the discovery to the
more diligent party. This unfairness is of particular concern when the
consultant gives an unfavorable opinion which, if presented to a jury,
will carry great weight against the first hiring party.41 2 When such
ex-parte contacts with consultant experts have occurred in violation
of pretrial discovery orders, courts have imposed sanctions against the
use of any information received.41 3 The question remains, however,
whether inadvertent ex-parte contacts are a violation of Rule
26(b)(4)(B) if the opponent of the party that made the initial contact
subsequently hires the expert and obtains adverse trial testimony from
the expert.
Several state courts which have expert witness discovery rules
modeled after Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4) have held that
the introduction of such adverse testimony against the initial hiring
party is not controlled by the discovery rules.41 4 Thus, in Granger v.
Wisner,41 '5 a medical malpractice action, the plaintiff sought to pre-
Vent the defendant from introducing the testimony of a doctor whom
plaintiff's counsel had previously consulted and from whom he had
received the opinion that there had been no malpractice.41 6 The Ari-
zona Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's admission of the
adverse testimony, because the ex-parte contact did not violate the
discovery process.417 The court examined the fairness concerns
underlying the exceptional circumstances requirement of Rule
26(b)(4)(B), but ultimately decided that the discovery rules provided
no basis for the suppression of the evidence. 41 8 Recognizing that
410. Ager, 622 F.2d at 503.
411. Id.
412. See Friedenthal, supra note 22, at 460; Note, supra note 397, at 358.
413. See, e.g., Durflinger v. Artiles, 727 F.2d 888, 891 (10th Cir. 1984) (upholding the trial
court's exclusion of testimony of an expert witness because that testimony was improperly
solicited from the opponent's non-testifying expert in violation of Rule 26(b)(4)(B)); Campbell
Indus. v. M/V Gemini Enter., 619 F.2d 24, 26 (9th Cir. 1980) (The district court did not abuse
its discretion in precluding testimony obtained from the opponent's non-testifying expert in
"flagrant violation" of Rule 26(b)(4).).
414. See, e.g., Granger v. Wisner, 134 Ariz. 377, 656 P.2d 1238 (1982); Fenlon v. Thayer,
127 N.H. 702, 506 A.2d 319 (1986); Cogdell v. Brown, 220 N.J. Super. 330, 531 A.2d 1379
(Law Div. 1987).
415. 134 Ariz. 377, 656 P.2d 1238 (1982).
416. Id. at 379, 656 P.2d at 1240.
417. Id. at 381, 656 P.2d at 1242.
418. Id., 656 P.2d at 1242.
1988] 1163
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:1101
unfair prejudice could result against the initial hiring party if jurors,
unfamiliar with the adversary system, drew the inference that the ini-
tial hiring party had attempted to suppress evidence, the trial court
enjoined defendant's counsel from mentioning, on direct examination,
the prior consultation by the plaintiff.41 9 This restriction, however,
would have been lifted had the expert's credibility or credentials been
attacked on cross-examination.42 Because this condition could
severely restrict an effective cross-examination of the expert, the court
conceded that in some cases the risk of unfair prejudice may be so
great that the trial court should preclude the expert's testimony
altogether.42'
In another medical malpractice action, Fenlon v. Thayer,422 the
plaintiff learned during discovery of a medical expert whom the
defendant had contacted to render an opinion on the malpractice
issues and as a potential testifying expert.423 After learning that the
expert had given a preliminary opinion that was favorable to their
case and that the defendant was not going to call the expert at trial,
the plaintiff listed the expert as a trial witness and subpoenaed him.424
After a voir-dire examination of the expert, the trial court denied the
plaintiff's motion to compel the unwilling expert to testify.4 25 The
New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed the trial court's order that
had denied the plaintiff the use of the expert's testimony. The State
Supreme Court rejected the argument that the plaintiff was precluded
from calling the expert to testify because he had been consulted ini-
tially by the defendant. 426 The court agreed with the Granger court
that the discovery rules did not control the issue of testimony at
trial.427 It disagreed, however, with Granger insofar as the latter had
placed a restriction on the introduction of testimony regarding the
defendant's previous consultation with the expert. 428  The Fenlon
court viewed the prior consultation by the defendant as a relevant
factor pertaining to the weight and credibility of the expert's testi-
mony which it believed the jury ought to have the opportunity to
consider.429
419. Id., 656 P.2d at 1242.
420. Id. at 382, 656 P.2d at 1243.
421. Id., 656 P.2d at 1243.
422. 127 N.H. 702, 506 A.2d 319 (1986).
423. Id. at 704, 506 A.2d at 320.
424. Id., 506 A.2d at 320.
425. Id., 506 A.2d at 320-21.
426. Id. at 705-06, 506 A.2d at 321.
427. Id., 506 A.2d at 321.
428. Id. at 708-09, 506 A.2d at 323.
429. Id., 506 A.2d at 323.
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In contrast to Granger and Fenlon is the federal district court
opinion in Healy v. Counts,43° a medical malpractice action in which
plaintiff's counsel consulted two expert witnesses during the prepara-
tion of the case.43 1 After reviewing the records, the experts concluded
that no malpractice had occurred.432 One of the experts was later
asked independently by defendant's counsel to review the record.4 33
When the expert realized that he had already reviewed the record for
the plaintiff, he informed defendant's counsel of that fact as well as
the opinion he had given to the plaintiff.4 34 The defendant subse-
quently listed both experts as trial witnesses. The magistrate denied
the plaintiff's motion to strike the defendant's endorsement of the
expert witnesses and the plaintiff appealed.4 35 The Healy court ruled
that the underlying policy concerns of Rule 26(b)(4)(B) precluded
both discovery and testimony from a consulting expert when offered
against the party that had initially consulted-the expert.43 6 The court
found that "to construct a rule for happenstance that differs from the
rule of discovery as set out in Rule 26 and the Ager opinion is an
invitation to permit 'happenstance' to replace the formal strictures of
discovery. ' 437 This court found that the Granger restriction on direct
testimony regarding the prior consultation by the opponent was insuf-
ficient to prevent unfair prejudice before the jury and that it would
further limit the already difficult job of cross-examination of expert
witnesses.438
The Healy court's rule would certainly be easy to administer,
however, it is too inflexible because it over-emphasizes the potential
unfairness to the initial hiring party. The defendant in Healy did not
learn of the plaintiff's consultation with the experts. in question
through the discovery process.439 The only way it could be said that
the defendant was "build[ing] his case out of his opponent's
experts"'  is if at trial the expert was allowed to testify about the
initial consultation."' Such testimony could be unfairly prejudicial,
430. 100 F.R.D. 493 (D. Colo. 1984).




435. Id. at 495.
436. Id. at 495-96 (relying extensively on the Ager decision throughout its analysis).
437. Id. at 497.
438. Id.
439. Id. at 494.
440. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee's note, 48 F.R.D. 487, 504.
441. See Healy, 100 F.R.D. at 496-97; Granger, 134 Ariz. at 382, 656 P.2d at 1243. But see
Fenlon, 127 N.H. at 704, 506 A.2d at 323 (holding that "the fact that a party's adversary first
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but as the Granger court indicated, the trial court has the ability to
control that problem using the rules of evidence. 44 2 The Fenlon court,
on the other hand, unnecessarily ignored the unfairness concerns of
expert discovery because, unlike Healy and Granger, the ex-parte con-
tact in Fenlon was initiated after the plaintiff learned through discov-
ery of the defendant's consultation with the expert.443 An additional
distinction is that the expert in Fenlon was unwilling to testify for the
plaintiff. '4 These two facts raise the argument concerning the chil-
ling effect on potential expert witnesses that the Ager court cited as
one of the underlying concerns of Rule 26(b)(4)(B)." 5 The Fenlon
court, however, rejected the argument that the discovery rules were
applicable, and instead focused on the unfair prejudice that resulted to
the party who was denied the use of the expert's testimony." 6
In Granger, although the Arizona Supreme Court emphasized
the untimeliness of the plaintiff's objection to the defendant's use of
the expert, 447 the court nevertheless carefully examined any potential
unfairness to the plaintiff. The court enjoined defense counsel from
mentioning the previous consultation with the plaintiff, thereby
preventing the expert from receiving unwarranted accreditation at the
plaintiff's expense. 448 This restriction upon the defense counsel pre-
vented the defendant from benefitting from the plaintiff's pretrial dili-
gence, while at the same time it allowed the defendant to benefit from
the fruits of his own search for favorable expert testimony. Although
the court did not discuss the chilling effect on potential expert wit-
nesses noted in Ager,449 it should be noted that that concern was not
relevant in Granger because the ex-parte contact with the expert did
not violate the trial court's discovery orders4 0 and because the expert
voluntarily accepted employment with the opposing party.45'
contacted the expert is material to the weight and credibility of that expert's testimony, and we
think the jury should have the opportunity to consider this fact").
442. Granger, 134 Ariz. at 381-82, 656 P.2d at 1242-43. Under Rule 403 of the Arizona
Rules of Evidence and its federal counterpart, a court may exclude evidence which is unfairly
prejudicial.
443. Fenlon, 127 N.H. at 704, 506 A.2d at 320.
444. Id. at 704-05, 506 A.2d at 320-21.
445. For a discussion of the fairness doctrine, see supra notes 45-65 and accompanying text.
446. Fenlon, 127 N.H. at 705-06, 506 A.2d at 321-22.
447. Granger, 134 Ariz. 379, 382, 656 P.2d at 1239-40. The court noted that the plaintiff
had had numerous opportunities to raise an objection to the defendant's use of the expert but
had failed to do so until three days after the trial had begun. The court also noted that it
would have been impossible for the defendant to retain another expert at that late date. Id.
448. Id. at 381-82, 656 P.2d at 1242-43.
449. For a discussion of the Ager case, see supra notes 399-413 and accompanying text.
450. Granger, 134 Ariz. at 379, 656 P.2d at 1240.
451. Id.
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While the fairness concerns are certainly heightened in the analy-
sis of the availability of discovery of informally consulted experts, sit-
uations may arise in which a complete bar to discovery would deny a
party access to critical information. If only one expert had reviewed
or examined certain evidence which was later altered or destroyed,
denial of discovery because of his informal consultant status would
squarely conflict with the overriding concern for adequate trial prepa-
ration.452 Under such circumstances, a court should first determine
whether the expert is in fact an informal consultant or a retained,
non-testifying expert.453 The Ager test, particularly the second and
third factors, could be used to determine the actual status of the
expert if this scenario were to arise.45 4 These factors require the court
to look at "the nature, type and extent of information or material
provided to, or determined by, the expert" as well as the duration and
intensity of the consultation. 455  From such an analysis, the court
could determine if the party seeking discovery should be permitted to
establish the exceptional circumstances required to allow discovery.45 6
By using the multi-factor Ager test in conjunction with the excep-
tional circumstances requirement of Rule 26(b)(4)(B), the courts
should have enough flexibility to balance the underlying policy goals
of the rule when making a determination concerning discovery of
informally consulted experts.457
452. Although this scenario has not yet arisen in the reported cases, it has been
hypothesized by courts and commentators See, e.g., Nemetz v. Aye, 63 F.R.D. 66, 68 (W.D.
Pa. 1974) (noting that in the event that a claim was made that an informally consulted expert
had tampered with records while examining them, then discovery of the informal consultant's
identity would be allowed); Graham, supra note 24, at 940 n.90 (advocating that in certain
unusual circumstances, such as when the consultant is or becomes the only expert with
knowledge of certain facts, discovery should be allowed of informally consulted experts).
453. But see In re Folding Carton Litig., 83 F.R.D. 256, 259 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (holding that
an "interrogatory need not be answered for experts consulted informally but not retained or
employed by plaintiffs because the exceptional circumstances necessary for this discovery have
not been shown"); see also Graham, supra note 24, at 940.
454. See supra notes 407-08 and accompanying text.
455. Ager v. Jane C. Stormont Hospital and Training School, 622 F.2d 496, 501 (10th Cir.
1980).
456. Professor Graham proposed an amendment to Rule 26(b)(4) which would eliminate
the need for a two-step procedure in such a case. This proposal would allow discovery of
informal consultants as well as retained non-testifying experts upon a showing of exceptional
circumstances. Graham, supra note 11, at 200. Professor Graham argued that in this form
the rule would "reflect the actual practice of the discovery of expert witnesses and would also
facilitate the policies of the Federal Rules of Evidence." Id.
457. See Ager, 622 F.2d at 502. The Ager court stated that a propounding party should be
given the opportunity to request a determination of the status of an opponent's expert at an in-
camera review by the court in which the court would apply the multifactor test to the facts.
Id. For a discussion of the multifactor Ager test, see supra notes 407-08 and accompanying
text.
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B. Discovery of "In-House" and Employee Experts
Courts are split on the question whether discovery of employee
or in-house experts is limited by Rule 26(b)(4). The 1970 advisory
committee's note states that "subdivision (b)(4)(B) exclud[es] an
expert who is simply a general employee of the party not specially
employed on the case. '458 There is no dispute over the availability of
discovery, limited only by the relevancy standard of Rule 26(b)(1), for
information acquired by an in-house expert as an actor or viewer of
the occurrences which led to the lawsuit. 45 9 If an in-house expert is
"specially assigned" to a matter for trial preparation, however, courts
disagree over whether the protections of Rule 26(b)(4)(B) are avail-
able. Because the advisory committee's note is ambiguous, one may
read it as supporting either argument.460 The distinction between the
cases turns on whether the phrase "specially assigned" was intended
to be included within the provision of Rule 26(b)(4)(B) for experts
"specially employed in anticipation of litigation."'46' Absent guidance
from the Rule itself, the courts have relied on a variety of factors to
determine whether an in-house expert merits Rule 26(b)(4) status.
Two 1975 district court decisions represent the leading cases for the
opposing viewpoints on this issue.462
In the first case, Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. Sun Shipbuild-
ing & Dry Dock Co. ,463 the plaintiff, Virginia Electric, brought an
action against Sun Shipbuilding, the manufacturers of a steam genera-
458. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee's note, 48 F.R.D. 487, 504.
459. Id. at 503; see, e.g., Duke Gardens Found., Inc. v. Universal Restoration, Inc., 52
F.R.D. 365, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (party's restoration experts are not protected by Rule
26(b)(4) for information acquired as participants in events giving rise to the lawsuit).
460. Compare Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 68 F.R.D.
397, 407 (E.D. Va. 1975) (Use of the term "specially employed" in the advisory committee
note refers only to the manner in which the expert's services are obtained, that is, put on the
payroll for the specific purpose of deriving facts and opinions for trial preparation.) with
Seiffer, 69 F.R.D. at 72-73 n.3 (stating that the language of the committee note supports, by
strong negative implication, the view that an in-house expert may be "specially employed"
within the meaning of Rule 26(b)(4)(B)).
461. Compare Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co., Inc. v. Marathon Oil Co., 109 F.R.D. 12,
15 (D. Neb. 1985) (stating that Rule 26(b)(4)(B) was not intended to protect in-house experts
because the terms "retained or specially employed" do not imply the simple assignment of a
current employee to work on current litigation) and Virginia Electric, 68 F.R.D. at 407 (In-
house experts are to be treated as ordinary witnesses for purposes of discovery.) with
Philadelphia Nat'l Bank v. Dow Chem. Co., 40 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1273, 1274 (E.D. Pa. 1985)
(holding that the Rule applies to the rather unusual in-house expert who can be shown to have
been retained in anticipation of litigation) and Seiffer, 69 F.R.D. at 72 (stating that an in-house
expert may be specially employed within the meaning of the Rule).
462. Compare Virginia Electric, 68 F.R.D. at 407 (In-house experts are not protected by
Rule 26(b)(4)(B).) with Seiffer, 69 F.R.D. at 72 (Certain in-house experts are protected by Rule
26(b)(4)(B).).
463. 68 F.R.D. 397 (E.D. Va. 1975).
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tor, for breach of contract. Virginia Electric sought to compel the
production of documents which Sun Shipbuilding's employees had
prepared.464 The defendant objected to discovery on the ground that
the documents were prepared in anticipation of litigation by employ-
ees who were experts and who were thus protected by Rule
26(b)(4)(B). They further argued that the term "specially employed,"
should include the assignment of an employee expert to work on a
matter in anticipation of litigation.465 The trial court rejected this
argument reasoning that any employee, even ifqualified as an expert,
could not be considered an expert within the meaning of the Rule
because of the lack of impartiality, non-partisanship, and ability to see
both sides of an issue.466 The court defined "specially employed" as
an "expert [who] is put on the payroll for the specific purpose of
deriving facts and opinions for use in trial preparation or anticipated
litigation. '467 The court supported this view by noting that Rule
26(b)(4)(C) and the accompanying advisory committee's note, requir-
ing payment of fees and expenses to the opposing party and its experts
when further discovery is permitted, was not meant to apply to a
master-servant relationship.468 The court concluded that the Rule
would have been drafted using "specially assigned" in place of "spe-
cially employed" if it had been meant to apply to an ordinary
employee assigned for trial preparation.469
The leading case for the view that an in-house expert may be
"specially employed" and may thereby gain the limited protection of
Rule 26(b)(4)(B) is Seiffer v. Topsy's International, Inc."' Seiffer
involved a very complex securities law violation with several third
party plaintiffs and defendants.471 One of the defendant underwriters
filed a motion with the court seeking to depose one of the partners of
Touche Ross & Co., a third party defendant. The court did not allow
the discovery concluding that the in-house expert was included within
the protection of Rule 26(b)(4)(B) and that the requesting party had
failed to meet the exceptional circumstances requirement.472 It based
its decision on four factors. First, the expert was not simply a general
employee, but rather had been assigned to assist with the litigation at
the attorney's request. Second, the expert had no involvement in the
464. Id. at 399.




469. Id. at 408.
470. 69 F.R.D. 69 (D. Kan. 1975).
471. Id. at 71.
472. Id. at 72.
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audits that gave rise to the issue in the lawsuit. Third, the expert had
reviewed the audits in question and had prepared a report for the
attorneys. And fourth, the expert would not be called as a witness.
47 3
The court also noted that the parenthetical language of the advisory
committee's note supports, by strong negative implication, the view
that "an in-house expert may be specially employed as well as an
expert drawn from personnel other than the party's own. '47 4 Unlike
the Virginia Electric court, the Seiffer court discussed the underlying
policy goals which led to the 1970 amendments to Rule 26 .41 The
court noted that Rule 26(b)(4)(B) was designed to balance a party's.
need for the expert's information against allowing a party to build his
case using the opponent's experts.47 6
In Philadelphia National Bank v. Dow Chemical Co. ,41 a prod-
ucts liability action, Philadelphia National Bank sought an order
allowing discovery of an expert, a twenty-year employee of Dow
Chemical Co., "who [was] not expected to testify at trial. '4 78 Deposi-
tion testimony revealed that for the preceding five years this employee
had been exclusively assigned as an in-house non-testifying expert for
trial preparation regarding the product at issue in the lawsuit.47 9 The
court denied the discovery request, holding that Rule 26(b)(4)(B)
applied to the "unusual in-house expert who can be shown to have
been retained in anticipation of litigation.
480
Although the court's opinion lacks a thorough analysis of the
473. Id.
474. Id. at 73 n.3. The parenthetical language of the advisory committee's notes to which
the Sieffer court refers reads as follows: "Subdivision (b)(4)(B) deals with an expert who has
been retained or specially employed by a party in anticipation of litigation or preparation for
trial (thus excluding an expert who is simply a general employee of the party not specially
employed on the case) ...." 48 F.R.D. 487, 504.
475. Sieffer, 69 F.R.D. at 72.
476. Id.
477. 40 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1273 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
478. Id. at 1274.
479. Id.
480. Id. The Philadelphia National Bank court opinion cited generally to Marine
Petroleum Co. v. Champlin Petroleum Co., 641 F.2d 984 (D.C. Cir. 1979), in an apparent
reference to this quote; "the rule's tacit acknowledgement of the necessity of meticulous
preparation has equal force whether the expert is one originally and exclusively retained for
anticipated litigation or one whose employment responsibilities are expanded to encompass
consultation and advice in expectation of litigation." Marine Petroleum, 641 F.2d at 993. In
Marine Petroleum, the court had been faced with the question whether Rule 26(b)(4)(B) could
be used to shield from discovery a general consultant whose duties had been altered to those of
a trial preparation consultant. 641 F.2d at 991-92. This court held that the Rule did l5rotect
from discovery the information developed subsequent to the consultant's reassignment to trial
preparation. Id. at 991-93. It noted that to allow discovery would be at odds with the Rule's
implicit recognition that thorough trial preparation requires that any work done by non-
testifying experts be protected from discovery. Id. at 992-93. The Marine Petroleum court
DISCOVER Y OF EXPERTS
application of Rule 26(b)(4)(B) to in-house experts, the decision is
nonetheless noteworthy because it ignored the impartiality require-
ment of the Virginia Electric decision. In addition, the case is note-
worthy because it is consistent with the Seiffer holding as well as
Professor Graham's interpretation of Rule 26(b)(4)(B), which would
apply the Rule to certain in-house experts.48 ' The court was careful
to limit the protection of the Rule to the period during which the
expert was assigned to trial preparation on a full-time basis. Thus,
any facts known or opinions held prior to his assignment as a litiga-
tion expert would not be protected.48 2
In Kansas-Nebraska National Gas Co. v. Marathon Oil Co. ,483 the
trial court examined the Seiffer and the Virginia Electric cases in the
context of a request for discovery of in-house experts. Finding that
any reconciliation of these two cases would be strained at best, the
Marathon Oil court cited the Virginia Electric analysis as being more
appropriate to the facts of the case it had at hand.48 4 Nonethless, its
analysis actually encompassed elements from both cases.4 8' As in
Seiffer, the Marathon Oil in-house experts had not been actors in the
occurrences leading up to the lawsuit. The court was convinced,
nonetheless, that the ongoing matters alleged by the plaintiff could
involve these employees thereby making them actors or viewers.48 6
Unlike the Seiffer experts, the duties of the in-house experts in Mara-
thon Oil were not limited to assisting with the attorney's trial prepara-
tion.48  Finally, the Marathon Oil court embraced the Virginia
Electric court's rejection of employee assignment as being consistent
with the term "retained or specially employed," in Rule
26(b)(4)(a). 4s
An analysis of the underlying policy concerns of liberal discovery
versus fairness to the employing party is arguably the only way to
correct the ambiguities of the Rule.48 9 The Virginia Electric decision,
cited to the Seiffer case and to Professor Graham's article as support for its holding. Id. at 992
n.44 & 993 n.49.
481. Graham, supra note 24, at 942-43. According to Professor Graham, the reference in
Rule 26(b)(4)(B) and the corresponding advisory committee note to a "specially employed"
expert should be interpreted "as encompassing a regular employee of the party who is
designated and assigned by that party to apply his expertise to a particular matter in
anticipation of litigation or for trial." Id.
482. Philadelphia National Bank, 40 Fed. R. Serv. 2d at 1274.
483. 109 F.R.D. 12 (D. Neb. 1985).





489. For a discussion of how the policy concerns of Rule 26(b)(4) relate to non-testifying in-
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however, failed to address both these policy concerns. 490 Instead, the
court in Virginia Electric applied the literal dictionary definition of
the term "expert," which it thought called for a determination of the
expert's impartialty.49' It is difficult to assess if the Virginia Electric
court was correct in its application of the Rule because the facts given
in the court's opinion do not indicate the extent of the experts'
involvement in the events which gave rise to the lawsuit. The court's
.analysis, however, should not be read as the appropriate application
of the Rule to all in-house experts. As the Seiffer and Philadelphia
National Bank cases properly indicate, the determination of in-house
expert's status is a factual one which courts should make on a case-
by-case basis.
In addition, any relevant knowledge held by the employee expert
but developed or acquired prior to the assignment for trial prepara-
tion is already discoverable and is not protected under Rule
26(b)(4)(B).4 92 Forcing a distinction between in-house experts and
retained independent experts thus results in "a distinction without a
difference. '493 Furthermore, endorsing a rule which requires a party
to hire outside experts in order to gain protection under Rule
26(b)(4)(B) encourages economic waste when competent in-house
experts are available.494 Such a rule is contrary to one of the underly-
ing goals of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that they "shall be
construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action."4 95 A practical solution to this problem is to follow the
lead of Alabama and eliminate the ambiguity present in the Rule's
current formulation by adding the words "or assigned" to the text of
the Rule.496
house experts, see Pielemeier, Discovery of Non- Testifying "In-House" Experts Under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26, 58 IND. L.J. 597 (1983).
490. Nevertheless, by denying the protection of the rule, the Virginia Electric court reflected
an obvious preference for liberal discovery.
491. Virginia Electric, 68 F.R.D. at 406 (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951)).
492. See infra notes 497-542 and accompanying text.
493. Craig v. Eastern Airlines, 40 F.R.D. 508, 509 (E.D.N.Y. 1966); Pielemeier, supra note
490, at 615.
494. See Graham, supra note 24, at 943 n.199; Pielemeier, supra note 489, at 620.
495. FED. R. Civ. P. 1 (emphasis added); Pielemeier, supra note 489, at 620.
496. ALA. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B) and committee comments, Alabama Rules of Court, 85,
88 (West 1988). Alabama adopted Rule 26(b) verbatim from the Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure. It then added the words "or assigned" in order to expand the protection of the rule
to employee experts.
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VIII. DISCOVERY OF INFORMATION NOT ACQUIRED IN
ANTICIPATION OF LITIGATION
This section examines how Rule 26(b)(4) applies to experts who
have information that was not acquired in anticipation of litigation.
The first subsection contains an analysis of how the ordinary witness
doctrine has been applied by the courts to allow discovery of some
information held by non-testifying experts. In the second subsection,
some of the issues which arise when discovery is sought of experts
that are not hired by either side are discussed.
A. Occurrence Witnesses and Pre-Retention Knowledge
Rule 26(b)(4) does not protect information or opinions held by
expert witnesses or consultants unless the information or opinions
were developed or acquired in anticipation of litigation or for trial.497
The 1970 advisory committee's note to Rule 26(b) expressly states
that the Rule does not address itself to information acquired by an
expert as "an actor or viewer with respect to transactions or occur-
rences that are part of the subject matter of the lawsuit. ' 498 These
497. E.g., Marine Petroleum Co. v. Champlin Petroleum Co., 641 F.2d 984 (D.C. Cir.
1979); Eliasen v. Hamilton, 111 F.R.D. 396 (N.D. Il. 1986); Sullivan v. Sturm, Ruger & Co.,
80 F.R.D. 489 (D. Mont. 1978); Barkwell v. Sturm Ruger Co., 79 F.R.D. 444 (D. Alaska
1978); Grinnell Corp. v. Hackett, 70 F.R.D. 326 (D.R.I. 1976).
498. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee's note, 48 F.R.D. 487, 503. E.g., Sipes v.
United States, 111 F.R.D. 59, 61 (S.D. Cal. 1986) (Treating physicians who are parties to the
lawsuit may not be shielded from discovery because they are experts.); Quarantillo v.
Consolidated Rail Corp., 106 F.R.D. 435, 437 (W.D.N.Y. 1985) (The court allowed the
deposition of a neurologist who treated the plaintiff's back condition for twelve years prior to
the incident and injury at issue, and who continued treatment thereafter because he was an
actor or viewer with respect to facts obtained during the plaintiff's treatment.); Baran v.
Presbyterian Univ. Hosp., 102 F.R.D. 272, 273 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (The 1970 Advisory
Committee's comments to Rule 26(b)(4) clearly show that the drafters did not intend the rule
to be applied to a party who is an expert.); Harasimowicz v. McAllister, 78 F.R.D. 319, 320
(E.D. Pa. 1978) (The court allowed a medical examiner to be deposed as an ordinary witness
regarding the autopsy he performed on the plaintiff's decedent.); Congrove v. St. Louis-San
Fransisco Ry., 77 F.R.D. 503, 504-05 (W.D. Mo. 1978) (The plaintiff need not pay the
defendant's expert witness a fee because the expert developed his opinions while he was an
actor or viewer to occurrences that were part of the subject matter of the lawsuit.); see also
Norfin, Inc. v. International Business Machines, 74 F.R.D. 529, 532 (D. Colo. 1977) (Office
equipment collator expert in a patent infringement action could be deposed as an actor or
viewer with respect to his knowledge and experience concerning the state of the art in the area
prior to retention by plaintiff.); Rodrigues v. Hrinda, 56 F.R.D. 11, 13 (W.D. Pa. 1972) (In an
malpractice action, defendant doctors, as parties in charge of the operation which allegedly
injured the plaintiff, can be deposed as ordinary witnesses regarding their "knowledge as to
why certain things happened."); In re Brown Co. Sec. Litig., 54 F.R.D. 384 (E.D. La. 1972)
(Defendant's employees could be freely deposed as actors or viewers regarding the basis for
certain opinions which although part of the subject matter of the lawsuit, they did not develop
in anticipation of litigation or for trial.); Duke Gardens Found., Inc. v. Universal Restoration,
Inc., 52 F.R.D. 365 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (Architects hired by plaintiff prior to litigation are not
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actors or viewers are subject to discovery as ordinary witnesses. The
case law has extended this ordinary witness doctrine to allow discov-
ery of information possessed by non-testifying experts, which they did
not acquire in the role of occurrence witnesses but had acquired or
developed prior to their retention by a party to the litigation. 99
The leading case on this issue is Grinnell Corp. v. Hackett."° At
a preliminary hearing, two experts testified for Grinnell on the impact
of unemployment benefits paid to workers who were on strike against
Grinnell."' The experts had been retained by Grinnell because they
had researched and published an academic study on the general topic
prior to, and unrelated to, the lawsuit." 2 The study had been intro-
duced as evidence at thepreliminary hearing. 0 3 Several years later
and after extensive proceedings, the defendant sought discovery of the
two experts as actors in the preparation of a piece of evidence."° The
magistrate rejected this argument and found that any discovery would
need to comply with Rule 26(b)(4) 505 Discovery ultimately was
denied because the defendants could not meet the exceptional circum-
stances requirement of subsection (b)(4)(B) of the Rule.
50 6
The federal district court for Rhode Island reversed the magis-
trate's ruling because it had been based on an erroneosly narrow read-
ing of Rule 26(b)(4)(B)5 °7 The district court recognized that even
though the experts had not been actors or viewers, the information
sought had not been acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation
or for trial5 0 Conducting its own textual and policy analysis of Rule
26(b)(4), the court concluded that the discovery sought did not violate
the Rule's limitations.50 9 The textual analysis emphasized that "Rule
26(b)(4) on its face appears to curtail the discovery of experts only if
the information sought was 'acquired or developed in anticipation of
protected as trial experts by Rule 26(b)(4) and should be subject to deposition as actors or
viewers of the events at issue in the lawsuit.).
499. See cases cited supra note 497; see also Day, The Ordinary Witness Doctrine: Discovery
of the Pre-Retention Knowledge of a Nonwitness Expert Under Federal Rule 26(b)(4)(B), 38
ARK. L. REV. 763, 765 (1985) (criticizing the application of the ordinary witness doctrine for
pre-retention knowledge and suggesting that the exceptional circumstances test is more
consistent with the underlying policies of the discovery of nontestifying experts).
500. 70 F.R.D. 326 (D.R.I. 1976).
501. Id. at 329.
502. Id. The study was conducted and published as a Master's Degree thesis at the
University of Pennsylvania. Id.
503. Id.
504. Id.
505. Id. at 331.
506. Id. at 329.
507. Id. at 331.




litigation or for trial.' "510 The court found this textual exegesis to be
reinforced by the fact that the expert witness discovery rule was
placed within Rule 26. In fact, the heading of Rule 26(b)(4) is "Trial
Preparation," which indicated to the court that subsection (b)(4) was
intended to limit the broad discovery range of subsection (b)(1) only
for expert information obtained "for the very purpose of preparing for
the litigation in question.
511
The Grinnell court also found that this reading of Rule 26(b)(4)
was consistent with two of the underlying policies of the federal dis-
covery rules. First, allowing discovery in the case was consistent with
the liberal discovery policy embodied in the rules that seeks to allow
the parties "to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and
facts before trial. ' ' 51 2 Second, the court argued that its interpretation
does not offend the fairness doctrine embodied in the 1970 amend-
ments to Rule 26(b)(4) because Grinnell had not paid the experts to
conduct or write the study. Thus, the choice of the topic by the
experts was not a product of Grinnell's diligence.513
The ordinary witness doctrine of Grinnell was later applied to
non-testifying experts in Barkwell v. Sturm Ruger Co. 514 and Sullivan
v. Sturm, Ruger & Co. 5 5 In both cases, the plaintiffs were suing a gun
manufacturer for injury and death caused by faulty safety mecha-
nisms on weapons the defendants had manufactured. 1 6 In both
cases, the plaintiffs attempted to depose the defendant's non-testifying
expert, Hillberg, who had done extensive historical research on gun
safety mechanisms while employed by Sturm Ruger prior to any liti-
gation.5 17 At one point, Hillberg, on his own initiative, sought
employment as an expert witness with the attorney who eventually
represented the plaintiff in the Barkwell case.5" 8 After having worked
on several other cases as a plaintiff's expert, Hillberg was rehired by
Sturm Ruger as a non-testifying expert in Barkwell51 9 Sturm Ruger
argued that the plaintiff must establish exceptional circumstances
prior to any discovery of Hillberg.520 The federal district court in
Alaska found that the plaintiff in Barkwell had failed to establish
510. Id.
511. Id.
512. Id. (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947)).
513. Id. at 333.
514. 79 F.R.D. 444 (D. Alaska 1978).
515. 80 F.R.D. 489 (D. Mont. 1978).
516. Id. at 490; Barkwell, 79 F.R.D. at 445.
517. Sullivan, 80 F.R.D. at 490; Barkwell, 79 F.R.D. at 445.
518. Barkwell, 79 F.R.D. at 445.
519. Id.
520. Id. at 446.
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exceptional circumstances.5 2' The protections of Rule 26(b)(4)(B),
however, were only applicable to information or opinions which had
been developed in anticipation of litigation.5 22 Therefore, the Bark-
well court subjected Hillberg to discovery as an ordinary witness on
any information and opinions he had held prior to this particular
litigation.-
23
In the Sullivan case, Sturm Ruger once again sought to deny dis-
covery of Hillberg as a non-testifying expert.5 24 Sturm Ruger argued
that because Hillberg was employed by it prior to his retention as a
plaintiff's expert in unrelated cases, and was under its employ once
again for this case, that employment should "bracket" the entire time
period, thus, entitling Hillberg to the full protection of Rule
26(b)(4)(B).5 25 The federal district court in Montana agreed that
exceptional circumstances had not been established in this case, and
thus any information developed by Hillberg subsequent to his reten-
tion for this trial was protected from discovery.5 26 Citing to the
rationale of the Grinnell and Barkwell courts, however, the Sullivan
court held that Hillberg was subject to discovery as an ordinary wit-
ness for knowledge, opinions and materials he had acquired or devel-
oped prior to his second term of employment with Sturm Ruger.
5 27
Professor Day has critized the manner in which the Grinnell
court and others have applied the ordinary witness doctrine for pre-
retention information held by non-testifying experts.5 28 He has con-
cluded that neither the text of Rule 26(b)(4)(B), nor the cases inter-
preting the rule, can justify the limitation of the Rule's protection in
this way.5 29 He has further argued that the courts have used faulty
reasoning and that each case should have been decided on "less
expansive grounds." 3 ' One of Professor Day's primary concerns is




524. Sullivan, 80 F.R.D. at 490.
525. Id.
526. Id.
527. Id. at 490-91.
528. Day, supra note 500, at 781-87.
529. Id. at 801.
530. Id. Professor Day suggested that the Grinnell court could have reached the same
result either by using a waiver theory (that plaintiff waived 26(b)(4)(B) protection by
introducing the report into the record) or by finding that the plaintiff's hiring of the experts
was an attempt to shield the experts and their reports from discovery thereby constituting
exceptional circumstances. Id. at 783. Professor Day argued that the Barkwell and Sullivan
courts also could have found that exceptional circumstances existed because the defendant was
attempting to suppress otherwise relevant information by retaining Hillberg. Id. at 786.
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from post-retention knowledge, therefore, creating the potential that
the witness may inadvertently reveal the latter during discovery. 53I
The result could be abusive discovery practices, attempts by a party to
get a 'free ride' on an opponent's expert, or violations of the other
policy concerns which led to the 1970 amendments to Rule
26(b)(4).5 32 Professor Day, therefore, suggests that the exceptional
circumstances test of subsection (b)(4)(B) of the Rule be applied to
pre-retention knowledge held by non-testifying experts. 533
In the recent case of Eliasen v. Hamilton, 534 the defendant in a
securities action sought discovery of plaintiff's non-testifying expert.
The non-testifying expert had prepared a report to be used by the
plaintiff's testifying expert for trial preparation.5 35 The report had
already been produced by the plaintiff, but the defendant sought dis-
covery of the expert who had prepared it.536 The Eliasen court denied
the defendant's motion to depose the expert regarding any work he
had done for this plaintiff.53 7 The court, however, ruled that the
defendant could depose the expert regarding information acquired or
opinions formed prior to his employment by the plaintiff.5 38 Thus, the
defendant could question the expert about the methodology he used in
preparing reports prior to his retention by the plaintiff, but no ques-
tions could be asked about the preparation of plaintiff's report.53 9
The court recognized that the difficulty in distiguishing between pre-
retention and post-retention facts and opinions may give rise to prac-
tical problems, particularly in a case such as the one at hand, which
had had a long history of discovery disputes. 540 The Eliasen court,
however, held that in spite of possible difficulties "there could be no
justification for barring testimony concerning facts and opinions not
developed in connection with the particular case." 54' It emphasized
that this interpretation of Rule 26(b)(4) appears to be the only way to
531. Id. at 775-76, 797.
532. Id. at 792-99.
533. Id. at 801. Professor Day also suggested that a broad application of the exceptional
circumstances test would prevent a party from using the limited immunity of Rule 26(b)(4)(B)
to suppress occurrence testimony. He maintained that this solution would encompass the
concerns that led courts to extend the ordinary witness doctrine to nonwitness experts and
would be consistent with the policy concerns which led to the creation of limited immunity for
such experts. Id. at 800.
534. 111 F.R.D. 396 (N.D. Il1. 1986).
535. Id. at 397.
536. Id. at 397-98.
537. Id. at 402.
538. Id. at 403.
539. Id.
540. Id. at 403-04 n.9.
541. Id. at 403.
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prevent a party from hiring an expert for the sole purpose of buying
out his expertise in order to prevent the opponent from hiring that
expert.
542
B. Pure Experts (Experts Not Retained by Either Party)
A pure expert is one who has not been retained by any party to
the lawsuit. 543 The pure expert's knowledge or opinion is not acquired
or formed in anticipation of litigation.5 " A party to a lawsuit typi-
cally seeks discovery of a pure expert because the expert may have
published a report or study which could be relied upon at trial by an
opponent's expert witness. 545  Because pure experts are outside the
protective ambit of Rule 26(b)(4),5 46 they are subject to discovery pur-
suant to the broad scope of Rule 26(b)(1). 54 7 In addition, federal
courts have the power to compel testimony from pure experts.548
This apparent double standard within Rule 26(b) has raised concerns
of unfairness regarding the lack of protection for pure experts.5 49 Dis-
covery matters, however, are left to the discretion of the trial court
judge,550 who may use other provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil




543. Maurer, supra note 248, at 94.104; Graham, supra note 24, at 934-38.
544. Maurer, supra note 248, at 95; Graham, supra note 24, at 936.
545. Maurer, supra note 248, at 94-95.
546. E.g., Wright v. Jeep Corp., 547 F. Supp. 871, 874 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
547. See, e.g., Deitchman v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 740 F.2d 556, 559 (7th Cir. 1984);
Farnsworth v. Procter & Gamble Co., 101 F.R.D. 355, 357 (N.D. Ga. 1984); Wright, 547 F.
Supp. at 874.
548. Kaufman v. Edelstein, 539 F.2d 811 (2d Cir. 1976); Carter-Wallace, Inc., v. Otte, 474
F.2d 529 (2d Cir. 1972); Wright v. Jeep Corp., 547 F. Supp. 871 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
549. Note, Discovery and Testimony of Unretained Experts: Creating a Clear and Equitable
Standard to Govern Compliance with Subpoenas, 1987 DUKE L.J. 140, 146.
550. See, e.g., Farnsworth v. Procter & Gamble Co., 758 F.2d 1545, 1547 (1 1th Cir. 1985);
Richards of Rockford, Inc., v. Pacific Gas & Elec., 71 F.R.D. 388, 389 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
551. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c) (A court may issue protective orders limiting discovery on a
showing of good cause or as justice may require.); FED. R. Civ. P. 45(b)(1) (A court may
modify or quash a subpoena if it is unreasonable or oppressive.); FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (A
court may limit discovery, on its own or upon motion under Rule 26(c), if the discovery is
unreasonably cumulative or duplicative or if the information is available from another source
that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive, etc.).
552. See, e.g., Farnsworth v. Procter & Gamble, Co., 758 F.2d 1545 (11th Cir. 1985) (The
district court acted within its discretionary power in modifying a subpoena on nonparty
medical' researchers in order to protect the confidentiality of general public volunteer
participants in the research project.); Buchanan v. American Motors Corp., 697 F.2d 151 (6th
Cir. 1983) (The court found no error in the district court's quashing of a subpoena duces
tecum that was unreasonably burdensome on a nonparty expert.); In re Snyder, 115 F.R.D.
211 (D. Ariz. 1987) (The district court quashed a subpoena duces tecum served on a nonparty
expert because it was excessively burdensome.); Richards of Rockford, Inc., v. Pacific Gas &
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Two Second Circuit cases established the Federal Court's power
to compel an unretained expert witness to respond to a subpoena. In
Carter- Wallace, Inc. v. Otte,5" a patent infringement action, the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had to decide whether the
testimony of expert witnesses taken in a prior action could be admit-
ted into the record as evidence against Carter-Wallace. 554 The court
held that the expert's prior testimony was admissible in view of the
court's power to compel an expert to testify to any previously formed
opinions.55
In Kaufman v. Edelstein,56 the Second Circuit, citing Carter-
Wallace, upheld a district court order compelling two experts to tes-
tify to previously formed opinions.5 7 The Second Circuit refused to
quash the subpoenas for the following reasons:5 58 First, the court
noted the presumption that the public is entitled to every person's
evidence. Second, the court noted the absence of any constitutional or
federal statutory privilege that protects an expert's testimony; that is,
an expert does not have a property right to his knowledge. And third,
the court noted that the proponent is not required to prove that a
voluntary expert of equal qualification cannot be found. Despite its
refusal to quash the subpoenas, the court recognized several concerns
that might cause a court to quash or modify a subpoena. 559  For
instance, the expert may argue that the subpoena is overly burden-
some if the expert witness has often been summoned as an involuntary
witness, or when the expert can demonstrate reasons for not testifying
which outweigh the proponent's need for the evidence.56
Dr. Richard G. Snyder is an example of a pure expert who fits
the Kaufman example of good cause. Dr. Snyder is a co-author of a
vehicle safety study prepared by a research institute at the University
of Michigan. The report was critical of the Jeep, an all-terrain vehicle
manufactured by American Motors Corporation (AMC).5 6 ' In at
least three lawsuits subsequent to the report's publication, AMC has
Elec., 71 F.R.D. 388 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (The district court quashed a subpoena served on a
nonparty academic researcher after finding that the research participant's interest in
confidentiality outweighed the litigant's need for the information.).
553. 474 F.2d 529 (2d Cir. 1972).
554. Id. at 535.
555. Id. at 535-38.
556. 539 F.2d 811 (2d Cir. 1976).
557. Id. at 817-18.
558. Id. at 820-21.
559. Id. at 818-21.
560. Id. at 821.
561. Wright v. Jeep Corp., 547 F. Supp. 871, 873 (E.D. Mich. 1982). Dr. Snyder was a
professor and research scientist at the Highway Safety Institute of the University of Michigan
and in that capacity co-authored a report, "On-Road Crash Experience of Utility Vehicles" for
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sought to compel discovery of Dr. Snyder and his research materials
in order to prepare for any of the plaintiff's trial experts who might
rely on Dr. Snyder's report. 562 In Buchanan v. American Motors
Corp.,56 3 the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit relied on Kauf-
man to uphold the district court's quashing of the discovery subpoena
served on Dr. Snyder.516 The Sixth Circuit found the subpoena to be
burdensome on a person who is a stranger to the litigation.
561
In Wright v. Jeep Corp.,566 on the other hand, a separate litiga-
tion in which a similar subpoena was served on Dr. Snyder, the fed-
eral district court for the Eastern District of Michigan refused to
quash the subpoena. 67 The district court found that because Dr.
Snyder's report was not prepared in anticipation of litigation, it did
not fit within Rule 26(b)(4) and, therefore, the relevant material could
be compelled under Rule 26(b)(1).5 68 In addition, the district court
also ruled that Dr. Snyder had no first amendment or common law
academic privilege; that the documents sought were not confidential;
and that the potential chilling effect of the discovery on Dr. Snyder,
or other researchers, was not sufficient to outweigh the needs of the
justice system to use basic research information. 69 The federal dis-
trict court did, however, respond to Dr. Snyder's claim that the dis-
covery was burdensome and ordered the payment of a reasonable fee
that included a professional fee, the cost of supplying the documents,
remuneration for the inconvenience, and if appropriate, a portion of
the expenses of the original research.5 70 The court also left open other
measures as necessary to relieve any further burden on Dr. Snyder.
In re Snyder17 1 marks the most recent encounter between Dr.
Snyder and AMC. In this case, the federal district court in Arizona
agreed with the Buchanan decision and quashed the subpoena for
the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety. The report concluded that the Jeep CJ-5 had a
disproportionately high roll-over rate in accidents.
562. Buchanan v. American Motors Corp., 697 F.2d 151 (6th Cir. 1983); Wright v. Jeep
Corp., 547 F. Supp. 871 (E.D. Mich. 1982); In re Snyder, 115 F.R.D. 211 (D. Ariz. 1987).
563. 697 F.2d 151 (6th Cir. 1983).
564. Id. at 152.
565. Id. ("Compliance with the subpoena would require the expert who has no direct
connection with the litigation to spend many days testifying and disclosing all of the raw data,
including thousands of documents, accumulated over the course of a long and detailed
research study.").
566. 547 F. Supp. 871 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
567. Id.
568. Id. at 874.
569. Id. at 874-76.
570. Id. at 877.
571. 115 F.R.D. 211 (D. Ariz. 1987).
1180
DISCO VER Y OF EXPERTS
being overly burdensome.572 The court noted that the number of
"legal skirmishes" imposed on Dr. Snyder by AMC might, by them-
selves, suffice to establish the excessive burden suffered by Dr. Snyder
due to the legal expenses incurred and the personal disruption
required of Dr. Snyder to respond to the subpoenas.57 3 In its analysis,
the court expressed particular concern over the potential chilling
effect that overly broad discovery orders may have on academic
research. 74 The court concluded that the adversarial process of the
judicial system was not the appropriate forum to test the validity or
acceptability of the opinions formed and expressed in the context of
other disciplines. 57 5 Such research provides great benefits to society,
and courts must protect the research from the potential disincentives
that the discovery process may inflict.576
Courts have also quashed or modified discovery subpoenas to
nonparty research groups in order to reduce the impact of judicial
interference on academic and medical research, particularly when
confidential information gathered from the public was involved, 577 or
when the research had not yet ,been completed. 7 8 In Farnsworth v.
Procter and Gamble Co.,5 79 a products liability case, the defendant, a
tampon manufacturer, served a subpoena on the Center for Disease
Control, a nonparty, seeking the names and addresses of women who
had participated in the toxic shock syndrome research. 580 In response
to the subpoena, the Center turned over numerous documents but
sought cburt protection for the identities of the participants.
5 81
Although the participants had never been guaranteed anonymity, the
Center argued that disclosure of the very personal and "potentially
embarrassing information would inhibit future studies by causing the
public to fear disclosure of personal information. ' 582 Based on Rule
26(c), which allows a court, when good cause is shown, to issue any'
order which justice requires to protect any party or person from
undue burden or expense,183 the trial court granted a protective order
denying the defendant access to the identities of the research partici-
572. Id. at 214.
573. Id.
574. Id. at 215.
575. Id. at 215-16.
576. Id. at 216.
577. E.g., Farnsworth v. Procter & Gamble Co., 758 F.2d 1545 (11th Cir. 1985).
578. E.g., Deitchman v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, 740 F.2d 556 (7th Cir. 1984).
579. 758 F.2d 1545 (11th Cir. 1985).
580. Id. at 1546.
581. Id.
582. Id.
583. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
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pants.5 8 4 The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
trial court's protective order and agreed that the defendant's need for
the identities of the research participants was outweighed by the
potential negative effect that disclosure might have on the beneficial
public health studies that the Center for Disease Control conducts.58 5
Therefore, in determining when to invoke the good cause standard of
the rule, courts have balanced the litigant's need for the information
against the burdens imposed on the party resisting discovery.
8 6
In Dow Chemical Co. v. Allen,5"7 the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit affirmed a district court's quashing of a subpoena
issued on an on-going university research group that was studying the
detrimental effects of certain herbicides on animals.588 The Environ-
mental Protection Agency had threatened to cancel a herbicide con-
tract with Dow Chemical Co., in part, because of adverse findings
included in a preliminary report of the university study.589 The uni-
versity research group objected to discovery because the project had
not yet been completed, and premature exposure of the study's infor-
mation could seriously impair its success.5 90 Employing the balancing
test, the court found that Dow Chemical's need for the information
was minimal compared to the burdens that premature exposure of the
study would impose on the project and its researchers.5 9'
In spite of these discretionary controls, the fairness concerns that
are discussed in the Dow Chemical, Farnsworth, and In re Snyder
cases have led to proposals to change Rules 26 and 45 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure so that they may offer more protection than
they presently do.5 92 Some state courts have gone further and have
584. Farnsworth, 758 F.2d at 1547.
585. Id. at 1547.
586. E.g., Farnsworth, 758 F.2d at 1547; Deitchman v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 740 F.2d
556, 559 (7th Cir. 1984); Dow Chem. Co. v. Allen, 672 F.2d 1262, 1268 (7th Cir. 1982).
587. 672 F.2d 1262 (7th Cir. 1982).
588. Id. at 1266.
589. Id.
590. Id. at 1273.
591. Id. at 1272-74. The court accepted the following factors as clearly supporting the need
to quash the subpoena:
[Tihat public access to the research data would make the studies an unacceptable
basis for scientific papers; that peer review and publication of the studies was
crucial to the researchers' credibility and careers and would be precluded by
whole or partial public disclosure of the information; that loss of the opportunity
to publish would severely decrease the researchers' professional opportunities in
the future; and that even inadvertent disclosure of the information would risk
total destruction of months or years of research.
Id. at 1273.
592. See Note, supra note 549, at 142, 152, 154. The author discusses, and ultimately
rejects as inadequate, the 1985 ABA House of Delegates' recommendations to amend Rule 45
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adopted an expert privilege that precludes any compelled discovery or
testimony of pure experts.5 93 Such an absolute expert privilege, how-
ever, has been unequivocally rejected by the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,594 and by the federal
courts.5 95 The better approach is to continue to use the balancing test
in conjunction with the other discretionary powers available to the
trial courts, such as ordering the payment of reasonable costs and fees
to pure experts that they may incur in responding to burdensome sub-
poenas. 596 By allowing the court to weigh the competing interests of
both the litigant and the pure expert, the balancing test should lead to
more consistent and socially desirable discovery decisions.
IX. CONCLUSION
The adoption of Rule 26(b)(4) has helped to eliminate many of
the inconsistencies in the discovery of expert information which
existed prior to 1970. For the most part, courts have interpreted the
Rule in a manner which promotes the purposes for which it was
adopted. The increasingly liberal posture taken by courts in permit-
ting the discovery of experts expected to testify reflects a deep concern
on the part of the courts for allowing attorneys to prepare for the
effective cross-examination of experts at trial. The similar concern
courts have shown for protecting non-testifying experts from discov-
ery has helped to promote the use of experts in consultative, non-
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in order to give nonparty witnesses greater protection.
The author suggests that the appropriate solution would be to extend the qualified immunity of
the work-product doctrine to the work of nonparty experts.
593. E.g., Commonwealth v. Vitello, 367 Mass. 224, 235, 327 N.E.2d 819, 827 (1975);
People ex rel. Kraushaar Bros. & Co. v. Thorpe, 296 N.Y. 223, 225, 72 N.E.2d 165, 166
(1947). See generally Annot., Right of Independent Expert to Refuse to Testify as to Expert
Opinion, 50 A.L.R. 4th 661, 680 (1986) (discussing state and federal cases regarding nonparty
experts But see Note, supra note 549, at 154 (rejecting the absolute privilege for nonparty
experts on public policy grounds).
594. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee's note, 48 F.R.D. 487, 504-05 ("These
new provisions of subdivision (b)(4) repudiate the few decisions that have held an expert's
information privileged simply because of his status as an expert.").
595. See, e.g., Kaufman v. Edelstein, 539 F.2d 811, 820 (2d Cir. 1976) (Rule 501 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence does not recognize any general privilege for experts.); Wright v.
Jeep Corp., 547 F. Supp. 871, 875 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (refusing to create a new privilege that
would shield academics from testifying); In re Snyder 115 F.R.D. 211, 213 (D. Ariz. 1987)
(same). But see Deitchman v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 740 F.2d 556, 561 (7th Cir. 1984)
(Even though an academic medical research study of great public interest may enjoy a
qualified privilege, a party seeking discovery could overcome this privilege by a showing of
absolute necessity.).
596. See, e.g., Wright v. Jeep Corp., 547 F. Supp. 871, 877 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (Researchers
who may be required to testify involuntarily should be paid a reasonable fee, including a
professional fee, remuneration for the cost of supplying the documents, for their inconvenience
and, if necessary, for a portion of the expenses of the original report.).
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testimonial roles in litigation, while effectively addressing the fear that
one party might unduly benefit from the efforts of its opponent. Nev-
ertheless, despite the uniformity that the Rule has helped to bring
about, there remains unresolved ambiguities concerning the Rule's
application. This Comment examined the Rule in its entirety while
identifying and discussing a broad range of issues and ambiguities that
have arisen under the Rule.
In respect to testifying experts, court decisions have evinced a
trend toward routinely permitting the discovering party to obtain dis-
covery beyond the use of interrogatories. In light of this trend, it is
questionable whether the two-step procedure mandated by Rule
26(b)(4)(A), whereby a party must first propound interrogatories to
the expert and then make a motion to the court for additional discov-
ery, serves any purpose. By amending the Rule to eliminate the
requirement of a motion to the court before proceeding with addi-
tional discovery, the rules would more accurately reflect the actual
practices of attorneys in exchanging expert information.
Court decisions have also evidenced a general acceptance of Pro-
fessor Graham's suggestion that the reports of testifying experts be
discoverable without any limitation based on the work-product doc-
trine. In many cases, by providing for liberal access to the reports of
testifying experts, parties will be able to forego the use of expensive
depositions, thus making discovery more cost effective.
The Rule might still be amended to deal more directly with the
problem of evasive discovery practices. In permitting the discovery of
the drafts of expert reports, courts have found one method for
preventing evasiveness in responding to discovery requests. Similarly,
by limiting parties to the fair scope of the information that they
divulge during discovery, courts will take away the incentive for reti-
cent responses to requests for discovery.
The paramount policy goal underlying section (B) of Rule
26(b)(4) is to protect the diligent pretrial preparation of a party by
allowing discovery of non-testifying experts only under exceptional
circumstances. Exceptional circumstances exist only when a party
cannot gain access to the information in question by any other means.
Such circumstances have been found to exist when a party could
either obtain the information only through the expense of an inordi-
nate amount of time, money, and other resources, or when the object
or location in question has been altered or destroyed, thereby making
it impossible to have a new expert examine it to render an opinion.
Courts remain split on the question whether a party must show
exceptional circumstances before being allowed to discover the names
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of an opponent's non-testifying experts. An examination of the rela-
tionship between Rules 26(b)(4) and 26(b)(1), supports the notion
that exceptional circumstances should be shown for such discovery in
order to shield non-testifying experts from discovery in furtherance of
the policy objectives of the Rules.
The limited immunity available under section (B) should not be
available, however, to any information that is used by a testifying
expert during his trial preparation. Courts have held that information
developed by a non-testifying expert and presented to a testifying
expert to be used as the basis of his testimony should be discoverable
to the same extent as any other materials relied upon by the testifying
expert. Therefore, an attorney should assume that any information or
document given to a testifying expert is fair game for discovery. This
includes reports prepared by non-testifying experts as well as informa-
tion and documents which may have, in years past, been protected
from discovery by the work-product rule.
Informally consulted experts are completely protected from dis-
covery. One of the concerns which led to this greater protection is
that discovery of these experts might lead to a reluctance by consul-
tants to render assistance to attorneys for fear that any consultation
would subject them to unwanted discovery procedures or court
appearances. Because of this heightened protection, it is imperative
that such experts are properly identified so that a party may not be
unfairly deprived of relevant information which only that expert may
hold. Recent case law has developed a multifactor test that courts
should adopt to determine the status of an expert to avoid unwar-
ranted protection from discovery.
Another issue which raises the unfairness concerns of Rule
26(b)(4)(B) is ex-parte contacts between informal consultants and the
opposing party's counsel. When such contacts occur in violation of a
court's pretrial discovery order sanctions are appropriately imposed.
However, when such contacts occur inadvertantly, courts should look
at this scenario on a case-by-case basis to determine if the spirit of the
discovery rules will be violated by allowing an attorney to adopt his
adversary's expert.
Whether in-house experts should receive protection under Rule
26(b)(4)(B) remains an open question. Some courts have decided that
the Rule is just not applicable to such experts. The better view is that
the Rule may be applicable and that a court should examine each case
on its own merits.
The final portion of this Comment examined the expert informa-
tion that is outside of the protection of Rule 26(b)(4). Any informa-
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tion developed or acquired outside of trial preparation falls outside
the scope of the Rule. This includes information acquired by an
expert as an actor or viewer to an occurrence at issue in the lawsuit.
It also means that a non-testifying expert will not be protected from
discovery concerning information developed or acquired prior to
being retained for trial preparation. The rationale behind this rule is
that the limited immunity of Rule 26(b)(4)(B) should not be used to
allow a party to buy up unfavorable opinions and that the courts have
the power to compel any expert to testify to previously held opinions.
Experts that have not been hired by either party are outside of
the Rule's protection as their information was not acquired or devel-
oped in anticipation of litigation. The courts as well as the Federal
Rules of Evidence and Procedure have refused to recognize any privi-
lege which would exempt these pure experts from discovery.
Although these experts are essentially viewed as ordinary witnesses
who have relevant information and, as such, may be compelled to
submit to discovery, many courts have properly recognized that these
experts are not ordinary witnesses. The courts have developed a bal-
ancing test to determine whether the need for the expert's information
is justified in light of the burden imposed on the expert by the discov-
ery request. While this balancing test does not offer the protection
from the judicial system that many pure experts would prefer, many
of the court opinions which have applied it offer examples of how
sensitive the courts can be to the plight of these experts in light of the
litigant's need for the evidence.
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